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This dissertation investigates the consequences of fractional dynamics for
political modeling.  Using Monte Carlo analyses, Chapters II and III investigate
the threats to statistical inference posed by including fractionally integrated
variables in bivariate and multivariate regressions.  Fractional differencing is the
most appropriate tool to guard against spurious regressions and other threats to
inference.  Using fractional differencing, multivariate models of British politics are
developed in Chapter IV to compare competing theories regarding which
subjective measure of economic evaluations best predicts support levels for the
governing party; egocentric measures outperform sociotropic measures.  The
concept of fractional cointegration is discussed and the value of fractionally
integrated error correction mechanisms are both discussed and demonstrated in
models of Conservative party support.  In Chapter V models of presidential
approval in the United States are reconfigured in light of the possibilities of
fractionally integrated variables.  In both the British and American case
accounting for the fractional character of all variables allows the development of













A History of Time Series and Popularity Functions
Time Series Methodology and Fractional Dynamics
Fractional Diffferencing
The Origins of Fractional Dynamics
Organization of the Study
II. FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED TIME SERIES IN BIVARIATE 
REGRESSIONS: A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS.....................................22
Introduction
Monte Carlo Simulations: Method and Control Simulation
Bivariate Simulations: The Case of Under-Differencing
The Case of Over-Differencing: Analytical Results
Bivariate Simulations: The Case of Over-Differencing
Conclusion
III. FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED TIME SERIES IN MULTIVARIATE 
REGRESSIONS: A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS.....................................49
Introduction
Monte Carlo Simulations: Method and Control Simulation
Multivariate Simulations: The Case of Under-Differencing
Multivariate Simulations: The Case of Over-Differencing
Conclusion
IV. FRACTIONAL COINTEGRATION AND MODELS OF GOVERNING PARTY 
SUPPORT IN GREAT BRITAIN...............................................................67
Introduction
iv
Prospections, Retrospections and Prime Ministerial Approval
Fractional Dynamics and the British Case
Data, Tests of Stationarity, and Point Estimates of d
Fractional Cointegration and Error Correction Models
Multivariate Models of Conservative Party Support
Conclusions
V. FRACTIONAL INTEGRATION AND MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
APPROVAL IN THE UNITED STATES....................................................94
Introduction
Peasants, Bankers, and Presidential Approval
Fractional Dynamics and the American Case
Data, Tests of Stationarity, and Point Estimates of d
Tests for Fractional Cointegration
Multivariate Models of Presidential Approval
Conclusions










2.1 Summary Statistics for Control Simulation.............................................134
2.2 Simulation 1: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y...............................135
2.3 Simulation 2: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y...............................136
2.4 Untransformed Fractionally Integrated Variables: Type I Errors by d 
 Values of X and Y, N=100.....................................................................137
2.5 Simulation 2: Standard Errors by d Values of X and Y...........................138
2.6 Simulation 2: Absolute Value of Coefficients by d Values of X and Y....139
2.7 Simulation 4: Durbin-Watson Values by d Values of X and Y................140
2.8 Simulation 4A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter’s
 Absolute t-statistic > 1.96 by d Values of X and Y.................................141
2.9 Simulation 4A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter
 was Invertible by d Values of X and Y...................................................142
2.10 Simulation 4A: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y.............................143
2.11 Simulation 4A: Average R-Square by d Values of X and Y....................144
2.12 Simulation 6: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y...............................145
2.13 Simulation 6: Standard Errors by d Values of X and Y...........................146
2.14 Simulation 6: Absolute X-Coefficients by d Values of X and Y...............147
2.15 Simulation 6A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter’s
 Absolute t-statistic > 1.96 by d Values of X and Y.................................148
2.16 Simulation 6A: Average Value of Standard Errors for
 Moving-Average Parameters by d Values of X and Y...........................149
2.17 Simulation 6A: Average Absolute Value of Moving-Average
 Parameter’s Coefficient by d Values of X and Y...................................150
2.18 Simulation 6A: Moving-Average Parameter’s Average 
 Absolute t-statistic by d Values of X and Y............................................151
2.19 Simulation 6A: Average R-Square by d Values of X and Y....................152
2.20 Simulation 6A: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y.............................153
2.21 Simulation 6B: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y.............................154
2.22 Simulation 6B: Type I Errors for Autoregressive Parameter
 by d Values of X and Y..........................................................................155
2.23 Simulations 6C, 6D, 6, 6E, & 6F: Standard Errors by d Values
 of Y and Sample Size............................................................................156
3.1 Summary Statistics for Control Simulation.............................................157
3.2 Simulation 1: Type I Errors for X by d Values of X and W,
 N=1,000,000..........................................................................................158
3.3 Simulation 1: Type I Errors for W by d Values of X and W,
 N=1,000,000..........................................................................................159
vi
3.4 Simulation 1: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................160
3.5 Simulation 1: Average Value of X’s Coefficient by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................161
3.6 Simulation 1: Average Standard Error for X by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................162
3.7 Simulation 2: Average Absolute Value of X’s Coefficient by
 d Values of X and W.............................................................................163
3.8 Simulation 2: Average Standard Error for X by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................164
3.9 Simulation 3: Type I Errors for W by d Values of X and W,
 N=1,000,000..........................................................................................165
3.10 Simulation 3: Average Absolute Value of W’s Coefficient by
 d Values of X and W.............................................................................166
3.11 Simulation 3: Average Standard Error for W by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................167
3.12 Simulation 4: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................168
3.13 Simulation 4: Average Absolute Value of X’s Coefficient by
 d Values of X and W.............................................................................169
3.14 Simulation 4: Average Standard Error for X by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................170
3.15 Simulation 5: Type I Errors for W by d Values of X and W,
 N=1,000,000..........................................................................................171
3.16 Simulation 5: Type I Errors for W by d Values of X and W
 where d(Y)=0.7, N=1,000,000...............................................................172
3.17 Simulation 5: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d Values
 of X and W............................................................................................173
4.1 Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller Results..............................174
4.2 Variance Ratio Test Results...................................................................175
4.3 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept (0 ).....................................176µ
4.4 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept and Linear
 Time Trend (0 )......................................................................................177
J
4.5 Summary of Stationarity Tests...............................................................178
4.6 Estimates of d Based on Robinson’s and Sowell’s Procedures.............179
4.7 Governing Party Support - Multivariate ARFIMA Models........................180
4.8 Personal Expectations Models - Various Specifications.........................181
4.9 The J-Test for Encompassing - Personal Expectations vs.
 Retrospections......................................................................................182
4.10 The J-Test for Encompassing - Personal Expectations vs.
 Retrospections, One-Step Error Correction Model................................183
4.11 The J-Test for Encompassing - Model with Fractionally Differenced
 Error Correction Mechanism vs. Model with Level-Form Error
 Correction Mechanism...........................................................................184
vii
5.1 Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller Results..............................185
5.2 Variance Ratio Test Results...................................................................186
5.3 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept (0 ).....................................187µ
5.4 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept and Linear Time
 Trend (0 )...............................................................................................188
J
5.5 Summary of Stationarity Tests...............................................................189
5.6 Estimates of d Based on Robinson’s and Sowell’s Procedures.............190
5.7 Stationarity Tests for the Residuals of Cointegrating Regressions
 with Presidential Approval (d=.94 (s.e.=.056)).......................................191
5.8 Presidential Approval - Multivariate ARFIMA Models.............................192
5.9 National Prospections Models - Various Specifications..........................193
5.10 The J-Test for Encompassing - National Expectations vs. Personal 
Expectations...........................................................................................194
5.11 The J-Test for Encompassing - National Expectations vs. National 
Retrospections.......................................................................................195
5.12 The J-Test for Encompassing - Wholly Differenced Interventions




1.1 A Stationary Series, d=0.........................................................................198
1.2 A Fractionally Integrated Series, d=0.25................................................199
1.3 A Fractionally Integrated Series, d=0.5..................................................200
1.4 A Fractionally Integrated Series, d=0.75................................................201
1.5 A Unit-Root Series..................................................................................202
2.1 Simulation 2: Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Average
 Absolute T-Stats....................................................................................203
2.2 Simulation 2: Standard Errors................................................................204
2.3 Simulation 4A: Durbin-Watson Values...................................................205
2.4 Simulation 6: Durbin-Watson Values......................................................206
2.4 Simulation 6A: Durbin-Watson Statistics................................................207
4.1 Governing Party Support and PM Approval, 1979-1996........................208
4.2 Autocorrelations of Error Correction Mechanism....................................209
4.3 Differenced and F. Differenced Governing Party Support, 1979-1996...210
5.1 Assassination Attempt, Differenced.......................................................211





One of the most important reasons why the integration of statistical
methods into the study of politics has failed to bring about the behavioralists’
anticipated ‘golden age’ is the lack of consensus among researchers regarding
how to employ their new statistical tools.  This problem is compounded in areas
where the methodology itself is either flawed or overly restrictive.  With these
problems, ideas and models that may make sense theoretically leave
themselves open to criticism on the basis of methodology.  Ultimately, these
models may be discarded as the specification process begins anew.   One
escape from this dilemma is the development of methodological approaches
capable of minimizing the subjectivity employed by researchers.  Such an
escape seems possible for analysts of time-series data as a greater
understanding of the need and value of using the fractional differencing
parameter, d, could lead to a greater consensus regarding model specification.
Until recently, researchers using time-series data have been confined to
the “knife-edged” decision of whether to treat their data as deriving from an I=0
(stationary) or I=1 (unit-root) process.  On the basis of this choice, researchers
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would then either difference their data (if they believed it to be derived from a
unit-root process) or leave it in level form (if they believed it to be stationary). 
The importance of this decision is highlighted when the theoretical and empirical
consequences are noted. Theoretically, classifying a variable as a stationary
process implies that, ceteris paribus, its value at previous periods is forgotten at
a consistent rate as it tends toward some long-term mean.  However, treating a
variable as a unit-root implies the belief that it has perfect memory - that is, its
value at each period is its value at the previous period plus any shock incurred
since the previous period.  
From an empirical standpoint, the researcher’s choice between stationary
or unit-root behavior will have an effect on the inferences that can be drawn from
any model that includes the variable.  Treating the variable as a unit-root process
leads the researcher to transform it through the process of differencing, that is,
generating a new series based on the differences between consecutive time
points.  However, this transformation is not benign as it prohibits the researcher
from identifying any long-term relationships between the differenced variable and
other variables in the model (Box and Jenkins 1970; McCleary and Hay 1980;
Norpoth 1993; Hamilton 1994; Enders 1995).  Leaving a variable in level form
avoids this problem but still can have negative consequences if the data
generating process (DGP) of the variable does indeed possess some degree of
long-memory.   Specifically, spurious regressions - finding a significant
relationship between variables where none truly exists - are a likely result when
variables with some degree of persistence are left in level form (Granger and
3
Newbold 1974; Lebo, Walker, and Clarke 1998b).
The introduction of fractional dynamics provides social science
researchers with an opportunity to avoid this forced dichotomy.  By questioning
the duality of stationary processes versus random walks, political scientists are
finding that variables need not be strictly classified as integrated of order zero
(I(0)) or of order one (I(1)) (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996).  Indeed,
between these two extremes lies the possibility that a series may be fractionally
integrated, where 0 < I < 1.  Over infinite periods, a fractionally integrated series
will be mean reverting but over finite periods, it will mimic the properties of a unit-
root series.  Given that political scientists work with finite data sets with relatively
few time points, the importance of understanding the properties of near- and
fractionally-integrated time-series may be appreciated.  
The use of fractional integration techniques has several attractive
features.  First and most important is an ability to develop models that more
accurately mimic the data generating processes of the variables involved. 
Expecting a DGP to possess either perfect memory, memory that declines
quickly at a constant rate, or no memory whatsoever implies a leap of faith
avoided by allowing for the possibility that the degree of integration falls between
zero and unity.  Second, knowing that data have been properly (rather than over-
or under-) differenced allows more confidence in regression results by
minimizing the chances of spurious regressions.  Lebo, Walker, and Clarke
(1998b) demonstrate that finding a significant (.05) relationship between two
variables may be as much as 15 times more likely when fractionally integrated
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variables are left in level form and included in regressions.  
Third, moving from Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) or
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to Autoregressive
Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) models by including the
fractional differencing parameter, d, often will lead researchers to adopt more
parsimonious specifications as they drop cumbersome moving average and
autoregressive parameters that have been included in their models to
approximate fractional dynamics (Hamilton  1994, p. 449; Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke 1998a).  Fourth, fractional, rather than integer, differencing guards
against the questionable practice of over-differencing (DeBoef and Granato
1997).  
Fifth, and finally, understanding that a series is fractionally integrated has
significant theoretical implications.  For example, as will be discussed, Key’s
(1966) explanation that some voters are “stand-patters” while others are
“switchers” (see also Converse, 1964) is consistent with finding that aggregate
measures of partisanship are fractionally integrated.  This follows from Granger’s
(1980) aggregation theorem as “macropartisanship” is computed by aggregating
individuals with various autoregressive patterns.  Thus, DGPs may become more
comprehensible when we are willing to entertain a wider range of behavior at the
micro-level.  Recognition of the significance of each of these five features
motivates this dissertation.  Various procedures for the incorporation of fractional
dynamics into bivariate and multivariate time-series models are first developed
and then demonstrated with a model of governing party support in Britain and a
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model of presidential approval in the United States.  The remainder of this
chapter places the problem of fractional integration within the development of the
field of time-series analysis.
1.2 A History of Time Series and Popularity Functions
Although the study of politics and economics were often inseparable
during much of the 19th century, studies of political economy entered a
hibernation period for much of the 20th century (Heilbroner 1972; Clarke, et al.
1992).  However, this situation has changed over the past quarter century as
new interest in the relationship between economics and politics has brought
political economy back as a major field within political science.  Clarke, et al.
(1992) propose that one reason for this renewed interest is the increased
involvement by governments in their national economies in the wake of the
Keynesian revolution in macroeconomic management (see also, Stewart 1986). 
The faith of political parties in Keynesian techniques led them to assure voters
that they could manage the economy effectively and provide continued
prosperity (Clarke, et el. 1992).  In turn, this encouraged voters to hold parties
accountable for fluctuations in personal and national economic health.  Through
these enhanced expectations, politics and economics grew ever closer and,
when the surging post-war western economies grew stagnant in the 1970s,
public discontent with the economy became synonymous with their discontent for
their governments.
At the same time as these real world factors brought together the topics of
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politics and economics, advances in political science sought the same result. 
The introduction to political science of the rational choice approach which is
concerned with the utility based decisions of rational, self-interested individuals
refocussed the direction of many researchers and quickly permeated the
discipline (Downs 1957; Keech, Bates and Lange 1989; Clarke, et al. 1992). 
Rational choice theory has had a particularly strong impact on the area of voting
behavior, supplanting the University of Michigan’s social-psychological approach
as the dominant paradigm (e.g., Campbell et al., 1954, 1960).  The economic
theories of the rational self-interested voter developed by Downs (1957) and
elaborated upon by Key (1968) have led to an explosion of research on electoral
choice (e.g. Kinder and Kiewet, 1979; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992;
Sanders 1991; Clarke and Stewart 1994, 1995).  These changes in real-world
politics and economics coupled with a new intellectual focus have led
researchers to study the relationships between each of objective economic
conditions - such as unemployment and inflation - and subjective financial
evaluations, and support levels for political parties and party leaders (Clarke, et
al., 1992).  Incorporating data on these items into models of political support,
researchers have improved their ability to explain and predict election outcomes
as well as the dynamics of party support between elections. 
Thus, a great deal of research has been concerned with the development
of “popularity functions” (Clarke, et al. 1992).  Aggregating individual-level
responses gathered from opinion polls between elections, popularity functions
model the factors that affect levels of political support (e.g., Sanders 1992;
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Clarke and Stewart 1994).  Among these factors are political and economic
events, economic sentiments, and leader support levels.  In terms of economics,
subjective measures have supplanted objective measures such as
unemployment and inflation as the keys to understanding the links voters make
between economics and politics (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). 
Indeed, subjective measures such as the University of Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment are useful because they isolate voters’ perceptions of
economic conditions.
Despite the widespread acceptance of the importance of subjective
economic evaluations, two important controversies exist among researchers. 
The first concerns whether voters emphasize their own self-interest or the state
of the national economy when they form their political preferences (Clarke, et al.
1992).  Kinder and Kiewet (1979, 1981) demarcate these attitudes as
“egocentric” and “sociotropic” evaluations, respectively.  Downs’ (1957) theories
of the rational self-interested voter would suggest that egocentric measures are
far more important than sociotropic measures.  Nevertheless, sociotropic
evaluations often have been found to be important predictors of voting intentions
(MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).
A second controversy exists between those who favor prospective
evaluations and those who favor retrospective ones, that is, whether voters are
more concerned with the past or the future.  Key’s (1966) assertion that
incumbents will be rewarded or punished by voters according to the state of their
pocketbooks is clear support in favor of the retrospective thesis.  This is entirely
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rational from a Downsian perspective because retrospective voting allows the
voter to consider “one actual present utility income and a hypothetical present
one” rather than merely “two hypothetical future utility incomes” (1957: 40). 
Clarke et al. (1992: 8) elaborate on the rationality of favoring retrospective
evaluations pointing out that if the rhetoric of all parties can be discounted on the
assumption that parties will say anything in their quest for victory, the only
trustworthy information available to voters is past performance. 
However, “Bankers” models question the rationality of retrospective
voting.  From this perspective, the rational voter understands that what is past is
past and thereafter muddles through party rhetoric in search of which party offers
the best hope for a prosperous future.  Past party performance will remain
informative to voters as they use it to judge parties’ ability to implement their
promises.  In this sense, prospective evaluations are inextricably bound to
retrospective ones (Clarke, et al. 1992).  
Research that compares the relative explanatory utility of prospections
versus retrospections and egocentric variables versus sociotropic ones has been
plagued by methodological problems.  Of particular interest here are the
problems that arise when one uses aggregate time series data.  The use of
aggregate data collected on a regular basis does provide students of political
dynamics with a wealth of time points compared to the use of individual-level
panel data.  However, despite their usefulness for studying dynamic
relationships, time-series variables created by aggregating individual-level data
may threaten inferences if dealt with improperly.
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Early attempts to construct popularity functions, such as Mueller (1970),
implicitly assume data to be stationary by leaving it in level form prior to
multivariate analyses.  Granger and Newbold (1974) point out the pernicious
consequences that occur when data that are non-stationary are treated as if they
were stationary.  Specifically, spurious regressions are likely to occur because
the non-stationary pattern of one variable may appear to cause the same
characteristics in the other.  Thus, more sophisticated techniques need to be
employed to guard against these threats to inference.
Over the past quarter-century, political methodologists have familiarized
themselves with Box-Jenkins ARIMA techniques (Box-Jenkins 1970) and VAR
models (Sims 1980).  These new techniques challenged OLS regression as the
method of choice for the analysis of time series data.  Although these techniques
are useful, they are insufficient to guard against spurious regressions if the
question of stationarity is not properly addressed.  Some modelers such as
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) have used autoregressive distributed lag
models in an attempt to circumvent the pitfalls of using non-stationary data in
level form.   Analysts such as Clarke and Stewart (1994) question the efficacy of1
this latter approach and use the concepts of cointegration and error correction
models as means of modeling the long-term dynamics of non-stationary series. 
Despite these advances, the recent introduction of the concept of fractional
integration to political researchers necessitates reexamination not only of the
conclusions derived from earlier studies but also of the data themselves and the
estimation procedures used to analyze them.
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1.3 Time Series Methodology and Fractional Dynamics
The concept of fractional dynamics may be usefully thought of as a
generalization of the familiar ARIMA models (see Box and Jenkins 1970;
McCleary and Hay 1980; Hamilton 1994; Enders 1995).  The result is an
ARFIMA model where the data generating process for series X is described as
follows,
N(B)(1-B) X = 2(B), where: ,  -N(0,F         (1.1)d                                         2)t  t                                   t  
In Equation (1.1) B represents the backshift operator such that B ,  = ,k t  t-k. 
Further, N(B) represents stationary autoregressive processes and 2(B)
represents stationary moving-average processes.  The degree of integration for
X is measured by the fractional differencing parameter, d.  
Traditional approaches to time-series analysis assign integer values to d
in (1.1) (e.g. Box and Jenkins 1970; McCleary and Hay 1980).  For the case
where d=0, the series will be characterized by mean reversion, finite variance
and covariance stationarity and can be adequately modeled using combinations
of autoregressive and moving average parameters (ARMA (p,0,q) models, see
Figure 1.1).  The special case of the random-walk, where d=1 (see figure 1.5), is
characterized by mean, variance, and covariance non-stationarity (Sims and
Uhlig 1991; Durr 1993; Ostrom and Smith 1993; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith
1998).  By wholly differencing, the random-walk series can be modeled using
stationary autoregressive and moving-average parameters in an ARIMA (p,1,q)
format.
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Recognizing that the value of d may lie between 0 and 1 and realizing the
diversity of characteristics in this middle ground motivates fractional integration
methods.  As with a series where d=0, a series where 0<d<1 will be mean
reverting.  However, a series will cease to be variance and covariance stationary
where .5<d<1 (Baillie 1996:22).  Figure 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 show various
fractionally integrated series where d equals 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively.
Of critical importance is the fact that a fractionally integrated time-series
will behave in a distinctly different manner than will a series where d holds an
integer value.   Specifically, the fractionally integrated series will be long-
memoried with significant - though not necessarily strong - correlations existing
between distant time points.  It is important to distinguish this type of series from
a so-called near-integrated series, a series that is highly autoregressive and for
whom significant correlations at long lags will also exist.  The key difference
between the two is that the long-memory of a near-integrated series declines
steadily at an exponential rate while that of a fractionally integrated series may
decline more slowly.  Indeed, significant and steady correlations across long lags
visible in its autocorrelation function is the signature characteristic of fractionally
integrated series (Lo 1991: 1286).  Over a great many time-points, the memory
of a fractionally integrated series thus may be more persistent than that of a
near-integrated series.  Hence, memory may fade at a rate that is neither
exponential nor constant.  
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1.4 Fractional Differencing
Aside from being less restrictive than a modeling technique where d is
confined to integer values, the ability to model memory in a wider variety of ways
seems a more reasonable method to mimic unknown data generating processes. 
Indeed, using the ARFIMA format, the short-term dynamics of autoregressive
and moving average parameters are complemented by the complex long-term
dynamics of d.   In order to properly model a fractionally integrated series, we
need to be acquainted with the concept of fractional differencing (Granger 1980;
Hosking 1981). 
When confronted with a series that is a unit-root, the standard procedure
is to create a new “differenced” series based on the changes from one period to
the next in the original variable.  By doing so, the problems of non-stationarity
exhibited in the original series are eliminated and the new series can be modeled
using stationary ARMA components only.  However, for a series where the level
of integration lies between 0 and 1, creating a series based on the differences
between time points will “over-difference” the series.  That is, it will not create a
white-noise ARMA series but, rather, will create an ARFIMA series for which d <
0.   Thus, rather than apply the usual differencing procedure of (1-B), we wish to
difference the series only by d, the true level of integration.  That is, the value of
each point in the fractionally differenced series should be based only on the
proportion of the previous time point remembered in the present. 
Granger’s (1980: 288) explanation of the fractional differencing procedure
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is helpful in conceptualizing what the new series will look like.  Granger imagines
“a filter "(B) such that when used twice, one gets the usual difference, i.e. "(B)2
= (1-B).”  Applying this filter twice, we are thus wholly differencing in the
traditional fashion.  However, by applying the filter only once, we are merely
“half-differencing,” exactly what we would want to do to turn a d=.5 series into a
stationary white-noise process.  Depending on our conception of "(B) we can
filter our original series to obtain a d=0 white-noise series, regardless of whether
d in the original series is a whole number or not.  Conceptualizing the fractional
integration filter as some factor of (1-B) is especially helpful when we see how
fractional dynamics arise.  
1.5 The Origins of Fractional Dynamics
Recently, researchers have demonstrated the commonality of fractional
dynamics for political variables.  Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1996, 1998) find
the quarterly macropartisanship index (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989),
the percentages of Democrat and Republican identifiers in quarterly Gallup polls,
and the University of Michigan index of consumer sentiment are integrated of
orders between zero and one.  Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998a) analyze 17
popular political time-series including U.S. presidential approval, U.S. Supreme
Court decision making in economics and civil rights cases, and domestic policy
mood (Stimson 1991) and find fractional dynamics to be at work in the DGP of
nearly all their variables.  The fact that so many variables across several areas of
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inquiry in political science follow similar patterns is less surprising when we
realize what these variables have in common.  Indeed, all of these variables are
aggregate measures of individual-level behavior, precisely the type of data likely
to be characterized by fractional dynamics (Granger 1980).
Granger (1980) demonstrates that fractional dynamics are built into a
series when it is created by aggregating heterogenous individual-level behavior.  2
Heterogeneity here refers to individuals’ possession of various degrees of
autoregressive and moving-average behavior.  Granger explains a series xjt
consisting of individuals j = 1,2,...,n each with their own autoregressive
parameter, " , randomly generated from a beta distribution (0,1).  Equation (1.2)j
shows this series.
x  = "  x  + ,      where ,  -N(0,F )                                                              (1.2)jt  j t-1  t      jt
2
Aggregating these autoregressive tendencies will create a series that is
fractionally integrated, that is it will long remember the behavior of individuals for
whom " approaches or equals unity but will quickly forget the past behavior of
those with less pronounced autoregressive tendencies.  The distribution of " for
each j between zero and one will determine the fraction by which the series is
integrated.
In the social sciences, Blumen, Kogan and McCarthy (1955) were the first
to identify this phenomena.  Their book, The Industrial Mobility of Labor as a
Probability Process presented the now famous “mover-stayer” model.  This
posits that between periods, some workers - the “movers” - will move from one
industry or plant to another while some workers - the “stayers” - will remain in
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place.  However, the movers switch back and forth and their distribution will
ultimately tend to some mean level in accord with industry or plant capacity.  A
measure of the percentage of workers in one industry or plant will aggregate
these individual-level heterogenous behaviors and, as Granger (1980) warns, will
thus be characterized by fractional dynamics.
Using standard practice, we would need to suppose that a given measure
will have either perfect memory (I=1), no memory whatsoever, or perhaps some
type of exponentially declining memory if it contained some autoregressive or
moving-average process.  However, in the mover-stayer model, we see that
choosing the order of integration to be either zero or one is impossibly restrictive. 
A measure created by aggregating the behavior of workers will contain the
behavior of the movers and the stayers at every time point.  Some part of this
aggregated series will have very long memory, remembering at any point the
behavior of the stayers many periods ago.  At the same time, another portion of
the series will have no memory as the stochastic decisions of the movers are
independent of their status in previous periods.  Further, during each period,
some stayers will be replaced in the industry’s population by either new stayers
or by movers.  Likewise, movers may be replaced by new movers or by stayers. 
Through this slower process of population replacement, the effects of many
periods ago eventually fade.  Nevertheless, as long as a single individual in the
sample stubbornly refuses to change over time and as long as another member
of the sample continues to make decisions independent of his/her own past
behavior, the series will continue to be fractionally integrated.  This fact is
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especially relevant when one realizes the applicability of the mover-stayer model
to many political phenomena (e.g. Converse 1964; Clarke and McCutcheon
1998).
Indeed, it may be hypothesized that political attitudes and behavior often
will conform to the general pattern of the mover-stayer model.  The popular
“macropartisanship” variable is a good example.  MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson (1989) calculate macropartisanship as the percentage of Democratic
identifiers out of all respondents who identify themselves as either Democrats or
Republicans.  As such, the variable aggregates individual-level decisions to form
a single variable designed to describe trends in partisanship.  By modeling
macropartisanship in level form with neither autoregressive nor moving-average
parameters, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson imply that the variable is devoid of
any memory.   If this were true, knowing the value of macropartisanship in any3
given month would be irrelevant to any estimate of what value the variable will
hold in the next month.  We would simply infer that macropartisanship is wholly
based upon exogenous factors and, ceteris paribus, behaves stochastically.
On the other hand, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson would still not have
been correct had they instead chosen the conventional alternative of diagnosing
and treating macropartisanship as a unit-root.  Disaggregating the unit-root
hypothesis implies perfect autoregressive behavior at the individual level, a
situation that may describe some of the population, but certainly not all.  In such
a case, all else equal, individual partisanship will never change - an assumption
directly opposed to that of the stationarity hypothesis.  Further, the effects of a
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shock to a unit-root variable will be permanent as long-term swings preclude the
variable from tending to some mean level.  Thus, given the  conclusions implicit
in modeling decisions, researchers must be careful to ensure that their modeling
techniques properly describe the underlying data generating process.  The use
of fractional dynamics makes this considerably more feasible.
However, including fractional dynamics in models becomes more
complicated when one moves from the univariate case to the multivariate one. 
Although a great deal of work has been done on the study of fractional
integration, very little has been done to inform political scientists of how to
include ARFIMA components in complex multivariate models.  Lebo, Walker,
and Clarke (1998b) demonstrate the possibilities of spurious regressions when
fractionally integrated series are left in level form and included in bivariate
regressions.  However, while showing the threats to inference posed by fractional
integration, these authors do not offer an alternative course of action for dealing
with the problem.  This dissertation demonstrates how fractionally integrated
time-series can be included in multivariate models of political behavior and
illustrates the utility of doing so.
1.6 Organization of the Study
This dissertation is composed of six chapters that investigate techniques
for developing models that include fractionally integrated time-series.  Chapters II
and III use Monte Carlo methods to investigate possible threats to inference
posed by including fractionally integrated series in bivariate and multivariate
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regressions.  Chapter II describes the results of Monte Carlo experiments which
randomly generated two fractionally integrated series, transformed one or both of
the variables, and then regressed one upon the other.  Chapter II addresses the
implications of both over- and under-differencing and finds that each of these
operations makes regression results questionable.  It is found that by fractionally
differencing each of the two variables in a bivariate regression, estimates
become quite trustworthy.
Chapter III extends the Monte Carlo experiments of Chapter II by adding
independent variables with various time-dependent characteristics and
experimenting with different ways of transforming these variables.  Again,
fractional differencing is found to be an important tool to ensure that expected
regression results are not confounded.  Taken together, the results in  Chapters
II and III demonstrate that the problem of fractional dynamics can easily be dealt
with provided that one is capable of determining the level of integration of a given
set of variables and then fractionally differencing them.
Chapter IV applies the results of the first two chapters to a model of
governing party support in Great Britain.  A discussion of the micro-foundations
of measures of governing party support is used to explain why Conservative
support and prime ministerial approval between 1979 and 1996 should be
fractionally integrated.  Indeed, numerous tests of stationarity and estimates of
the d parameter show each of the two series are fractionally integrated with
prime ministerial approval possessing nearly the memory of a unit-root.  After
fractional differencing, these variables are included in models that compare the
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utility of various types of subjective evaluations of economic performance in
predicting support for the Conservative Party over the 1979-96 time period. 
Chapter IV also introduces the concept of fractional co-integration to political
science after demonstrating that traditional approaches to error correction
mechanisms are inappropriate with the presence of long memory in the
equilibrium term.  Chapter IV argues that while fractional integration techniques
do not substantially alter the results obtained by more traditional methods, they
are preferable for several reasons.  Among these are improved model
diagnostics and coefficient estimates as well as the simultaneous ability to mimic
more accurately the DGP of the variables involved and reduce the possibility of
spurious regressions.
Chapter V applies fractional integration techniques to a model of
presidential popularity in the United States for the years 1978 to 1997.  Again,
various subjective economic evaluations are compared in rival models of
presidential approval.  The results obtained from the multivariate ARFIMA
models support the findings of Clarke and Stewart (1994) who find that
evaluations of future national prospects outperform personal prospections,
personal retrospections and national retrospections as predictors of presidential
approval.  Chapter V also investigates the use of dummy variables in multivariate
ARFIMA models.
Chapter VI concludes the dissertation and establishes an agenda for
future research.  A summary of the process by which researchers should
evaluate and deal with the problem of fractional integration in their models is
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presented.  The benefits of these methods are discussed at length with particular
attention being paid to the ability of ARFIMA models to provide researchers with
a common analytical framework.  By beginning with the equation: N(B)(1-B) X =d t 
2(B), and thus allowing the order of integration to vary beyond integer values,t  
ARFIMA modeling follows the directives of Hendry (1995) and others of the “LSE
school” of econometrics (Gilbert 1986, 1989; Davidson and MacKinnon 1993)
who insist researchers must begin with the most general model and “test, test,
test” until reaching the more specific and parsimonious approximation of the data
generating process.  Using tests of stationarity and estimates of the value of d,
researchers working separately can each approximate the true characteristics of




1. Using Monte Carlo analyses, Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998b) find that while
the use of a lagged endogenous variable does mitigate the problem, spurious
regressions can still occur at 3-4 times their normal rate when data are
fractionally integrated.
2. Granger explains that a fractionally integrated series may also be created by
aggregating variables with dynamic relationships at the individual level.  Further,
a series will be fractionally integrated if its error term contains fractional
dynamics.  
3. Aggregating a panel survey in such a way would imply that as T approaches
infinity, the partisanship of every respondent will at some point change. 
However, with the sample varying from one time point to the next, it is impossible




FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED TIME SERIES IN BIVARIATE REGRESSIONS:
A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS
2.1 Introduction
Although the topic of fractional integration has been discussed in the
economics literature since Granger (1980), its ability to aid political researchers
in their construction of complex dynamic models has been suggested only
recently.  Box-Steffensmeier and Smith introduce many political scientists to the
problem of fractional integration in their 1996 American Political Science Review
article, “The Dynamics of Aggregate Partisanship.”   Following Granger’s (1980)
explanation that the aggregation of heterogenous individual-level behavior would
produce a series that is fractionally integrated, Box-Steffensmeier and Smith
alert researchers to the possibility that data used by political scientists may be
plagued by fractional dynamics.  Indeed, the authors demonstrate that the
popular political variables macropartisanship and the index of consumer
sentiment (ICS) are each fractionally integrated.  Investigating the univariate
properties of a much greater variety of time-series including the ICS and its
components and measures of U.S. Supreme Court liberalism, Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke (1998a) confirm that many time-series used by political researchers are
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indeed fractionally integrated.
While understanding the univariate characteristics of political variables is
valuable, recognizing the consequences of fractional dynamics should cause
concern among researchers who use time-series methods to understand political
relationships.  Specifically, the possibility that regression results may be spurious
when the value of d for either or both of the independent and dependent
variables diverges from zero necessitates the re-examination of many models. 
Spurious, or “nonsense” regressions occur as the presence of serially correlated
errors invalidate traditional methods of inference for regression (e.g., Yule, 1926;
Phillips, 1986).  As Granger and Newbold (1974) demonstrated in Monte Carlo
experiments, tests of significance are seriously biased towards rejection of the
null hypothesis of no relationship when unit-root series are included in bivariate
regressions.  Secondary problems of unit-root regressions include high R  and2
highly correlated residuals indicated by low Durbin-Watson statistics (Phillips,
1986). 
However, the problem of spuriousness is not confined to regressions
involving unit-roots.  DeBoef and Granato (1997a) perform Monte Carlo
experiments on series that are near-integrated and again find the problem of
spuriousness to be rampant.  In cases where the auto-regressive parameters of
their two simulated variables approached unity, rejection rates of the null
hypothesis are 69%, nearly 14 times as frequent as chance would allow in the
absence of serial correlation when using significance tests with p=.05.  Marmol
(1995) extends Phillips’ analysis by analytically demonstrating that the likelihood
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of spurious regressions increases as d diverges from zero even when d is not
confined to integer values.  
Monte Carlo experiments employed by Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998b)
confirm the huge problem spurious regressions pose for analysts using
fractionally integrated data.  They find that rejection rates soar as high as 72% in
bivariate regressions where d =.9 for each of the variables and T= 100 (see
Table 2.4).  In support of Phillips (1986) and Marmol (1995), Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke (1998b) also find rejection rates to increase along with the size of T. 
Even with the inclusion of a lagged endogenous variable as an independent
variable, a popular panacea for models with poor diagnostics, rejection rates
were three to four times as high as chance would allow.  Thus, a great deal of
evidence exists that demonstrates the dangers of including in regressions
variables for which d > 0.  
Given this evidence it is clear that researchers must deal with the
possibility of fractional dynamics if they wish to have confidence that the
inferences drawn from their regression analyses are sound rather than
“nonsense.”  Although the problem encountered by Granger and Newbold -
spurious regressions from unit-root series - is easily fixed via the process of first-
differencing, researchers have been slow to offer a solution for the fractionally
integrated case.  This and the following chapter attempt to fill this void. 
Confining attention to the bivariate case, this chapter uses simulated data to test
a variety of methods to avoid spurious regression results when dealing with
fractionally integrated data.  After explaining how these simulations were
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performed and what results one should expect in the absence of a bias towards
rejection of the null hypothesis, the Monte Carlo results are presented.  These
include tests of the efficacy of fractional- and unit-differencing as well as the
option of leaving variables in level form.
2.2 Monte Carlo Simulations: Method and Control Simulation
Monte Carlo simulations are useful when one wishes to investigate the
properties of a certain statistical method (Mooney 1997).  Simulation methods
are particularly helpful when statistical theory is weak or entirely lacking.  By
randomly generating data and invoking a statistical procedure repeatedly, the
results can be compiled and one can judge the attributes of the method
employed (Mooney 1997).  With these empirical results, one can test existing
theory or generate new hypotheses.   
There are several steps in the Monte Carlo simulations presented below
and each follows the same basic pattern.  Using RATS’ ARFSIM procedure, two
series (Y , X ) were randomly generated so that T = 150 and d = 0.1 for each.  t  t
1
Then, depending on the simulation, some data transformation was performed on
either or both Y  and X .  Next, using ordinary least squares (OLS), thet  t
dependent variable Y was regressed on a constant and the dependent variable,
X, and the following output was recorded: coefficient estimates, standard errors,
R , and the Durbin-Watson statistic.  This was repeated 1,000 times.  Next, the d2
value for the simulated X series was increased by 0.1 and another 1,000
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bivariate regressions were performed.  After 10,000 regressions, the d value of
the simulated Y-series was increased by 0.1 and the process was repeated until
ultimately 100,000 regressions were estimated and 100,000 observations existed
for each of the four statistics.  For each regression result, the value of X’s t-
statistic was calculated and the number of times that the absolute value of t was
greater than 1.96 was recorded for each set of 1,000 regressions.  This number
was the occurrence rate of type I errors, the frequency with which true null
hypotheses of no relationship were rejected as false.  At the .05 level of
significance, we would expect roughly 50 type I errors per 1,000 regressions to
occur by chance alone.  
In order to judge the results we would expect under perfect conditions, a
control simulation was performed.  As was done for all the simulations, two
series were randomly generated from a (0,1) Beta distribution.  However, for this2
control experiment, it was stipulated that each series would be mean, variance,
and covariance stationary with d=0.  For each of 100,000 regressions between
these random series, the X-coefficients, X-standard errors, R , and Durbin-2
Watson statistic were recorded.  The frequency of type I errors was also
recorded.  The results of this simulation conformed nearly perfectly to what we
would expect based on probability.  This indicates the acuracy of the ARFSIM
procedure as well as providing a model with which to compare later simulation
results.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the control simulation.  The
X-coefficients are normally distributed with a mean very near zero.  The standard
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errors are normally distributed (skewness=0.24 and kurtosis=3.10) with a mean
of 0.0822, an artifact of the sampling pool.   The Durbin-Watson statistic is3
normally distributed (skewness=-0.01 and kurtosis=2.96) with a mean of 1.999
indicating that on average no bias towards serial correlation in the error term
existed.  The R  statistics indicate, as they should, very little relation between the2
random X and Y variables.  And, most importantly, type I errors occurred only
5,164 times out of 100,000 regressions, almost exactly the 5,000 we would
expect to find at the .05 level of significance.  Thus, as expected, when one
stationary series is regressed upon another, spurious regressions occur roughly
1 in 20 times.  Comparing the results of subsequent simulations to these will
demonstrate the need for all variables to be d=0 in order to minimize the threats
to inference.
2.3 Bivariate Simulations: The Case of Under-Differencing
Standard time-series techniques suggest that the most efficient way of
including non-stationary variables in bivariate regressions is to first transform
them so that d=0 for each.  Though analysts are chiefly concerned with
eliminating long-term trends in the dependent variable, leaving a fractionally
integrated independent variable in level form may create its own threats to
inference.  Following a discussion of the hypotheses under investigation, results
are presented indicating the efficacy of fractionally differencing both sides rather
than under-differencing the independent variable.  The three hypotheses are:
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H : In bivariate regressions, fractionally differencing both the dependent and2.1
independent variables by their respective estimated d values produces spurious
regressions less often that does fractionally differencing the dependent variable
only while leaving the independent variable in level form.  This can be expressed
as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + ,  and (1-B) Y  = a + b X  +   ,2.1   t    1 t  t  t    2 t     t
d(Y)     d(X)     d(Y)
 b will be statistically significant (.05) more frequently that will b .2          1
To demonstrate the value of fractionally differencing both the dependent and
independent variables, the following hypothesis also was tested:
H : In bivariate regressions, fractionally differencing both the dependent and2.2
independent variables by their respective estimated d values will produce
spurious regressions 5% of the time at the .05 level of significance, i.e. at the
same rate we would expect from two stationary variables.  Hypothesis 2.2 can be
expressed as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + ,2.2   t    1 t  t
d(Y)     d(X)
b  will be statistically significant (.05) 5% of the time.1
Also, the practice of fractionally differencing both sides was tested against the
option of fractionally differencing the dependent variable and including the
popular “cure-all” of a first-order auto-regressive parameter as an independent
variable along with a fractionally integrated independent variable left in level
form:
H : In bivariate regressions, fractionally differencing both the dependent and2.3
independent variables by their respective estimated d values produces spurious
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regressions less often than does fractionally differencing the dependent variable
and including a first-order auto-regressive parameter as an independent variable
along with an untransformed fractionally integrated independent variable.  This
can be expressed as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + ,  and (1-B) Y  = a +Y  +  b X  + ,2.3   t    1 t  t  t   t-1   3 t   t
d(Y)     d(X)     d(Y)
b  will be statistically significant (.05) more frequently than will b .3          1
To test hypotheses 2.1-2.3, three sets of simulations were performed as
described above.  In Simulation 1, prior to each regression, the independent and
dependent variables were fractionally differenced by the value of d built into each
by the ARFSIM procedure.  In Simulation 2, the independent variable was left in
level form while the dependent variable was fractionally differenced as it was in
Simulation 1.  Simulation 3 was similar to Simulation 2 except for the inclusion of
a lagged endogenous variable as an independent variable.
Simulation 1 Results
When both the dependent and independent variables were fractionally
differenced by their assigned d values, the rate of spurious regressions was near
perfect at 5,181 per 100,000, thus supporting Hypothesis 2.2.  Table 2.2 breaks
down these type I errors by each set of 1,000 regressions and demonstrates the
value of fractionally differencing both sides.  In only two of Table 2.2’s 100 cells
is the number of type I errors statistically distinguishable from the expected 50,
again supporting Hypothesis 2.1.   Also, no pattern seems to exist that would4
indicate that fractional differencing gains or loses power as d varies between 0
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and 1.  
Looking more closely at the results of Simulation 1, we can see how the
problem of bias towards nonsense regressions was overcome and thereby
recognize the value of fractionally differencing both the dependent and
independent variables.  The Durbin-Watson statistics were normally distributed
(skewness=-0.01 and kurtosis=2.99) with a mean of 1.9959.  Standard errors
were likewise normally distributed (skewness=0.26 and kurtosis=3.11) with a
mean of 0.082, results nearly identical to those of the control experiment.  R2
values were consistently low and coefficient estimates averaged 0.0002 and
were distributed normally.  Thus, comparing the results obtained from Simulation
1 with those of the control simulation, it is evident that fractional differencing
each side by its assigned value of d is sufficient to avoid the problem of spurious
regressions.  The next two simulations demonstrate that selectively applying the
fractional differencing filter fails to negate this problem.
Simulation 2 & 3 Results
In Simulation 2, the dependent variable was fractionally differenced but
the independent variable was left untransformed.  Rejection rates of the null
hypothesis of no relationship rose to nearly 5.5%.  While this number is not
alarmingly high, it does represent a 10% increase in the likelihood of finding a
relationship between two variables when no such relationship truly exists.  Table
2.3 shows that the occurrence rate for type I errors is statistically different from
the expected 50 in 16 of 100 cells and that the frequency of these errors
increases substantially as the independent variable crosses the d = .5 threshold
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and moves from variance stationarity to variance non-stationarity.  Comparing
these results with those of Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998b) in Table 2.4 we see
that, although an imperfect procedure, fractionally differencing only the
dependent variable vastly reduces the possibility of making a type I error. Thus,
although the evidence from Simulation 2 supports Hypothesis 2.1 it does not do
so overwhelmingly.  An examination of the components of the t-statistic reveals
the true problems with this approach.
 Indeed, it is in the standard errors and coefficients estimated by
Simulation 2 that the inadequacy of leaving the independent variable in level-
from is demonstrated.  Table 2.5 shows that the standard errors of the
independent variable are biased downwards as the d value for X moves from 0
to 1.  When d > .7, the mean value for the standard error is less than half of
0.082, its expected value under perfect conditions.  The findings of Lebo,
Walker, and Clarke (1998a) make this result especially relevant as they find
most political variables in their inventory to have d values in the range of 0.7 to
0.9.  
Table 2.6 shows that leaving the independent variable in level form also
biases downward the absolute value of X-coefficients.   The fact that both5
standard errors and coefficients are moving in the same direction and at nearly
the same pace as d grows accounts for the failure of spurious regressions to rise
dramatically (remembering that t = estimate of b ÷ estimate of s.e.).  Indeed,
Figure 2.1 shows that, as far as rejection rates are concerned, this is a case of
two wrongs making a right.  Nevertheless, the decline in the standard errors due
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to time dependence in the error term is a bias worth avoiding.  This is confirmed
by Figure 2.2 which compares the skewed distribution of the standard errors
(skewness=-0.28 and kurtosis=1.87)  generated by Simulation 2 to the normally
distributed standard errors of the control simulation (the solid line).
In order to ensure that these problems could not be solved by including a
lagged endogenous variable, another simulation was performed.  Simulation 3
was the same as Simulation 2 except for the inclusion of a first-order auto-
regressive parameter as an independent variable.  This addition, however, failed
to overcome the threats to inference created by failing to fractionally difference
the independent variable, X.  In Simulation 3, 5,677 type I errors were made. 
Again, this number is not staggering but it is statistically different from 5,000 with
13.5% more spurious regressions than we would hope for at the .05 confidence
level, thereby supporting Hypothesis 2.3.  Further, as was seen in Simulation 2,
standard errors and the absolute value of coefficients declined steadily as the
value of d for X increased.  As before, the simultaneous decline of standard
errors and coefficients prevented an explosion of type I errors but nevertheless
indicates the unwanted presence of autocorrelated errors (skewness=-0.52 and
kurtosis=5.41 for the Durbin-Watson statistics) .
Thus, by comparing each of simulations 1, 2, and 3 with the control
simulation, we can see the value of fractionally differencing both the independent
and dependent variables prior to including them in bivariate regressions.  In
support of hypotheses 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, it is evident that fractionally differencing
Y while leaving X in level form increases the number of spurious regressions by
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a statistically significant, albeit not overwhelming, number.  These simulations
also demonstrate that fractionally differencing each of the variables avoids
biasing downwards standard errors and coefficients as d increases for X. 
Indeed, regardless of the respective values of d for Y and X, fractionally
differencing both prior to regression yields results identical in all respects to
those obtained by using stationary variables where d=0.  Next, the value of
fractional differencing again will be supported as additional simulations
demonstrate the consequences of over-differencing.
2.4 The Case of Over-Differencing: Analytical Results
Having demonstrated the consequences of assuming no long-term
memory in the presence of long or permanent memory, the alternative of
incorrectly assuming the presence of permanent memory is now investigated. 
While researchers have spent a good deal of time considering the threats to
inference posed by under-differencing (e.g., Granger and Newbold, 1974;
Phillips, 1986; Marmol, 1995; DeBoef and Granato, 1997a; Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke, 1998b) very little attention has been given to the consequences of over-
differencing (DeBoef and Granato, 1998b being one exception).  This lack of
interest is quite surprising given the frequency with which first-differencing is
used and given the precarious nature of the implicit assumption of first-
differencing, that the original series must contain perfect (d=1) memory.  When
this assumption is incorrect and d < 1, first-differencing will create a series with d
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< 0.  
A series of this type is typified by negative auto-correlations in the error
term and inferences based on the differenced series lose credibility (DeBoef and
Granato, 1997b: 3).  While DeBoef and Granato (1997a) found that no serious
problems arose from over-differencing near-integrated (N$0.8) data, the
discussion below outlines the possible consequences of including in bivariate
regressions fractionally integrated series that have been over-differenced.
Indeed, several problems are likely to arise when either or both the
dependent and independent variables are over-differenced.  As mentioned
above, an over-differenced series, )Y , will be characterized by auto-correlatedt
errors.  The presence of this problem is readily apparent as it serves to inflate
Durbin-Watson values.  Further, when modeling )Y , either in univariate ARIMAt
form or with the addition of an exogenous independent variable, the inclusion of
a moving-average parameter is likely to be necessary to mimic the error term’s
built-in auto-correlation.
To explain this phenomenon simply, the univariate case where d is
constrained to integer values in a (0,d,0) model is presented:
begin with the DGP:
Y  = NY  + ,              where: ,  - N(0,F )                                                     (2.1)t  t-1  t              t
2
Suppose Y  is stationary and therefore the true value of N = 0, but we mistakenlyt
believe Y  to be a unit-root, i.e. that N = 1.t
We would then proceed to difference Y  to obtain )Y:t
Y  - Y  = (NY  + , ) - (NY  + , ).                                                               (2.2) t  t-1  t-1  t   t-2  t-1
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Replacing )Y  for Y  - Y  and substituting in the true value of N, we have:t  t  t-1
)Y  = ,  - ,               where: ,  - N(0,F )                                                     (2.3) t  t   t-1               t
2
Here ,  is a stationary white noise process and ,  represents a non-invertiblet        t-1
moving average process with 2 = -1 (see Enders 1995: 97).  The presence of a
non-invertible moving-average parameter defies explanation in a theoretical
sense and also wreaks havoc on estimation procedures.   Further, for bi- or6
multivariate purposes, the addition of an independent variable will not mitigate
these effects.  While the error of over-differencing is seldom committed to the
extent where d=-1 for the differenced series, problems quickly mount as a series
diverges downwards from d=0. 
DeBoef and Granato expand (2.2) and demonstrate that first-differencing
a near-integrated series will also build a moving-average process into the series. 
The same can be said for the long-memoried, fractionally integrated series. 
Again using the univariate case and temporarily ignoring the short term auto-
regressive and moving-average parameters, the case where d is no longer
constrained to integer values is presented:
Begin with the DGP of pure fractional noise:
(1-B) Y  = ,           where: ,  - N(0,F )                                                      (2.4)d                2t  t           t
now isolate for Y  and apply first differencingt
Y  - Y = (1-B),  / (1-B)t  t-1  t
d
            = (,  - , ) / (1-B)t  t-1
d
thus,
)Y  = , /(1-B)  - , /(1-B)                                                                         (2.5)   t  t   t-1
d  d
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First differencing Y  will be appropriate when d = 1 and (2.5) thereby reduces to:t
)Y  = , .t  t
However, we are again left with a non-invertible moving-average process for the
case where d = 0 and (2.5) reduces to:
)Y  = ,  - , .t  t  t-1
When a fractionally integrated variable (0< d < 1) is first differenced, a moving-
average parameter equal to 1/(1-B) will be built into the series.  This will be thed 
case whether we wish to model the variable in univariate, bivariate or multivariate
form.  
Aside from the creation of moving-average processes, the act of over-
differencing is expected to cause other problems as well.  The most obvious
problem stems from the fact that two over-differenced series will have at least
that aspect in common.  As such, their inclusion in a bivariate regression may
lead one to conclude more often than chance would allow that the DGP of one
variable is explicable by the DGP of the other.  Thus, spurious regressions are
again expected to plague regressions that use two over-differenced variables.   
2.5 Bivariate Simulations: The Case of Over- Differencing
Given the analytical results, it was expected that over-differencing
variables prior to their inclusion in bivariate regressions would cause several
problems and it was further expected that these problems would be magnified as
the original value of d declined thereby increasing the degree of over-
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differencing.  Three hypotheses below address these anticipated problems. After
stating these hypotheses, Monte Carlo evidence is presented which
demonstrates the threats of over-differencing and thereby again underscores the
value of fractional differencing.  The first of the three hypotheses is:
H : In bivariate regressions, first-differencing both the dependent and2.4
independent variables will lead to spurious regressions more often than the 5%
of the time chance would otherwise allow.  This can be expressed as:
H : for   (1-B)Y  = a + b (1-B)X  + ,   where d(Y) and d(X) < 1,2.4     t    1 t  t
b  will be statistically significant (.05) more frequently than 5% of the time.1
Next:
H : When d < 1 for the dependent variable, first differencing will introduce a2.5
statistically significant moving-average process into the DGP of the differenced
series more frequently than the 5% of the time chance should allow.  This can be
expressed as:
H : for  Y  - Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + 2, + ,   where d(Y) < 12.5    t  t-1    1 t-1  t-1  t  
d(X)
2 will be statistically significant (.05) more frequently than 5% of the time.
And, finally:
H : for  Y  - Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + 2, + ,   where d(Y) < 12.6    t  t-1    1 t-1  t-1  t  
d(X)
2 will often be non-invertible when d(Y) is close to 0.
To test hypotheses 2.4-2.6, several sets of simulations were performed
following procedures similar to those described above.  Several additional
simulations also were performed to explore the additional complications that can
arise by from over-differencing.  In Simulation 4 the dependent variable was first-
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differenced while the independent variable was fractionally differenced by its
value of d.  Simulation 4A was the same as Simulation 4 except that regressions
included a moving-average parameter and were estimated using Box-Jenkins
techniques rather than linear regression methods.   In Simulation 5, the7
dependent variable was fractionally differenced and the independent variable
was first-differenced and OLS was used to estimate the regression.  Simulation
5A added a moving-average parameter to the regression equation and used
Box-Jenkins analysis rather than linear regressions.  Simulation 6 first-
differenced both the dependent and independent variables prior to the OLS
regression.  Simulation 6A added a moving-average component and switched to
Box-Jenkins estimation.  Simulation 6B was the same as Simulation 6 but added
a first-order auto-regressive parameter as an independent variable.  Finally,
Simulations 6C, 6D, 6E, and 6F emulated Simulation 6 but investigated the
impact of sample size on the threats to inference posed by over-differencing
using sample sizes of 50, 100, 200, and 500, respectively.
Simulations 4 & 4A Results
In Simulation 4, the dependent variable was first-differenced while the
independent variable was fractionally differenced rendering it d = 0.  Although
the rate of false rejections in this simulation was completely acceptable at 5,214
per 100,000, several negative consequences of over-differencing were evident. 
One such problem was with the standard errors and absolute coefficient values,
each of which was biased upwards as the value of d for Y decreases.  Their
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simultaneous rise accounts for the failure of this over-differencing exercise to
increase the rate of type I errors.  Also, as expected, negative auto-correlations
in the error term were present as seen in the Durbin-Watson values of Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7 demonstrates that the negative auto-correlation becomes more serious
as the degree of over-differencing increases.  This negative auto-correlation is a
strong hint at the validity of Hypothesis 2.5, and thus motivated another
simulation that included a moving-average parameter.
Indeed, Simulation 4A clearly demonstrated the quirks that over-
differencing can artificially build into a transformed series.  Using the Box-
Jenkins approach, the dependent variable, Y , was regressed on a constant, ant
independent variable, X , and a moving average parameter.  As Table 2.8 shows,t
the moving-average parameter was statistically significant over 99% of the time
for d(Y) # 0.6 and still significant over 69% of the time when d(Y) = .8, a popular
degree of memory for political time-series (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1886;
Lebo, Walker, and Clarke 1998a).  The strength of the moving-average process
is demonstrated by the absolute value of its coefficient which averaged .948,
.547, and .118 when Y had been over-differenced by .9, .5, and .1, respectively. 
This is also evident in Table 2.9 which shows, as Hypothesis 2.6 posits, that non-
invertibility of the moving-average parameter plagued the estimates where d
approached zero.  Combined, these results not only demonstrate the validity of
Hypotheses 2.5 and 2.6, they show how over-differencing, even by .1 or .2 can
seriously alter our perception of the DGP of the dependent variable.  
Further, the results of Simulation 4A show that attempts to “model out”
40
auto-correlation only serve to create further problems.  Although with a mean of
1.871, Durbin-Watson values have fallen to manageable levels, as Figure 2.3
shows, the distribution of these values is a far cry from what it should be
(skewness=-1.00 and kurtosis=4.09).  Indeed, the mean value of the Durbin-
Watson statistic only serves to mask the deeper problems created by over-
differencing.  First, by including a moving-average parameter, the standard errors
of the independent variable were again biased downwards leading to a
substantial increase in the number of type I errors (see table 2.10).  Also, the
presence of moving-average parameters that are strongly significant drastically
increases R  values.  Table 2.11 demonstrates the degree to which model fit2
improves over the mean R  value of .007 given by the control simulation. 2
Though the independent variable here is no more related to the dependent
variable than it was before, relatively larger R  values may ask us to believe our2
models are fairly sound. 
Simulation 5 & 5A Results
As one might suspect, the havoc that over-differencing creates is greatly
reduced when it is done to the independent rather than the dependent variable. 
With the dependent variable fractionally differenced as it was for Simulations 5
and 5A, regression results will seldom include the problem of auto-correlation in
the error term and will thereby avoid the majority of the threats to inference
observed in Simulations 4 and 4A.  Although X’s standard errors and coefficient
values were biased downwards by over-differencing, spurious regressions
occurred at an acceptable rate of 5.2 per hundred.  Durbin-Watson values
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averaged 1.994, indicating that the addition to the equation of a moving-average
parameter would only prove superfluous.  Not surprisingly, this finding was
confirmed by Simulation 5A, the results of which barely differ from those of
Simulation 5.  
Simulations 6, 6A, 6B, & 6C- 6F Results    
 For Simulations 6, 6A, and 6B each of the independent and dependent
variables were first-differenced.  These simulations are likely the most important
ones performed as they mimic most accurately the standard operating
procedures of  political time-series analysts.   Indeed, ARIMA researchers are
compelled to use this technique for several reasons.  The decision of whether to
first-difference data has traditionally been answered by tests of stationarity, most
notably the Dickey-Fuller test that tests a null hypothesis of a pure random walk
or random walk with drift against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity (Dickey
and Fuller, 1979).  
Like many tests of stationarity, however, the Dickey-Fuller test pre-dates
knowledge of fractional integration and has low power when confronted with
fractionally integrated alternatives (e.g., Diebold and Ruderbusch, 1991).  As a
great many political time-series are characterized by long, yet finite, memory with
d values approaching but not reaching 1, the Dickey-Fuller test and others like it
often conclude that a given series is a unit-root and requires first-differencing
(Lebo, Walker, and Clarke, 1998a).  Since models of political relationships often
include non-stationary - yet not quite unit-root - processes on both sides of their
equations (see MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s “macropartisanship," for
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example), over-differencing is often extended to the independent as well as the
dependent variable.  This latter fact is also ensured by the common “rule of
thumb” in ARIMA modeling that what one does to the left-hand-side variable
must be done to those on the right-hand-side as well (DeBoef and Granato,
1997a).  Thus, while Simulations 4, 4A, 5, and 5A are informative, it is in the
results to follow that we truly confront the nasty consequences political analysts
create for themselves by over-differencing.
When both the dependent and independent variables were first-
differenced (i.e., (0,1,0) ARIMA models), the number of spurious regressions
increased substantially to the rate of 7,115 per 100,000.  While these
occurrences are a substantial improvement upon the horror show of Table 2.4
where rejection rates soar as high as 76%, they nevertheless represent a 40%
degradation in the .05 confidence interval and occur often enough to support the
validity of Hypothesis 2.4.  Further, as Table 2.12 shows, nonsense regressions
are an evident problem in 66 of the 100 cells and become more frequent as the
degree of over-differencing increases.  The roots of this increase are visible in
X's standard errors (Table 2.13) and absolute coefficients (Table 2.14).  Although
both are simultaneously biased upwards, this bias affects the coefficients to a
slightly greater extent and t-statistics thereby grow along with the degree of over-
differencing.  And, not surprisingly, negative auto-correlation in the error term is a
large problem with an average Durbin-Watson value of 2.538 and a skewed
distribution (skewness=-0.44 and kurtosis=2.42), shown in Figure 2.4.  Although
it is perhaps as bad as the disease, the cure to this auto-correlation is the
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addition of a moving-average parameter as was done for Simulation 6A.
In Simulation 6A’s (0,1,1) models, the problem of auto-correlation has
been improved but only at the cost of further obfuscating one’s perception of the
DGP.  Figure 2.5 shows the modest improvement in the mean (1.874) and
distribution of the Durbin-Watson statistic (skewness=-0.98 and kurtosis=4.06). 
As was seen in Simulation 4, Table 2.15 shows a significant moving-average
parameter in nearly every case where the original dependent variable was
variance stationary (d < .5).  Increasing the degree to which the dependent
variable has been over-differenced biases downwards the moving-average’s
standard errors while simultaneously biasing its coefficient upwards.  As Tables
2.16 and 2.17 show, rather than the reduction of its standard errors, it is the
explosion in the values of X’s coefficients that accounts for the moving-average’s
often enormous t-statistics (Table 2.18) and the model’s drastically improved R2
values (Table 2.19).  Even when a variable is over-differenced by as little as .1,
moving-average parameters become significant more than 5 times as often as
chance should allow.  At the other end of the spectrum, over-differencing by .9
creates non-invertible moving average coefficients over one-quarter of the time. 
As Table 2.20 shows, support for Hypothesis 2.4 - that a significant increase in
the rate of spurious regressions occurs as a result of over-differencing both sides
of the equation - is not mitigated by adding a moving-average parameter to the
estimated equation.  Finally, the size of the spurious regression problem ranges
from mild to serious as the d value of the pre-differenced Y crosses the 0.5
threshold and becomes variance stationary.
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Next, Simulation 6B tested an over-differenced fractionally integrated
dependent variable modeled in (1,1,0) form with a first-differenced independent
variable.  Durbin’s h test values showed that the addition of the auto-regressive
component is helpful in mitigating, though not quite eliminating, the problem of
negative auto-correlation.  Spurious regressions occur less frequently (Table
2.21) with X’s standard errors and coefficients again biased from their expected
values as the level of over-differencing increases.  As was seen with the moving-
average parameters, over-differencing introduces short-term dynamics into the
series.  Table 2.22 shows the high frequency with which the auto-regressive
parameters are statistically significant especially where d #  -.5 for the
differenced series.  Further, the high frequency of significant auto-regressive
parameters contributes to inflated R values. Finally, we can see that estimating2  
the d parameter has the added advantage of being more parsimonious as (0,d,0)
models simplify more archaic (1,1,0) models and thus conserve a degree of
freedom.
One final set of bivariate simulations investigates whether sample size
has an effect on the consequences of over-differencing.  Each of the dependent
and independent variable was first-differenced with sample sizes of 50, 100, 200,
and 500 for Simulations 6C, 6D, 6E, and 6F, respectively.  Increasing sample
size was found to minimize the rate of spurious regressions which ranged from
7,325 for T=50 to 6,891 for T=500.   This improvement, however, is
unsatisfactory, especially given that so few political time-series can ever hope to
attain 500 time-points.  Indeed, a larger sample size does nothing to alleviate the
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problem of auto-correlation in the errors and Durbin-Watson values actually
diverge further from 2 as T increases.  Nevertheless, larger sample sizes were
found to decrease the upwards bias on standard errors (Table 2.23) and thereby
mitigate the problem of false rejections of the null hypothesis.  8
2.6 Conclusion
The Monte Carlo experiments presented above clearly show that
fractional differencing is the  appropriate method of dealing with fractionally
integrated data.  With the ability of statistical packages such as RATS and OX to
simply and quickly estimate the long-memory parameter d for a given series and
then fractionally difference the series by that amount, the threats to inference
posed by incorrectly differencing have become as unnecessary as they are
drastic.  Indeed, regardless of its original d value, fractional differencing creates
a series with the same behavior as a stationary process, the same happy result
as occurs when a unit-root process is first-differenced.  Thus, when included in
bivariate regressions, two fractionally differenced series are no more likely to
appear to be related than are two stationary processes.  The distribution of
standard errors, coefficients, t-statistics, and Durbin-Watson statistics were the
same for simulations which began with variables where d=0 as they were for
those who required fractional differencing to achieve stationarity.  Thus,
fractional differencing is found to be vastly superior to the choice of under-
differencing.
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As demonstrated by Monte Carlo simulations, the traditional choice of
first-differencing also presents serious threats to inference when variables fall in
the range 0 # d < 1.  Among the negative consequences of over-differencing are:
upward bias of standard errors and coefficients, increased negative auto-
correlation in the error term and an increased rate of false rejections of the null
hypothesis.  It was shown analytically, as well as in simulation experiments, that
first differencing a fractionally integrated series introduces artificial short-term
dynamics into the transformed series.  Although modleing these short-term
dynamics in estimated equations mitigates the problems of over-differencing, it
does so imperfectly and entails a loss of parsimony.  In the next chapter, Monte
Carlo experiments using simulated fractionally integrated time-series in
multivariate regressions demonstrate that the value of fractional differencing
extends to more complex models of time-dependent relationships as well.    
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Endnotes
1. A sample size of 150 was chosen because it is typical of time-series used by
political scientists.  Values for the simulated series were drawn from a (0,1) Beta
distribution.  The ARFSIM procedure was developed by Rob Schoen and is
available through the Estima website.  The procedure is based on the proposed
method of Davies and Harte (1987) and is described in Beran (1994:215-17). 
See Appendix 1 for RATS programs and seed values.
2. The (0,1) Beta distribution was chosen so that the simulated series would
closely resemble the type of political series under investigation here, i.e.
aggregated and bounded on both ends with no known bias towards the normal
curve.  Choosing the (0,1) Beta distribution rather than the normal means that,
holding d to zero, there is an equal probability of choosing any number between
zero and one.
3. The values of the standard error estimates are only important relative to the
values of the coefficient estimates.  Since every time point in every one of the
simulated series falls between zero and one, the average value for standard
errors and absolute coefficients is quite low.  
4. Each cell can be thought of as a sample observation of an entire population of
t-statistics.  The overall population is normally distributed and every twentieth
individual has a t-statistic greater than 1.96 or less than -1.96.  In order to judge
if any of these observations are statistically distinguishable (.05) from the
expected 50, a confidence interval is used as follows:
A = P +/- 1.96 [(P(1-P))/n]   where P = .051/2
simplified...  A = .05 +/- .0135
Thus, 95% of the observations should fall between 36.5 and 63.5 (see
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1990; 273).
5. The absolute values of coefficients are used rather than simple coefficients
because we are interested in the strength, not the direction of the relationship. 
Also, the use of absolute values keeps positive and negative values from
canceling each other out when averaged.
6. The absolute value of a moving-average parameter must be less than 1 for
invertibility.   Non-invertible moving-average parameters cannot be estimated by
Box-Jenkins techniques.  The failure of Box-Jenkins estimation procedures to
converge is often attributable to non-invertible moving-average processes
(Enders, 1995).
Enders (1995, p. 97) explains with the following MA(1) model:
Y  = ,  - 2,      which can be expressed as:  Y  / (1 - 2B) = ,t  t   t-1           t      t
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or
Y  + 2Y  + 2 Y  + 2 Y  + ...  = ,t  t-1  t-2  t-3     t 
2   3
If the absolute value of 2 <1, Y  can be represented by a finite-order AR processt
and estimation via the Box-Jenkins method is possible.  However, if 2 = 1, the
above becomes:
Y  = -Y  + Y  - Y + ...t  t-1  t-2  t-3 
 
As such, the autocorrelations and partial autorelations between Y  and Y  willt  t-n
never decay - a factor upon which Box-Jenkins estimation relies.  Enders (p. 97)
further explains that “there is nothing ‘improper’ about a non-invertible model.” 
The series Y implied by Y  = ,  - ,  is stationary with constant time-invariantt    t  t   t-1
mean, variance, and autocovariances.  See also Hamilton (1994, pp. 64-68).
7. Moving-average parameters cannot be estimated using standard OLS
procedures (Box and Jenkins, 1970).
8. These findings seem to contradict Phillips (1986), Marmol (1995) and Lebo,
Walker, and Clarke (1998b) each of whom find that false rejections decreased
as T increased. This discrepancy is likely due to the fact that each of those
authors used series with positive d values while the over-differenced series of
Simulations 6C-6F have negative d values.  
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CHAPTER III
FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED TIME SERIES IN 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS:
A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
As Chapter II demonstrated, the fractional dynamics of each variable must
be properly dealt with in order for models to yield unbiased and credible
inferences.  This fact, in conjunction with Box-Steffensmeier and Smith’s (1996)
and Lebo, Walker, and Clarke’s (1998a) findings that fractional dynamics are
extremely prevalent in political analysis, has serious implications for long
accepted models of dynamic political relationships.  A reexamination of the
analyses in MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s 1989 article “Macropartisanship” in
light of the findings of Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1996, 1998), Lebo, Walker,
and Clarke (1998a) and the Monte Carlo results of Chapter II reveals the need to
reappraise dynamic models of political relationships.
In “Macropartisanship” MacKuen, et al. specify two time-series models.  In
the first, a quarterly measure of presidential approval is explained as a function
of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), various political events such as
Watergate and the Iranian hostage crisis, and presidential administration dummy
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variables (p. 1135).  In their estimation of these relationships, MacKuen, Erikson,
and Stimson opt for simplicity and keep their variables in level form which has
serious consequences for the inferences they draw.  Indeed, Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke (1998a)  estimate  d values for the quarterly ICS and presidential1
approval to be 0.91 and 0.89, respectively.    With a standard error of .068, Lebo2
et, al. reject the hypothesis of weak stationarity for both the ICS with t=13.37 and
presidential approval with t=13.44.   Based on these results, it is clear that3
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s use of these variables in level form is
inappropriate.  According to the Monte Carlo evidence of Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke (1998b), the long-memory characteristics of the ICS and presidential
approval make it 14 times more likely (71.5%) than chance would otherwise
allow that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson would find a significant (.05)
relationship between the two variables (p. 19).  This increased likelihood of
spuriousness was also present in their macropartisanship equation.
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson next explaine a level-form
macropartisanship, the proportion of Democratic identifiers out of all identifiers of
both parties, as a function of the Index of Consumer Sentiment, presidential
approval, historic events, and administration dummies.  Based on this model,
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson conclude that macropartisanship responds
quickly to changes in the independent variables implying that realignment is a
continuing process based on perceptions of economic performance and the
sitting president.  However, a better understanding of the time series properties
of the variables involved leads to different conclusions.
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The DGP that generated the macropartisanship variable is certainly a
textbook example of the type of process that will create fractional dynamics
(Granger 1980; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996, 1998).  At the individual
level, party identification switchers exhibit different autoregressive behavior than
will party stayers.  Aggregating these heterogenous behaviors to create the
macropartisanship variable creates fractional dynamics in the aggregate time
series data.  The long-memory of the macropartisanship variable is first
established empirically by Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1996) who estimate a d
parameter of .804 for the variable with a standard error of .057 rejecting the unit-
root hypothesis (.01).  The long-memory of Macropartisanship was further
confirmed by Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998a) who estimate d to be equal to
.82 with a standard error of .066.  As a long-memoried series, the fluidity of
partisan attachments suggested by MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson is certainly
over-stated.  
Further, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s macropartisanship equation
regresses a fractionally integrated variable (d=.8) on two other fractionally
integrated series with d=.91 (ICS) and d=.89 (presidential approval).  They were
thereby more likely than not to find significant relationships between their
variables merely due to the troublesome presence of long-memory.  Thus, for
theoretical as well as empirical reasons, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s
failure to account for the long-memory of macropartisanship seriously
compromises their findings.  
To date, the most important departure from practices that encourage such
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threats to inference is made with Box-Steffensmeier and Smith’s 1998 article,
“Investigating Political Dynamics Using Fractional Integration Methods.”  The
authors undertake a reappraisal of MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson’s
macropartisanship specification by applying a fractional differencing filter.  4
Although their ARFIMA specification allows the equation to be estimated with a
weakly stationary dependent variable, the authors leave their independent
variables, presidential approval and consumer sentiment, in their original,
fractionally integrated, form.  But, as Chapter II demonstrated, the failure to deal
with a fractionally integrated independent variable can cause problems on its
own including the biasing downwards of standard errors and regression
coefficients, and a slight rise in the probability of obtaining spurious results, i.e.,
an enhanced probability of type I errors.  
Hence, while their explanation and treatment of macropartisanship as a
fractionally integrated series is a significant improvement upon previous work,
Box-Steffensmeier and Smith seem to have incorrectly constructed their
multivariate ARFIMA transfer function.  Perfecting the methods with which we
analyze fractionally integrated data in multivariate models is a necessary step for
researchers of political time series.  With more confidence in the inferences
derived from their models, researchers can gain a better understanding of
complex political relationships such as those found in MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson’s “Macropartisanship” (1989).
The remainder of this chapter develops this methodology by testing a
variety of ways of dealing with fractionally integrated data in multivariate models. 
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The Monte Carlo simulations of Chapter II demonstrate that fractional
differencing on both sides of a bivariate model negates the threats to inference
posed by the original long-memory of either variable.  The remainder of this
chapter extends this finding to the multivariate case.  The several sets of
simulation results below test the efficacy of fractional-, and unit-differencing as
well as the option of leaving variables in level form.  And, as was the case in
Chapter II, the value of fractional differencing is again demonstrated.
3.2 Monte Carlo Simulations: Method and Control Simulation
For the most part, the multivariate simulations mimicked those of Chapter
II.  Specifically, RATS’ ARFSIM procedure was used to randomly generate three
series (Y , X , W ) so that T = 150 and d = 0.1 for each series.   Next, dependingt  t  t
5
on the simulation, some data transformation was performed on one, two, or all of
the series.  Then, using ordinary least squares (OLS), the dependent variable, Y,
was regressed on a constant, and the independent variables X  and W  and thet  t
following output was recorded: X-coefficient estimates, X-standard errors, W-
coefficient estimates, W-standard errors, R , and the Durbin-Watson statistic. 2
This procedure was repeated 1,000 times.  Next, the d value of X  was increasedt
by 0.1 and another 1,000 regressions were performed.  After 10,000 regressions,
the d value of W  was increased by 0.1 and the procedure was repeated untilt
100,000 regressions had been performed.  Finally, the value of Y  was increasedt 
by 0.1 and the first three loops were repeated until a data set of 1,000,000
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observations for each of the six statistics was created.  For each regression the
value of each of X’s and W’s t-statistic was calculated, and the number of times
that the absolute value of t was greater than 1.96 was counted for each to
determine the occurrence rate of type I errors at the .05 level of significance.  As
before, we should expect roughly 50 Type I errors for each set of 1,000
regressions.
To provide a basis for comparison, a control simulation was run.  As in
every simulation to follow, three series, Y , X , and W , were randomly generatedt  t   t
from a (0,1) Beta distribution.  However, for this experiment it was stipulated that
each series would be mean, variance, and covariance stationary with d=0.  For
each of 100,000 regressions with Y  as the dependent variable and X , and W  ast      t   t
the independent variables, the X-coefficients, X standard errors, W-coefficients,
W-standard errors, R , and Durbin-Watson statistic were recorded.  The2
frequency of type I errors was calculated for each of the two independent
variables and recorded as well.  As before, the results of this control simulation
conformed almost exactly with what we would expect based on probability and
thus provide a reliable model for later comparisons.  
The summary statistics for this multivariate control simulation are
presented in Table 3.1.  The coefficients for the independent variables X and W
are normally distributed with a mean very close to zero (skewness= -0.001 and
kurtosis = 3.001 for W; skewness = -0.021 and kurtosis = 3.035 for X) .  The
standard errors of X and W are normally distributed - though slightly skewed -
with a mean of .0824 for each (skewness= 0.224 and kurtosis = 3.092 for W;
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skewness = 0.255 and kurtosis = 3.112 for X).  The Durbin-Watson statistic is
normally distributed (skewness= -0.009 and kurtosis = 2.958) with a mean of
1.9993 indicating that on average there is no bias towards serial correlation in
the error term.  Although minuscule, the R  values average twice what they did2
for the bivariate control experiment, indicating the tendency of R  to rise with the2
addition of independent variables.  Most importantly, at 5,286 and 5,189 for X
and W, respectively, the occurrence rate of type I errors was statistically
indistinguishable from the 5,000 we would expect at the .05 level of significance. 
A second control simulation estimated a first-order auto-regressive parameter in
addition to the two stationary independent variables and found, as expected, this
AR parameter to be significant roughly 5% of the time.  Subsequent simulations
demonstrate the need to use fractional differencing to avoid the threats to
inference posed by fractionally integrated variables.
3.3 Multivariate Simulations: The Case of Under-Differencing
The simulations described below test a variety of methods for dealing with
fractional dynamics on either side of a multivariate regression model.  If the
threats posed by non-stationary data are eliminated, regression results should
follow those of the control simulation described above. The results indicate that,
as is the case for bivariate regression investigated in Chapter II, threats to
inference are minimized when all fractionally integrated variables are rendered
d=0 through the process of fractional differencing.   These results are described
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below after presenting the hypotheses of interest.  The first of the three under-
differencing hypotheses is:
H : In multivariate OLS regressions, fractionally differencing all variables by3.1
their respective estimated values of d produces spurious regression less often
than does fractionally differencing only the dependent variable while leaving the
independent variables in level form.  This can be expressed as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + b (1-B) W  + e    AND3.1   t    1 t  2 t  t
d(Y)     d(X)   d(W)
(1-B) Y  = a + b X  + b W  + ed(Y) t    3 t  4 t  t
b  and b  will be statistically significant (.05) more frequently than either b  or b .3  4          1  2
To confirm the value of fractionally differencing all variables, a second
hypothesis was tested:
H : In multivariate OLS regressions, fractionally differencing all of the3.2
independent and dependent variables by their respective values of d will produce
spurious regressions 5% of the time, i.e. at the same rate we would expect from
stationary variables.  This can be expressed as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + b (1-B) W  +e  3.2   t    1 t  2 t t
d(Y)     d(X)   d(W)
each of b  and b  will be statistically significant (.05) 5% of the time.1  2
As in Chapter II, the practice of fractionally differencing both sides is
tested against the alternative of fractionally differencing the dependent variable
and including a first-order autoregressive parameter as an independent variable
along with two fractionally integrated independent variables left in level form. 
Hypothesis 3.3 speculates on the results of this comparison:
H : In multivariate regressions, fractionally differencing both the dependent and3.3
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independent variables by their respective values of d produces spurious
regressions less often than does fractionally differencing the dependent variable
only and including a first-order autoregressive parameter as an independent
variable along with untransformed fractionally integrated independent variables. 
This can be expressed as:
H : for (1-B) Y  = a + b (1-B) X  + b (1-B) W  +e    AND3.3   t    1 t  2 t t
d(Y)     d(X)   d(W)
(1-B) Y  = a + Y  + b X  + b W  + e  d(Y) t    t-1  3 t  4 t  t
b  and b will be statistically significant more frequently than either b  or b .3  4         1  2
To test these three hypotheses and to further investigate the
consequences of various ARFIMA techniques, three sets of simulations were
performed as described above.  In Simulation 1, all of the variables were
differenced by their assigned value of d prior to the regression.  In Simulation 2,
the dependent variable was fractionally differenced by its d value while the two
dependent variables were left in level form.  In Simulation 3, Simulation 2 was
repeated with the addition of a lagged endogenous variable as an independent
variable in the regression equation.
Simulation 1 Results
As per Hypothesis 3.2 and as is found in Chapter II, when both sides were
fractionally differenced, the rate of spurious regressions was very near the
perfect rate of 5%, with X and W being statistically significant 52,077 and 52,062
times out of 1,000,000 trials, respectively.    Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the rate of
spurious regressions for X and W to be statistically distinguishable from 500 in
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14 of Table 3.2’s cells and in 10 of Table 3.3’s cells.   While the rate of spurious6
regressions is slightly higher than it should be, with an overall rate of roughly 5.2
type I errors per 100, Hypothesis 2 is supported.  Further, there is again no
evident pattern to suggest that fractional differencing gains or loses its ability to
prevent spurious regressions as d varies between 0 and 1.
A closer examination of the results of Simulation 1 reveals how fractionally
differencing both sides of the equation guards against biases that would threaten
inferences.  The Durbin-Watson values of Tables 3.4 show no bias towards
autocorrelation when each set of 10,000 regressions is averaged thus
demonstrating the overall value of fractionally differencing both sides.  A closer
look at the coefficient estimates (Table 3.5) and standard errors (Table 3.6) of
the independent variable, X, shows that these values do not change depending
upon the variable’s initial value of d.   Indeed, each of the sets of coefficients,7
standard errors, and Durbin-Watson statistics are normally distributed and have
mean values nearly identical to those produced by the control simulation.  8
Comparing these results with those of Simulation 2 and Simulation 3, we see
where problems arise when we fail to account for the fractional dynamics of the
independent variables.
Simulation 2 & 3 Results
In Simulation 2, the independent variables were left in level form while the
dependent variable was rendered d=0 by fractional differencing.  As was seen in
Chapter II, several problems emerged.  Type I errors rose to 54,425 and 55,055
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per 1,000,000 for the X and W variables, respectively.  While this increase is not
perilously high, it does represent an approximately 10% increase in spurious
regressions and indicates that problems are likely present in the coefficient and
standard error estimates.  Tables 3.7 and 3.8 bear out this suspicion as one
sees coefficients (shown in Table 3.7) and standard errors (shown in Table 3.8)
biased downwards for an independent variable as its own value of d moves from
0 to 1.   Indeed, as d moves from .1 to 1.0, the average coefficient and standard9
error diminishes by roughly 75%.  
The simultaneous downwards bias of coefficients and standard errors
does guard against the inflation of t-statistics and type I errors but is nonetheless
problematic.  Without the ability to trust our estimates, coefficients lose their
primary function as indicators of the size of the effect of one variable upon
another.  This is true not only for coefficients of standard independent variables
but also for those of error correction mechanisms.  The coefficient of an error
correction mechanism specifies the rate at which cointegrating variables will
return to equilibrium following a shock (Engle and Granger 1987; Banerjee,
Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry 1993).  With bias in the estimation of this
coefficient, our understanding of the equilibrium relationship will be
misunderstood.  Chapter IV shows how best to deal with error correction
mechanisms in light of fractional dynamics.  Hence, based on these problems,
although Hypothesis 3.2 is not strongly supported, the consequences of leaving
fractionally integrated independent variables in level-form are sufficiently
troublesome to dismiss this method in favor of fractionally differencing both
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sides.  Next, a lagged endogenous variable was added to verify that fractional
differencing is the best method for dealing with fractionally integrated
independent variables.
The results of Simulation 3 indicate that none of the problems found in
Simulation 2 are alleviated by adding a lagged endogenous variable.  The
occurrence rate of spurious regressions for the two independent variables was
55,464 and 55,040 per 1,000,000 for W and X, respectively.  This represents
again the approximate 10% increase over what one should expect.  Breaking
down type-one errors for W by the d values of each of the independent variables,
Table 3.9 shows the tendency of spuriousness to increase as d moves from 0 to
1.  Note that in 65 of 100 cells in Table 3.9, the value is statistically
distinguishable from the expected 500 type-one errors and that for the X variable
the corresponding number is 64 out of 100.  While not overwhelmingly high,
these numbers are sufficient to support Hypothesis 3.  Furthermore, the
coefficients and standard errors for W shown in Tables 3.10 and 3.11,
respectively, again show a downward bias as d increases.  
Thus, a comparison of Simulations 1, 2, and 3 with the control simulation
provides clear support for the option of fractionally differencing all variables by
their respective values of d.  Aside from supporting Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, the
problems evident in coefficient and standard error estimates also are serious
enough to support the method of Simulation 1.  Indeed, as seen in Chapter II,
fractionally differencing all variables prior to their inclusion in a regression yields
results identical an all respects to those obtained in a regression where d=0 for
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all variables initially.  Next, the option of fractionally differencing independent
variables is compared with the option of wholly differencing them.
3.4 Multivariate Simulations: The Case of Over-Differencing
Although simulations 2 and 3 tested the consequences of assuming no
long-term memory in the independent variables, the following two simulations
test the consequences of assuming perfect memory, first in the independent
variables, and, second, in all the variables.  As discussed in Chapter II, over-
differencing a variable will introduce negative auto-correlation into its error term
and threaten inferences made using bivariate or multivariate regression models. 
For the case where a dependent variable is over-differenced only to a slight
extent, these threats may remain low and the autocorrelation can be
accommodated by including a moving average process.  However, as the degree
of over-differencing increases autocorrelation can wreak havoc on estimates and
often, by creating non-invertible moving average processes, make estimation
impossible.  Although Chapter II establishes most of these practical difficulties,
two additional simulations are presented here to demonstrate the continuing
usefulness of fractional differencing when one moves from the bivariate to the
multivariate case.  
Simulation 4 & 5 Results
Simulation 4 regresses a fractionally differenced dependent variable on a
constant and two wholly differenced variables, thus testing the consequences of
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over-differencing only on the right-hand side of a regression model.  While this
approach is one unlikely to be chosen purposely, we can envision the case
where Dickey-Fuller tests suggest to a researcher that his/her dependent
variable is stationary but that their independent variables requires differencing to
achieve stationarity.  The results of Simulation 4 suggest that the negative
effects of this approach are relatively mild but nonetheless significant.  With
51,518 and 51,681 type I errors for W and X, respectively, spurious regressions
were not a problem.  Further, over-differencing the independent variables
produced only the slightest positive autocorrelation as evident in the Durbin-
Watson values of Table 3.12.  However, this tendency was minuscule even
where X and W had each been drastically over-differenced.
Once again, the true problem of this approach was found to be a
simultaneous biasing downwards of coefficients (Table 3.13) and standard errors
(Table 3.14).  Although not as strong as that seen in the under-differencing
simulations, the bias downwards of roughly 25% in cases of drastic over-
differencing is sufficient to warn against this practice.  Again, the failure of t-
statistics to rise is the result of two wrongs - downward bias in both standard
errors and coefficients - making a right. 
Simulation 5 tested the more relevant case of over-differencing both the
dependent and independent variables.  Given the commonality of fractional
integration (Lebo, Walker, and Clarke 1998a) and given many researchers’
reliance upon stationarity tests incapable of distinguishing between unit-root and
fractionally integrated processes, over-differencing both sides of a regression is
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a common mistake.  The results of this simulation show that the consequences
of this mistake are significant.  The occurrence rate of Type I errors for W and X
were 71,080 and 70,900 per million, respectively, indicating roughly a 40% loss
of efficiency in the 5% probability level.  Table 3.15 demonstrates that as the
degree to which an independent variable has been over-differenced increases,
so too does the likelihood of finding a statistically significant relationship between
it and a dependent variable.  Isolating the case where the d value of Y equals a
value common for a political variable, 0.7, Table 3.16 shows that even where
over-differencing of the dependent variable is slight (0.3), significant relationships
become far more frequent than chance should allow.  As before, spurious
regressions increase as standard errors are biased downwards faster than are
coefficient estimates.  One final problem arises from over-differencing both sides
of the equation.  As found earlier, negative autocorrelation continues to plague
these regressions with Durbin-Watson statistics averaging 2.533 (Table 3.17). 
Note that this autocorrelation appears uniform throughout Table 3.17 because it
is dependent wholly on the over-differencing of Y.    
3.5 Conclusion
From the Monte Carlo experiments presented here, it is clear that
fractional differencing maintains its utility in multivariate models.  Complex
models of political relationships should begin by estimating values of d for each
variable and then should difference each variable by its own value of d.  In so
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doing, researchers avoid introducing autocorrelation into their analyses, avoid
biasing their coefficients estimates and standard errors, and minimize the
possibility of finding a significant relationship between two variables where none
truly exists.  Furthermore, avoiding the knife-edged decision between stationarity
(I(0)) and unit-root behavior (1(1)) will allow competing researchers to come to a
consensus as they first agree on the time series properties of their variables and
then move on to investigate the relationships among them.  In the following two
chapters, complex multivariate ARFIMA models of political relationships are
developed and used to demonstrate the value of rendering variables d=0. 
Chapter IV considers models of  governing party support in Great Britain and




1. Using Robinson’s (1995) Gaussian Semi-Parametric Estimator.  Sowell’s
(1992) exact maximum likelihood estimator was also used and yielded d
estimates and standard errors of 0.928 and .085 for presidential approval and
0.874 and .070 for the ICS.  Robinson’s estimation procedure (RGSER.SRC) is
available for RATS on the Estima web page: http://www.estima.com.  Values are
derived from the estimation of (0,1+d,0)  models.  The variables are first-
differenced before estimation because of the constrained parameter space that
does not allow estimation of the long memory parameter except when -1.5 < d <
.5 (see Hamilton 1994: 449).  Sowell’s estimator is available as part of OX, the
matrix language that accompanies PCGive 9.0 and is also available on its own
on the web at: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik (June, 1999).  Again, data
must be first differenced before estimation.  As the output of each of Sowell’s
and Robinson’s procedures reflects an estimate of d for the first differenced
series, 1 must be added to these estimates to obtain the d value of the original
series.  See Baillie (1996) for a more complete explanation of these estimation
procedures.  Chapter IV discusses methods of estimating d in greater detail. 
2. Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (1998) estimated d values for the ICS and
presidential approval to be .258 and .261, respectively with standard errors of
.329 and .297.  They were thus unable to reject the null hypothesis of weak
stationarity for either variable.  These d values are extremely suspect, however,
as they were estimated simultaneously with autoregressive and moving-average
parameters in (3,d,3) models.  Box-Steffensmeier and Smith use these more
complex models based upon the suggestions of OX’s incorrectly calculated
Schwartz Information Criterion which failed to properly discriminate against less
parsimonious models.  Using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Lebo,
Walker, and Clarke (1998a) find the ICS is best characterized by a (0,d,0)
process and that presidential approval is best characterized by a (1,d,0) process
(see Akaike 1973, 1974; and Chatfield 1996: 226 for a complete discussion of
the AIC).
3. Rejection of the unit-root hypothesis at the .05 level of significance was not
possible for the ICS with t=1.32 but was just possible for presidential approval
with t=1.66.
4. For another conception of how to understand macropartisanship see Green,
Palmquist, and Schickler’s APSR article “Macropartisanship: A Replication and
Critique.”  In their response to Green, et al., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
maintain that they are still unconvinced that macropartisanship is anything other
than a stationary AR1 process (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 1998).  Finally,
Walker and Lebo (1999 working paper) re-conceive the macropartisanship
equation by fractionally differencing each of macropartisanship, presidential
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approval, and the index of consumer sentiment.
5. As was done for the bivariate simulations, values for the simulated series were
drawn from a (0,1) Beta distribution.  See Appendix 2 for RATS programs and
seed values.
6.  Again, each cell should be conceived of as a sample observation of an entire
population of t-statistics.  The overall population is normally distributed and one
in 20 individuals have an absolute value greater than 1.96.  To judge whether
any observation is statistically distinguishable from the expected value of 500 per
10,000, a confidence interval is used as follows:
A = P +/- 1.96 [(P(1-P))/n]   where P = .051/2
simplified...  A = .05 +/- .00427
Thus, 95% of the observations should fall between 457.3  and 542.7 (see
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1990; 273). Note that this confidence interval is not
simply ten times that of the confidence interval in Chapter II.  The consistency of
the OLS regression results is apparent as the distribution becomes steeper with
an increased sample size. (For a detailed description of the Central Limit
Theorem see Kmenta 1986 or Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988).
7. The values in these tables are nearly identical to those of the second
independent variable, W.
8. For the W coefficient, skewness = -0.001 and kurtosis = 3.035.  For the X
coefficient, skewness = 0.006 and kurtosis = 3.034.  For the W standard error,
skewness = .230 and kurtosis = 3.124.  For the X standard error, skewness =
.223 and kurtosis = 3.101.  For the Durbin-Watson statistic, skewness = 0.000
and kurtosis = 2.958.  Skewness scores should be as near to 0 as possible and
kurtosis scores should be as near to 3 as possible (Hamilton 1993).  Note that
the slight skewness in the distribution of the standard errors is the same as was
seen in the control simulation.
9. Further, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 demonstrate the tendency for one independent
variable’s standard error and coefficient estimate to rise slightly as the d value of
another independent variable rises.  This is likely due to increases in
multicollinearity between the two independent variables as d increases for both.  
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CHAPTER IV
FRACTIONAL COINTEGRATION AND MODELS OF
GOVERNING PARTY SUPPORT IN GREAT BRITAIN
4.1 Introduction
Based on the Monte Carlo results of Chapters II and III, it is apparent that
multivariate models of political relationships need to account for the fractional
dynamics of their variables.  Through the process of fractional differencing
variables can be rendered d=0 and thereafter included in multivariate models
without threatening inferences.  This chapter seeks to apply these findings while
investigating the question of what drives governing party support in Great Britain. 
Also, following Cheung and Lai (1993), the problem of fractional dynamics is
extended to the methodology of cointegration and error correction mechanisms
in models of British politics.
The chapter begins by reviewing the debate regarding various
specifications of governing party support in Britain.  This is followed by
arguments concerning why one should expect the British variables of governing
party support, prime ministerial approval, and four subjective measures of
economic performance each to be fractionally integrated.  Tests of stationarity
are discussed and applied to the British data as are methods for estimating the
68
fractional differencing parameter, d. 
A discussion of the relatively new concept of fractional cointegration
follows and the plausibility of fractionally-integrated error correction mechanisms
is considered.  Next, tests of fractional cointegration between the variables are
presented.  Governing party support is then explained in terms of a multivariate
ARFIMA model that includes a fractionally-differenced error correction
mechanism.  Finally, encompassing tests are employed to address first the
controversy concerning what kind of economic evaluations drive governing party
support in Britain and, second, the topic regarding how model specification can
be improved through the use of fractional integration and fractional cointegration
techniques.
4.2 Prospections, Retrospections and Prime Ministerial Approval
As the link between objective economic conditions and individuals’
perceptions of their own and their country’s financial well-being, survey data
collected by in Britain by Gallup have proven useful in terms of predicting
governing party support (Sanders 1991; Sanders 1995; Clarke and Stewart
1995; Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 1997).  Indeed, the compilation of several
long series of subjective economic evaluations has greatly enhanced the ability
of researchers to isolate  the most important economic factors that affect voting
decisions.  Although a consensus has grown regarding their advantages, debate
continues about which subjective measure is most valuable as a predictor of
party support.  
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On the one hand, Key’s (1966) claim that voters punish or reward
incumbents for the state of their pocketbooks strongly supports retrospective
evaluations (hereafter the PR model).  In contrast, Sanders’ use of personal
expectations (hereafter the PE model) was a key to his impressive ability to
predict the surprise Conservative victory in the 1992 British General Election
(Sanders 1991).
Further, debate exists between those such as Key and Sanders who
emphasize the importance of personal, or ‘egocentric,’ evaluations and others
such as Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) and MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992)
who favor national, or ‘sociotropic,’ evaluations.  MacKuen et al. (1992) argue
convincingly that national expectations (hereafter the NE model) outperform the
national retrospection (NR) model for the case of American presidential approval
while Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) and many others (see Clarke et. al., 1992: Ch.
1) favor national retrospections.  
Despite the controversy between the advocates of these competing
models, it should be noted that the variables at issue are quite similar.  Clarke
and Stewart (1995) observe strong correlations among the four subjective
measures (averaging r=.67 from 1979-1992) and between each of the four
measures and governing party support but nevertheless find personal measures
to be preferable to national ones.  That these authors find no clear winner
between Key’s PR model and Sanders’ PE model suggests that perhaps the
longer period of data and the more sophisticated methodological approach
provided herein may be useful in clearing up the question of which model works
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best.
An additional controversy among analysts of the dynamics of party
support in Britain concerns the inclusion of prime ministerial approval as an
explanatory variable (see, e.g., Butler and Stokes 1976; Clarke, Ho, and Stewart
1998).  The close relationship between the two variables (r=.91 for 1979-1996) is
sufficient to make one wary of including prime ministerial approval as an
independent variable (Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 1998).  Indeed, if the variables
are too closely related, modeling one in terms of the other is paramount to
modeling one in terms of itself, a pointless exercise.  Yet, as the embodiment of
the party in power, it is important to include support levels for the prime minister
in any attempt to predict support for the party in power (Crewe and King 1994;
Clarke and Stewart 1995).  
These latter theoretical and methodological controversies have motivated
the use of sophisticated techniques such as tests for cointegration and the
development of models that include error correction mechanisms to capture the
long-run equilibrium relationship between variables (Clarke and Stewart 1995;
Clarke, Stewart and Whiteley 1997; Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 1998).  Later, it is
shown that the assumptions of cointegration are too restrictive and that the
relationship between prime ministerial approval and governing party support is
best described as fractionally cointegrated.  First, however, I present a brief
discussion of how fractional dynamics arise and, second, why one should expect
the British data to exhibit this property.
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4.3 Fractional Dynamics and the British Case
Granger (1980) explains three ways by which a fractionally integrated
series can be created.  In the first case, aggregating individual-level
heterogenous behavior will produce fractional dynamics.  This heterogeneity
exists with respect to various autoregressive and moving average tendencies
(see equation (1.2)).  The aggregated series will long remember the behavior of
individuals with strong auto-regressive tendencies while quickly forgetting the
behavior of others.  Eventually, the series will revert to a long-term mean, but this
may not occur until some time in the distant future.  Fractional dynamics also
may arise, Granger (1980) explains, when we aggregate data with dynamic
relationships at the individual-level or when the disturbance term of a series is
fractionally integrated.  Of these three possibilities, it is the first that is relevant
here.  
Indeed, governing party support, prime ministerial approval, and the four
subjective evaluations of the economy are each constructed by aggregating the
opinions of a random sample of individuals.  While Granger’s forewarning should
immediately alert us to the possibility of fractional integration, theoretical debate
among partisanship scholars gives rise to this suspicion as well.   On the one
hand, Green and Palmquist (1990, 872) state that “the outstanding characteristic
(of party identification) is persistence over time.”  Realignment theories also
assume a great deal of persistence over time that can only be interrupted by
major shocks (Burnham 1970; Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 1980; Sundquist
1983; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996).  
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On the other hand, Converse’s (1964) Black/White model and Key’s
(1966) Switchers/Stand-patters model both suggest that partisanship is
immovable for some citizens while for others minor disturbances can cause them
to shift allegiances.  In their examination of the British electorate, Byers and Peel
(1997) argue that understanding that the electorate is composed of “committed”
and “uncommitted” voters necessarily leads to the conclusion that approval
measures will be fractionally integrated.  The stronger partisan attachments of
the committed voters will dictate their opinions and their votes while the
uncommitted will base these decisions on short-term factors such as
performance (Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 1999).
Hence, it becomes easier to imagine volatility when we move from
partisanship to survey responses measuring voting intentions, leadership
approval, and subjective evaluations of the economy.  Allsop and Weisberg
(1988) show that voting intentions can oscillate over short periods while actual
partisanship remains relatively stable.  In the American case, the popularity of
split ticket voting is further evidence that, even if partisanship is persistent,
individuals’ voting behavior - and their voting intentions as measured in surveys -
are considerably more erratic (Fiorina 1990).  Thus, the size of a shock needed
to induce some to switch their vote intention is smaller than that needed to alter
their partisanship.  Smaller still is the size of a shock needed for some
respondents to alter their responses on political questionaires.  For the less
politically sophisicated, the size of this shock may be such that their expressed
opinions may be based upon the party foremost in their minds at the time they
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are surveyed (Taylor and Fiske 1978; Zaller 1992).  
Zaller (1992) hypothesizes that political knowledge is distributed normally
with individuals with high and low levels of information at the extremes.  For
persons with a great deal of political knowledge it will take a tremendous amount
of new information to sway their opinions.  However, those in the middle of this
distribution are susceptible to recent information and will incorporate it into their
assessments and their opinions.  Lastly, the responses of those with low levels
of information may change based upon the slightest of shocks such as a
newspaper headline or a six o’clock news sound-bite. 
Thus, within each monthly sample of the British data there will be
individuals with a diverse array of auto-regressive tendencies, the distribution of
which will determine the degree of persistence in an aggregated series.  One
may speculate that some variables, such as prime ministerial approval, are likely
to be dominated by stayers/stand-patters as most people’s opinions of the
country’s leader are unlikely to change from month to month.  On the other hand,
subjective economic evaluations are far more likely to be volatile at the individual
level as people continually reassess personal and national fortunes in light of
updated information about national and personal economic conditions.   1  
Hence, there are several reasons to suspect that fractional dynamics will
characterize the series of interest.  Previous chapters demonstrate that failing to
fractionally difference fractionally integrated independent variables leads to a
host of problems including the downward bias of Durbin-Watson values and the
upward bias of standard errors and, subsequently, spurious regressions.  Thus,
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to avoid the problems presented by under-differencing as well as those of over-
differencing, one should take two preliminary steps prior to developing
multivariate models.  First, the nature of memory, d, should be identified for each
variable and, second, in order to render error terms white-noise processes, each
variable should be differenced by its own value of d.  Following a discussion of
the data, tests of stationarity and estimates of d are employed to accomplish the
first of these tasks.
4.4 Data, Tests of Stationarity, and Point Estimates of d
As did the first Thatcher government, the monthly British data used herein
begin in August, 1979.  The six series end in December, 1996, four months
before the Conservatives’ defeat in the May 1, 1997 general election.   Hence,2
the British case provides one with the rare opportunity to study over two hundred
months of single party rule in a mature democracy.  The first Gallup variable is
governing (Conservative) party support, calculated by adding the percentage of
respondents replying “Conservative” to the question “If there were a general
election tomorrow, which party would you support?” to the percentage who
replied “don’t know” to the latter question and “Conservative” to the subsequent
question: “Which party would you be most inclined to vote for?”  The second
variable, prime ministerial approval, was calculated as the percentage saying
they are “satisfied” to the question, “Are you satisfied with [name] as prime
minister?”  The remaining four variables are subjective economic evaluations
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calculated by subtracting the percentage of negative responses from the
percentage of positive ones to the following questions: 
(a) personal expectations (or prospections) - “How do you think the financial
situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?” 
(b) personal retrospections - “How does the financial situation of your household
now compare with what it was 12 months ago?” 
(c) national expectations (or prospections) - “How do you think the general
economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months?” 
(d) national retrospections - “How do you think the general economic situation in
this country has changed over the last 12 months?”  
Each variable is bounded between -100 and +100 and is an aggregate
measure of individual-level behavior, characteristics that both suggest fractional
integration (Granger 1980; DeBoef and Granato 1997b).  Multiple tests of
stationarity and estimation of d for each show the hypothesis of fractional
integration is suggested by the data.
While several tests of stationarity exist, each is limited in its own way
(Maddala and Kim 1998).  Thus, it is a sound idea to rely upon multiple tests of
stationarity in addition to point estimates of d to ascertain a series’ degree of
integration.   Four such tests, each of which addresses the problem of3
stationarity in a different way, were used.  The first of these tests was the Dickey-
Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979, 1981).
The Dickey-Fuller unit-root test uses the following regression model:
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)R  = " (R  + " J + G )R  + , (4.1)
J  0 + J-1  2    J-B  J
In its basic form, the Dickey-Fuller equation includes a differenced version
of the series of interest, lagged values of the level-form series, and the error
term.  Testing for a random walk with drift requires the addition of the constant
term, " .  Testing for a deterministic time trend adds " J.  The null hypothesis for0          2
the test is a unit-root with or without drift, (=0, against the alternative hypothesis
that (<0.  To deal with autocorrelation in the error term, the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) inserts lagged values of )R  so that the Dickey-Fuller
J
regression residuals are rendered white noise and inferences about ( become
possible.
Table 4.1 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests for the British data. 
While each of the four subjective economic measures rejects the null hypothesis
of a random walk at the .05 level, Conservative party support and prime
ministerial approval look to be borderline cases in the d=0 vs. d=1 dichotomy. 
However, these results are suspect given findings that the Dickey-Fuller test has
low power in light of fractional alternatives (Diebold and Rudebusch 1991).  With
the likelihood of fractional processes, it is preferable to use a test with an
alternative hypothesis of fractional behavior.  The variance ratio test is
appropriate for this purpose.
The variance ratio test is useful because it tests a null hypothesis of a

















































((1-L) x  =e ) (Diebold 1989).   Given that a unit-root series will never forget ad    4t t
random shock, the variance ratio test tests the hypothesis that the variance in
period k should be k times the variance in period 1.  The test statistic, R(k), is
formally given in (4.2) with k as the differencing interval.
The results of the variance ratio tests shown in Table 4.2 are generally
similar to the Dickey-Fuller results.  The null hypothesis of random walk with drift
is rejected (.05) for each of the four subjective economic measures as well as for
Conservative party vote intentions.  Again, the null hypothesis of a random walk
cannot be rejected for prime ministerial approval.  Some discrepancies do exist
between the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests and those of the Variance Ratio
tests, however.  Although each set of results indicate that unit-root behavior does
not characterize the four subjective measures, the differences between the tests’
alternate hypotheses determine that the tests are unable to agree on whether


















hypothesis of stationary behavior against fractional alternatives.  The tests
developed by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992, KPSS hereafter) fit
this description, and thus allow further clarification of the dynamics of the British
series.  
The KPSS tests (1992) focus on two distinct processes in the series under
examination.  The tests separate the series into a deterministic trend, a random
walk, and a stationary error term (KPSS 1992: 162).  The series is then tested for
strong mixing properties using a score test shown in (4.3).  Strong mixing refers
to the tendency of a series’ autocorrelation function to die down quickly as
correlations between time points are “mixed” away at a constant, exponential
rate (KPSS 1992). 
In (4.3), T represents the sample size, s (l) is an estimate of the2
disturbance variance, and S  is the partial sum of the residuals, e .  The first oft        i
the two KPSS tests, 0 , employs a base equation consisting solely of theµ
stationary errors and an intercept parameter to test for strong mixing against an
alternative of either a unit-root or fractionally integrated process.  The second
test, 0 , adds a linear trend to the intercept and errors and tests the same null
J
and alterative hypotheses.  Lee and Schmidt (1996) demonstrated the ability of
the KPSS tests to be consistent against I(d) alternatives and thereby found them
useful in distinguishing among short- and long-term dynamics.  Political scientists
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have also begun to appreciate the usefulness of the KPSS tests (Ostrom and
Smith 1993; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996, 1998).
Table 4.3 shows the results of the first KPSS test, 0 .  Looking at columnµ
3 with the recommended lag truncation parameter of 4, we see that Conservative
party support and prime ministerial approval each reject the null hypothesis of
strong mixing at the .01 level.  The egocentric economic measures reject the null
hypothesis only at the .10 level and neither of the sociotropic measures is
capable of rejecting the hypothesis that d=0.  
Table 4.4 shows the results of the second KPSS test, 0 .  Here the results
J
are nearly unanimous as all but national expectations fail to reject the null
hypothesis of strong mixing at the .01 level.  Thus, trend stationary processes do
not describe these series.  Combining the results of these KPSS tests with those
of the variance ratio tests and the Dickey-Fuller tests, it is evident that the
stationary/integrated (I(1)) dichotomy is too restrictive for these series. 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of all the stationarity tests.  Based solely
on these tests, it seems that Conservative party support and prime ministerial
approval are each characterized by a greater degree of persistence than are any
of the subjective economic measures.  Indeed, no test rejects the possibility that
prime ministerial approval is a unit-root series.  Nevertheless, while these tests
are helpful for preliminary diagnoses of time series, generating direct estimates
of the order of integration remains an important next step.
The exact value of d may be estimated using several techniques including
semiparametric estimation (Geweke and Porter-Hudak 1983; Robinson 1995),
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approximate maximum likelihood estimation in the frequency domain (Fox and
Taqqu 1986), and exact maximum likelihood estimation in the time domain
(Sowell 1992).   Before looking at the results of two of these procedures, the5
advantages and disadvantages of each are discussed.
Sowell (1992) finds that the approximate maximum likelihood techniques
of Fox and Taqqu (1986) and the semiparametric estimation techniques of
Geweke et al. (1983, GPH hereafter) each have undesirable properties when
sample size is small.  Given the relatively short length of most political time-
series, this is particularly unfortunate.  Hurvich and Ray (1995) find the
semiparametric estimation of GPH to be less than optimal as bias exists in
estimates of d and mean square error.   Though it has yet to be thoroughly6
examined, Robinson’s (1995) gaussian semiparametric estimation technique,
available in RATS, seems to be a significant improvement upon the GPH
estimator.  Sowell’s (1992) full maximum likelihood estimation, available in OX,
has also proven to be a reliable and easy to implement method of estimating d.  7
Yet in their survey of these rival procedures, Smith, Sowell, and Zin (1993, 1996)
conclude that there are small bias tradeoffs using either approximate maximum
likelihood or Sowell’s estimation procedure.  Based on these studies, it seems
that Robinson’s procedure is most appropriate with Sowell’s the best alternate.8
Thus, the d value for each of the British series was estimated using both
Robinson’s and Sowell’s estimator.  Searching for the best noise model that
accounted for both the short- and long-term dynamics of each series, d was
estimated for each variable in a (0,d,0) model and in (p,d,q) models containing
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up to three autoregressive and three moving average parameters.  The Akaike
Information Criterion (Akaike 1973, 1974), and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion
(Enders 1995) were employed to distinguish which of  the 16 models per variable
was superior.   According to the BIC, the (0,d,0) model was the best noise model9
for each of the six variables.  According to the AIC, the (0,d,0) models also work
best for each variable.10
Table 4.6 shows the results of the d estimates using both Robinson’s
semiparametric estimator and Sowell’s full maximum likelihood estimator.  It is
immediately apparent that the two procedures yield very similar estimates. 
Indeed, in all but one case, the estimates are within one standard error of one
another.  Furthermore, the two estimators strongly agree that d does not equal
zero for any of these series and that d does not equal one for every series save
prime ministerial satisfaction.  While estimates for d of .96 and .91 for this
variable indicate fractional integration, they are each within two standard errors
of one and thus rejection of the unit-root hypothesis is impossible.  Based on
these results, we can conclude that fractional integration characterizes five (and
perhaps all) of the six series.  Next, the concept of fractional cointegration is
discussed and used to analyze the relationship between Conservative vote
intentions and prime ministerial approval.
4.5 Fractional Cointegration and Fractional Error Correction Models
Just as the likelihood of finding fractional dynamics in political variables
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motivates a reconfiguration of standard regression techniques, the methodology
of cointegration must likewise be rethought in light of the possibilities of long-
memoried equilibrium relationships between variables.  Among the advantages
of this new methodology is the ability to identify more precisely the equilibrium
relationship between two or more variables.  Thus, along with ARFIMA modeling,
fractional cointegration techniques improve the chances for rival modelers to
reach a consensus on the nature of the relationships among their variables.  The
concept of fractional cointegration is most easily explained as a more general
form of traditional cointegration.
Cointegration can be understood as a long-term relationship between two
or more variables (Granger 1981; Engle and Granger 1991; Beck 1993).  An
equilibrium relationship exists between the variables so that shocks to one
variable are gradually “re-equilibrated” and the long-term relationship continues
(Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley 1997; Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 1999). 
Standard operating procedure for finding cointegration relies on, first, finding
each of the original series to be unit-roots (I(1)) and, second, finding the
residuals of a cointegrating regression to be white-noise (I(0)).  Simple unit-root
tests such as Dickey-Fuller are a usual method for assessing the order of
integration (Dickey and Fuller 1979).   However, when one ceases to demand11
that d has an integer value and one realizes the infinite values on the number
line between 0 and 1, it is evident that one’s chances to find potential candidates
for cointegration are drastically reduced (Barkoulas and Baum 1997; Dueker and
Startz 1998).  In terms of the first step, finding unit-roots is a difficult task,
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especially when using aggregate measures of survey data (Lebo, Walker and
Clarke 1998a).  Also, the hope of finding residuals to be I(0) seems unnecessary
as it should be enough to find that these equilibrium errors are mean reverting
(Cheung and Lai 1993).  The key point is that despite being fractionally
integrated and thereby demonstrating persistence in the short-run, as long as the
equilibrium errors are mean reverting in the long-run and are of a lower order of
integration than are either of the initial variables, the initial variables are in
equilibrium and can be said to cointegrate.    12
Hence, relaxing these assumptions of integer-level integration seems a
viable way of fusing the methodology of cointegration with the concept of
fractional integration (Cheung and Lai 1993; Dueker and Startz 1998).   Abadir
and Taylor (1998, p. 6) redefine a bivariate cointegrating relationship as follows:
two variables, {Z } and {X } where Z  - I(d) and X  - I(b) are cointegrated if t   t   t    t
þg(.) such that 0/ Z  +g(X ) - I(s) and s < d.   t  t t
13
Thus, each of the parent and residual series may be I(d) where d 0 [0,1] and the
existence of some function g(X ) that reduces the order of integration for Zt         t
establishes that Z  and X  are cointegrated (Abadir and Taylor 1998; Box-t  t 
Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 1998).  As will be shown, such a relationship exists
between Conservative party support and prime ministerial approval.  
Next, with the extension of the methodology of cointegration to include
cases of fractional cointegration, it is likewise reasonable to update the
methodology of error correction mechanisms (ECMs).  Standard practice is to
employ an error correction mechanism when two series cointegrate in the
84
traditional sense (Engle and Granger 1987).  The use of the ECM allows the
specification of both short- and long-term relationships among two or more non-
stationary variables (Clarke and Stewart 1995; Charemza and Deadman 1997). 
Among the assumptions of the ECM methodology is that the residuals of the
cointegrating regression, and hence, the ECM, are I(0).  Relaxing this
assumption to allow for the possibility of fractional cointegration is a natural
extension of standard cointegration methodology.  Indeed, the Granger
Representation Theorem only requires a cointegration vector to be stationary
making it wholly unnecessary to expect the ECM to be an I(0) process (Granger
1981, 1983; Baillie and Bollerslev 1994).  Rather than using Dickey-Fuller unit-
root tests to make the “knife-edge” decision between I(0) and I(1), point
estimates of the d parameter for the ECM allow a more complex understanding
of the nature of the equilibrium relationship.  Thus, the range of possible
behavior for the ECM is greatly increased.  Defining an ECM as possessing long
memory simply implies that shocks to one variable are re-equilibrated at a slower
rate than the normal exponential decay of an ARMA process.   14
The existence of a fractionally integrated ECM does present a problem to
the multivariate modeler, however.  If one wishes to include a fractionally
integrated ECM as an independent variable in a larger equation, one should be
wary of the threats to inference generated by its long-memory characteristics. 
As found in Chapter III, even in the presence of a dependent and other
independent variables for which I=0, a single fractionally integrated independent
variable will threaten inferences.  Specifically, coefficient estimates and standard
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errors are biased down drastically and the rate of spurious results increases
slightly.  Thus, our interpretation of an ECM’s coefficient as a measure of the
strength of the adjustment mechanism will be severely flawed.  
Hence, it is important to remember the standard admonition and ensure
that ECMs are I(0) before including them in multivariate equations.  As shown
below for the case of British governing party support, this can be done simply by
fractionally differencing the residuals of the cointegrating regression by their
estimated value of d.  This process necessarily entails avoiding one-step ECM
procedures such as those of Johansen (1988) and Stock and Watson (1988) in
favor of the traditional two-step approach of Engle and Granger (1987).   A full15
multivariate ARFIMA model with an ECM specification can thereby be estimated
without worrying about threats to inference posed by any fractionally integrated
component.  Prior to demonstrating such a model, prime ministerial approval and
Conservative party support are tested for fractional cointegration.
Previous studies of the relationship between public support for political
parties and their leaders have been correct both in their speculation that some
long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the two variables and in their
use of error correction mechanisms to guard against under-differencing non-
stationary variables (Beck 1992; Clarke and Stewart 1994; Clarke and Stewart
1995; Smith 1993; Clarke, Ho, and Stewart 1998).  Indeed, Figure 4.1 shows the
close relationship between governing party support and prime ministerial
approval.  However, in light of the possibilities of fractional cointegration, it is
possible that previous research has over-estimated the rate at which leader
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support and party support will return to equilibrium following a shock.  
To test for this possibility with the British data, a cointegrating regression
was performed between prime ministerial approval and Conservative party vote
intentions and the residuals (the error correction term) were tested for
stationarity.  The d estimate for the ECM was .59 (s.e.=.059), over 4 standard
errors below the d values for either of the initial variables indicating the presence
of fractional cointegration.   Figure 4.2, a graph of the autocorrelations of the16
ECM, demonstrates the slow decline that is the signature characteristic of long-
memory (Lo 1991; Baillie and Bollerslev 1994).  The presence of mean-reverting
long-memory in the ECM tells us that a shock to one variable will persist longer
than a geometric decay would suggest but that this shock will dissipate as the
variables eventually return to equilibrium.  Hence, conclusions of a cointegrating
(d=0)  relationship between prime ministerial approval and conservative party
support (such as found in Clarke and Stewart, 1995) over-estimate the speed
with which the two variables return to their long-term equilibrium following a
shock to one of the variables.  Next, it will be shown how accounting for this long-
run relationship in more complex multivariate models improves model
specification.
4.6 Multivariate Models of Conservative Party Support
I now consider multivariate models of Conservative party vote intentions. 
To ensure that threats to inference were minimized, Conservative party support,
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prime ministerial approval, and the four subjective measures were rendered d=0
by fractionally differencing each by its own value of d (see Table 4.6 for these
values).   Figure 4.3 shows the similarity between governing party support in17
differenced and fractionally differenced form.  As will be shown, the differences
between these two series are nevertheless significant for multivariate analyses.
In order to account for the long-term equilibrium relationship between
Conservative party support and prime ministerial approval, the error correction
term (lagged back one period) is included in the multivariate models.  Before its
inclusion, however, the ECM was fractionally differenced by its d estimate, .59. 
Note that the desire to include only d=0 variables in the multivariate models led 
to the use of a 2-step ECM procedure.   18
The models also include as independent variables interventions for the
national elections of 1983 and 1992, the Falklands war, the introduction of the
Poll Tax, and the beginning of John Major’s tenure as prime minister and leader
of the Tories.  Finally, an additional variable, EVENTS, is used to capture shifts
in public opinion likely to result from various miscellaneous political and
economic events.
Conservative party support was used as the dependent variable in the
four separate analyses shown in Table 4.7.  Column 1 of Table 4.7 shows
personal expectations to be significant (.05 level) along with prime ministerial
approval, the error correction mechanism, and each of the intervention variables. 
Column 2 shows a nearly identical pattern with personal retrospections being
significant.  However, turning to columns 3 and 4, we see that evaluations of
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personal finances outperform the national measures.  Indeed when other factors
are controlled, both of national expectations and national retrospections fail to
achieve statistical significance in their respective models, thus supporting the
“egocentric” thesis.  
Between the two personal variables, personal retrospections appears to
be a slightly better predictor of conservative support than are personal
expectations.  Encompassing tests (j-test, see Mizon 1984; Mizon and Richard
1986) between the two show that neither model encompasses the other (see
Table 4.9).  To check this latter result, each of the PR and PE models was run
using the one-step procedure and encompassing tests followed (see Table
4.10).  Again, neither model encompassed the other.  Thus, the inclusion of new
data and the use of fractional techniques is insufficient to decide between these
two highly correlated variables as to which one is a better predictor of governing
party support in Britain.
I was also interested in testing the efficacy of my multivariate ARFIMA
modeling approach.  Several rival methods were tested for the personal
expectations model.  A comparison between the ARFIMA model with a
fractionally differenced ECM (column 1 of Table 4.8) and the standard ARIMA
model (column 2) shows the substantial improvement gained by using fractional
techniques.   Further, even though columns 1 and 3 differ only in so far as19
column 3's ECM is left in level form, there is some improvement in the more
precise specification.  Consistent with the findings of the Monte Carlo simulations
in Chapters II and III, a comparison of the ECM’s coefficients and standard
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errors in columns 1 and 3 shows the tendency of these statistics to be biased
downwards when the ECM is under-differenced.  An encompassing test of the
two models (Table 4.11) shows that the fractionally differenced ECM model
clearly encompasses the level-form ECM (.01 level, t=2.83) while the latter
barely fails to encompass the former (.05 level, t=1.94).  Finally, column 4 of
Table 4.8 shows the results of a one-step ECM procedure.  J- tests find that
column 1 encompasses its one-step rival (column 4, .01 level, t=2.82) and that
column 4 fails to encompass column 1 (.05 level, t=1.90).
4.7 Conclusions
The multivariate ARFIMA model developed in this chapter provides clear
support for the hypothesis that egocentric measures of the economy are better
predictors of governing party support than are sociotropic measures.  However,
no clear winner is found between the personal expectations and personal
retrospections models.  It is quite possible that these two questions are so similar
in the minds of respondents that no distinction between the two will emerge in
multivariate analyses that include them.  Nevertheless, the question of which
variable is more relevant remains worthy of investigation.  In terms of model
choice, while the differences between results vary little among the various
specifications employed here, it is important to note that the multivariate ARFIMA
model with a fractionally differenced ECM outperforms every other specification
while providing a more accurate picture of the dynamic relationships present
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within and between the variables.
The long memory methods described and demonstrated above provide a
more accurate way of explaining the complex relationships between variables. 
ARFIMA modeling and fractional cointegration techniques allow us to more
carefully construct complex multivariate models while simultaneously improving
their accuracy and reducing threats to inference.  Indeed, fractional dynamics in
an error correction mechanism can present the same threats to inference posed
by other fractionally integrated independent variables.  Testing and accounting
for the presence of long-memory in all  variables and in the relationships among
them should become necessary steps in the dynamic analyst’s craft.  In the next




1. Looking for support for these expectations in estimates of d for the aggregated
series would be an ecological fallacy, however.  It is inappropriate to make
conclusions about individual-level behavior based on aggregate data (Kramer
1983).
2. The following month, January, 1997, Gallup slightly changed its survey making
one wary of including the final four months of data from the Conservatives’ reign.
3. One advantage of fractional integration techniques is that it allows us to forgo
the process of wading through the results of tests with limited null hypotheses of
either d=1 or d=0 (Maddala and Kim 1998).  Point estimates of d have become
reliable enough that they can be used confidently and, along with estimated t-
ratios, determine orders of integration (Barkoulas, Baum, and Caglayan 1999,
Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 1999).  Nevertheless, standard stationarity
test results are presented here.
4. Diebold (1989) actually presents two tests, the R test and the J (for joint) test. 
While the J test may be more appropriate for other alternatives such as
explosive processes, the R test’s assumption that d#1 is proper for the series
investigated here.
5. Bayesian techniques (Koop, Ley, Osiewalski, and Steel 1995) and robust
testing with the bootstrap (Andersson and Gredenhoff 1998) have also been
developed recently but are less appropriate here due to the relative wealth of
time points (T=209).
6. See also Agiakloglou, Newbold, and Wohar (1993).
7. Prior to estimation, the variable of interest is differenced in order to dispense
with the “troublesome intercept parameter” (Baillie 1996: 39). Differencing is also
necessary because Sowell’s estimator is incapable of estimating d when d $ .5
(Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996: fn 28, 1998: fn 14). Differencing is also
necessary prior to implementing Robinson’s procedure in RATS.
8. RATS’ Robinson’s Gaussian Semiparametric Estimator procedure is also very
easy to implement and as well as integrate into a longer program.  Thus, it is
Robinson’s estimates of d that were used for the fractional differencing that
precedes the multivariate models presented.
9. The AIC formula can be expressed as: AIC = -2*ln[log likelihood] + 2p.
Where p is the number of independent parameters estimated.  Hence, the AIC
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favors more parsimonious models by increasing with each additional degree of
freedom consumed.  For a full discussion of the AIC see Chatfield (1996: 226). 
The SBC formula can be expressed as: SBC = -2*ln[log likelihood] + 2p(ln[T])
where T is the number of time points.  Thus, the SBC imposes a slightly higher
penalty for over-parameterized models.  OX’s Bayes’ Information Criterion was
also used and in every case favored the (0,d,0) models.
10. This is strictly true only for Conservative party support.  For each of the other
five variables a noise model with a lower AIC is possible.  However, in every
case there is a sound and obvious reason for favoring a (0,d,0) model.  Aside
from losing parsimony, the models with lower AICs had either multiple
autoregressive parameters that summed greater than one, had multiple moving-
average parameters that summed greater than one - or less than negative one -,
or had non-significant autoregressive or moving-average parameters.
11. Among the advantages of fractional cointegration techniques is an ability to
progress from low power tests of integration such as Dickey-Fuller (Diebold and
Rudebusch, 1991) to analyses that incorporate the more precise d parameter.
12. Cheung and Lai (1993) and Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson (1998) explain
that if the equilibrium errors are not mean reverting, i.e. 1 # d, a permanent
disequilibrium may result from a shock.
13. Requiring only that s < d follows a broader definition of cointegration provided
by Granger (1986) (Dueker and Startz 1998). 
14. Barkoulas, Baum, and Oguz (1997; 9) state that “The error correction term
could be I(d) with 0 < d < 1, in which case deviations from equilibrium are
persistent but the cumulative impulse response of a shock to the system equals
zero at an infinite horizon.  In this case, the error correction term follows a
fractionally integrated process and the system’s variables form a fractionally
cointegrated system.”
15. Enders (1995; 385) provides several reasons why a one-step procedure is
preferable.  Nevertheless, as a “multivariate generalization of the Dickey-Fuller
test” (Enders, 1995; 386) it should not be surprising that the Johansen procedure
loses effectiveness in the presence of fractional alternatives (see Diebold and
Rudebusch 1991).
16. Traditional stationarity tests support the hypothesis that the ECM is
fractionally integrated.  For example, the Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null
hypothesis of a unit-root process (.01) with a critical value of -5.88 and the
variance ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of a random walk with drift (.05)
with critical values of 2.208 (4 lags) 3.236 (8 lags).
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17. The values estimated by Robinson’s procedure were used.
18. One-step specifications were tried, i.e. governing party support (t-1) and
prime ministerial approval (t-1) were included in a multivariate ARFIMA model of
conservative party support.  Comparing the results of the one-step regression
with those of the two-step, the latter model outperformed the former in every
respect (see Table 4.8, column 1 vs. column 4).
19. An encompassing test between these two models is impossible because the
two do not have the same dependent variable.  However, the ARIMA model was
run with a fractionally differenced dependent variable and the model accounting
for the fractional dynamics of all of its variables encompassed the model dealing
only with the fractional dynamics of its dependent variable (.01 level, t=3.01). 
The latter did not encompass the former (.05 level, t=1.73).
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CHAPTER V
FRACTIONAL INTEGRATION AND MODELS OF
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL IN THE UNITED STATES
5.1 Introduction
As observed in Chapter III, multivariate models that account for the
fractional character of all their variables outperform models that confine
themselves to the dichotomous choice between stationarity and non-stationarity. 
Based on the Monte Carlo evidence of Chapters II and III, it also is evident that
in the presence of fractional integration, inferences from ARFIMA models are
more trustworthy than are those from simpler ARMA or ARIMA models.  Here,
the findings of previous chapters are applied to dynamic models of presidential
approval in the United States during the 1978-97 period.  As in Chapter IV, the
possibility of fractional cointegration is tested.  For the American data, however,
no fractionally cointegrating relationships are found.
The chapter begins by reviewing the literature regarding factors that affect
Americans’ evaluations of their president.  This is followed by a discussion of
why one should expect time-series variables such as presidential approval and
the components of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS) to be fractionally
integrated.  Presidential approval and four subjective economic measures are
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tested for stationarity using the tests discussed in Chapter IV and estimates of
the fractional differencing parameter, d, are derived for each series.  Next, tests
of fractional cointegration between presidential approval and the ICS variables
are estimated.  Following this, parameters in multivariate models of presidential
approval are presented.  Finally, encompassing tests are employed to address
which subjective economic measure best explains presidential approval. 
5.2 Peasants, Bankers and Presidential Approval
Mueller’s (1970) path-breaking “Presidential Popularity from Truman to
Johnson” argued that, ceteris paribus, a president’s popularity was destined to
diminish as time passed.  Although his argument has since been dismissed as
the “myth of inexorable descent” (Ostrom and Smith 1993), it remains important
as the first serious analysis of the dynamics of presidential approval.  Indeed,
Mueller’s finding that a president’s popularity is dependent upon long-term trends
and short-term events is a model that still dominates the literature.  However, the
economy and people’s perceptions of it have long since replaced the inexorable
descent thesis as factors believed to drive approval ratings (MacKuen 1983;
Lewis-Beck 1988; MacKuen, Erikson, Stimson 1989, 1992; Clarke, Elliott,
Mishler, Stewart, Whiteley, and Zuk 1992; Clarke and Stewart 1994). 
MacKuen (1983) investigates the relationship between economics and
presidential approval using the unemployment rate and the consumer price index
as indicators of the nation’s economic well-being.  However, despite their
salience, these two measures are merely two of several antecedent variables in
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the relationship between economics and political support (MacKuen, Erikson,
and Stimson 1992).  Of crucial importance to opinion formation is an individual’s
subjective evaluation of economic conditions.  Using Granger causality tests
(Enders 1995), MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992), show that the
introduction of the ICS to analyses of presidential approval “wipes out the ‘direct’
contribution of the economic variables.”  Hence, the use of subjective
perceptions of the economy such as the Index of Consumer Sentiment and its
components allows researchers to delineate the links between objective
economic conditions and political support.
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) use the components of the ICS to
compare competing theories regarding which subjective evaluations have the
strongest impact on presidential approval.  Specifically, MES challenge Key’s
(1966) long-standing hypothesis that voters are retrospectively oriented and are
most concerned with the state of their own pocketbooks.  In their multivariate
models of presidential approval, MES favor national expectations over national
retrospections and personal expectations and retrospections, stating that
“controlling for business expectations, no other measure of economic sentiment
directly affects approval” (1992, 603).  Thus, MacKuen and his colleagues claim
voters are best described as “bankers” - sophisticated individuals who base their
political judgements on how they expect the government to guide the economy in
the future - rather than “peasants” whose evaluations are based on a “What have
you done for me lately” mentality (1992, 597).   
Clarke and Stewart (1994) argue that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson err
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by failing to test the quarterly presidential approval series and the quarterly
economic measures for stationarity.  Indeed, MES leave these variables in level
form, thus implicitly assuming them to be stationary.  Hence, Clarke and Stewart
(1994) suggest that MES’s finding that long-term national prospections dominate
models of presidential approval may be a spurious result.  Based on the results
of Dickey-Fuller tests, Clarke and Stewart (1994) conclude that the measures of
presidential approval, long- and short-term sociotropic expectations (good/bad in
year ahead), and egocentric prospections are unit-root processes for the years
1954-92.  Further, their Dickey-Fuller results suggest rejection of the unit-root
hypothesis for a second short-term sociotropic prospects variable (better/worse)
and for both egocentric and sociotropic retrospections.  With values ranging
between -2.12 and -3.93, these Dickey-Fuller results were all very near the
critical value thresholds of -2.88 (.05 level) and -3.47 (.01 level) forcing the
authors to make the knife-edged stationarity decision based on borderline
evidence.  Taking account of the stationarity of their variables, as decided by
their Dickey-Fuller results, and using error correction specifications, Clarke and
Stewart (1994) find that sociotropic retrospections as well as sociotropic
prospections influence presidential approval.
Given that previous research has been unable to choose between the
several subjective measures largely because of model choice, it is worthwhile to
reconsider models of presidential approval in light of the possibility of fractional
integration.  Indeed, fractional integration is found to characterize presidential
approval and all of the ICS series in both their quarterly and monthly forms
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(Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998a).  Establishing these series as being
fractionally integrated is useful, first, because it provides insight into the
dynamics that characterize the variables and, second, because it allows for more
specific estimations of multivariate models that include them.  Before presenting
stationarity tests and multivariate ARFIMA models to answer the question of
which subjective economic series best describes presidential approval, a brief
discussion follows that considers the theoretical assumptions implicit in
stationarity decisions and outlines why we should expect fractional dynamics to
be present in the series of interest.
5.3 Fractional Dynamics and the American Case
The political researcher’s decision to model a series either as a stationary,
a unit-root, or a fractionally integrated process is not simply a matter of caprice or
taste but, rather, entails important theoretical assumptions about the series of
interest (Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1998).  Initial analyses of presidential
approval such as Mueller (1970) and MacKuen (1983) argue that the presidential
approval series was best characterized as a stationary, autoregressive series. 
By doing so, these authors assume that while political events or economic
shocks may affect the movement of presidential approval in the short-run, these
effects are merely temporary as the series returns to its long-run mean  (DeBoef
1999). 
At the other extreme, authors such as Ostrom and Smith (1993) who
hypothesize that presidential approval is characterized as a unit-root process
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implicitly assume that any shocks to the series are permanent.  Under this
hypothesis, events have an additive effect and, rather than being forgotten,
completely determine current approval ratings (DeBoef 1999).  A unit-root series
will tend to wander for long periods, has no true mean, and i’s variance increases
with the passage of time (Enders 1995; DeBoef 1999). 
However, a fractionally integrated series accepts that individuals’
reactions to shocks may not be homogenous.  This follows theories of
partisanship and other political attitudes such as Converse’s (1964) black/white
model and Key’s (1966) switchers/stand-patters model.  In this regard, Green
and Palmquist’s (1990) assertion that individual party identification is strongly
persistent over time is likely true for a substantial portion of the electorate who
will always return to their party of choice following a shock.  For example, strong
Republicans may have temporarily abandoned their party in the aftermath of
Watergate, but the dissipation of this shock was evident in the election of Ronald
Reagan as president in 1980 and in his landslide reelection of 1984.  However,
at the same time, partisanship will be transitory for another portion of the
population.  Always flexible, the current partisanship of the latter group will
merely be the sum of their reactions to a long line of political events (Byers and
Peel 1997).  A series created by aggregating these two groups will be fractionally
integrated with shocks lasting for long, yet finite, periods (Granger 1980).  A
fractionally integrated series will eventually exhibit mean reversion but any large
segment of the series may appear to be a unit-root.  This is precisely the type of
behavior we should expect from the series under investigation here.
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Additionally, as was the case for the British data discussed in Chapter IV
(see section 4.3) the fact that the American series are aggregate-level data
should lead us to expect fractional integration.  Granger’s (1980) finding that
aggregating heterogenous individual-level behavior will produce a fractionally
integrated series suggests that integer levels of integration are unlikely for the
ICS variables and presidential approval.  Indeed, all of these variables are
created by adding together the survey responses of individuals possessing
various autoregressive and moving average tendencies.  Further, the fact that all
of these series are bounded at both extremes is indicative of fractional dynamics
as some long-term mean reversion is inevitable despite prolonged wanderings in
the series’ values (DeBoef and Granato 1997b).  Thus, based on the statistical
and theoretical reasons given above, we should expect tests of stationarity and
estimates of d to reveal fractional dynamics in the American series.   
5.4 Data, Tests of Stationarity, and Point Estimates of d
The monthly American data begin halfway through the term of President
Carter, in January, 1978, and end halfway through the second term of President
Clinton, in December, 1997.  As such, the series cover a full 20 years, or 240
months.  The first variable is monthly presidential approval, gathered by Gallup
and calculated as the monthly percentage of people responding affirmatively to
the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way ________ is handling
his job as President?"  The remaining four variables are subjective economic
evaluations gathered to create the Index of Consumer Sentiment by the
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University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center as part of its ongoing Survey of
Consumer Finances and Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior.  These
variables are: 
(a) personal expectations (or prospections) - "Now looking ahead - do you think
that a year from now you (and your family living there) will be better off
financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?"
(b) personal retrospections - "Would you say that you (and your family living
there) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?"
(c) national expectations (or prospections) - “Looking ahead, which would you
say is more likely - that in the country as a whole we'll have continuous good
times during the next 5 years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread
unemployment or depression, or what?"
(d) national retrospections - "Would you say that at the present time business
conditions are better or worse than they were a year ago?"
Beginning with a base score of 100, each of these variables is constructed
by adding the percentage of respondents offering a positive response and
subtracting the percentage offering a negative response.  Thus, each is an index
bounded between 0 and 200 and created by aggregating individual-level
behavior, characteristics that should immediately alert us to the possibility of
fractional integration (Granger 1980; DeBoef and Granato 1997b).  Multiple tests
of stationarity and point estimates of d discussed below show that fractional
dynamics are indeed present in each of these variables.
Table 5.1 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller
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1979, 1981; see equation (4.1)) for the American data.  Presidential approval
rejects the unit-root hypothesis at the .05 level while personal expectations,
personal retrospections, and national expectations do so at the .01 level.  Only
national retrospections fails to reject the unit-root hypothesis.  While, these initial
results suggest the presence of fractional integration, additional tests of
stationarity using various null hypotheses were used to further diagnose the
series.  
The variance ratio test (Diebold 1989; see equation (4.2)) with a null
hypothesis of a random walk with drift and an alternative hypothesis of pure
fractional noise was the next test to be employed.  As was the case with the
British data, the variance ratio results shown in Table 5.2 are generally similar to
the Dickey-Fuller results.  Personal expectations, personal retrospections, and
national expectations each reject (p # .05) the null hypothesis of a random walk
with drift while national retrospections fails to reject the null.  However, in
contrast to the Dickey-Fuller results, however, the presidential approval variable
fails to reject the random walk hypothesis.  Taken together, the Dickey-Fuller
results and the variance ratio results are unable to differentiate between
fractional dynamics and stationarity.  KPSS tests were thereby employed
(Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 1992; see equation (4.3)) as an
additional diagnostic tool.  
The results of the first KPSS test, 0 , are shown in Table 5.3.  Recall fromµ
Chapter IV that the KPSS test tests the tendency of a series’ autocorrelation
function to decline at a constant rate (see equation 4.3).  With the recommended
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lag truncation parameter of 4, each of the series rejects (p # .05) the null
hypothesis of a stationary, strong mixing process.  Based on these results, we
cannot say that correlations between successive values of these series decline
at a constant exponential rate.  Hence, the autocorrelation functions of these
series will die down slowly, a pattern indicative of fractional integration (Lo 1991).
The results of the second KPSS test, 0 , establish that trend stationary
J
processes do not describe these series (see Table 5.4).  Here, every series
soundly rejects the null hypothesis of a stationary, strong mixing process at the
.01 level.  Thus, the KPSS results, combined with those of the Dickey-Fuller tests
and those of the variance ratio tests indicate that fractional dynamics may indeed
describe these series.  
A summary of these stationarity tests (Table 5.5) shows that presidential
approval appears to be a fractionally integrated series.  The same conclusion
can be drawn for personal expectations, personal retrospections, and national
expectations as each of these series rejects d=1 in one test and d=0 in another. 
Only national retrospections appears as though it may be a unit-root series. 
Based on these tests of stationarity, one should expect point estimates of the d
parameter to reveal fractional dynamics at work in most, if not all, of these series.
The value of d was estimated for each of these series using both Sowell’s
(1992) and Robinson’s (1995) estimators.  As was done for the British data in
Chapter IV, d was estimated for each variable in (p,d,q) models containing up to
three autoregressive and three moving average parameters for a total of 16
models per variable.  The Akaike Information Criterion (1973, 1974) and the
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Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (Enders 1995) were used to distinguish which noise
model best described each variable.  As in Chapter IV, (0,d,0) models worked
best in each case.
Table 5.6 shows the results of the d estimates for the (0,d,0) models.  It is
immediately evident that d does not equal 0 for any of these series.  Presidential
approval appears to be fractionally integrated but the unit-root hypothesis cannot
be rejected (p # .05).  The large t-statistic of 16.71 for rejection of the d=0
hypothesis indicates that researchers such as MacKuen (1983) and MacKuen,
Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1992) err by modeling presidential approval in level
form, implicitly assuming it to be d=0.  The same can be said for each of the four
subjective economic measures for which rejection of the d=0 hypothesis is again
easy with t-statistics ranging between 11.73 and 14.96.  Rejection of the unit-root
hypothesis is also possible for these series although this is only barely true for
national retrospections (t=1.98).  Based on these results, one can conclude that
fractional dynamics characterize at least four, and likely all five, of these series. 
Thus, multivariate analyses that are to include these variables must account for
this fractional integration.  However, before fractionally differencing each
variable, however, it is worthwhile to see if the use of an error correction
mechanism is appropriate.  Tests for cointegration and fractional cointegration
presented next, however, show that no equilibrium relationship exists between
presidential approval and the four subjective economic evaluations.
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5.5 Tests for Fractional Cointegration
In Chapter IV, cointegration was explained as a long-term relationship
between two or more variables (Granger 1981; Engle and Granger 1991; Beck
1993).  Traditionally, a cointegrating relationship is said to exist between a
system of variables if they each are non-stationary and some linear combination
of the variables is stationary (Engle and Granger 1987; Banerjee, et al. 1993). 
Fractional cointegration relaxes the necessities of initial variables to be unit-roots
and of the linear combination to be d=0 (Cheung and Lai 1993).  Rather, the
methodology of fractional cointegration requires the simpler concern of finding
the level of integration for some linear combination of two variables to be lower
than the level of integration for any one of the system’s variables (Cheung and
Lai; Dueker and Startz 1998).  One advantage of the introduction of fractional
cointegration is that it allows researchers to consider a wider range of behavior in
the long-run relationships between variables.
In the standard method of cointegration, the existence of a cointegrating
relationship between variables means that if a shock affects one, the system will
be re-equilibriated as the variables return to their long-term relationship (Clarke,
Stewart, and Whiteley 1997; Box-Steffensmeier and Tomlinson 1999). 
Fractional cointegration extends the methodology of cointegration by allowing for
a wider range of behavior in this equilibrium relationship.  Fractional integration in
an equilibrium (error correction) term indicates that following a shock, the system
of variables re-equilibriates at a rate slower than the exponential decay of an
ARMA process (Barkoulas, Baum, and Oguz 1997).  Next, the American data
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was tested in order to determine if any such relationships exist.
To test for the presence of cointegration and fractional cointegration, first,
a cointegrating regression was performed between presidential approval and
each of the four subjective economic measures and, second, the residuals (the
error correction term) for each regression were tested for stationarity.  The first
cointegration test regressed presidential approval on personal expectations.  As
shown in Table 5.7, a Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals rejects the unit-root
hypothesis (-3.54 versus a critical value of -3.46 at the .01 level).  Based purely
on this result, one might conclude that the residuals are stationary and that the
two series cointegrate.  However, an estimate of d for these residuals shows that
this finding would be premature.  Indeed, with a d value of .91 (s.e.=.056) the
residual series is of a higher order of integration than is the personal
expectations variable (d=.66) and is within a single standard error of the d value
for the presidential approval variable (d=.94).
As Table 5.7 shows, this pattern repeats itself in the cointegrating
regressions of personal retrospections, national expectations, and national
retrospections.  In each case, the Dickey-Fuller test results would have one
conclude that the residual series is stationary but in no case is the d estimate for
the residual series more than 1.4 standard errors below that of the presidential
approval series.  Further, in no case is the d estimate for the residual series
below that of the original independent variable.  Thus, not only do these results
suggest that the presidential approval series does not cointegrate with any of the
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four subjective measures, they also demonstrate how likely it is that one could
falsely accept the cointegration hypothesis by relying exclusively on Dickey-Fuller
results.  
 This failure to find evidence of cointegration shows that none of the
subjective economic variables move closely with presidential approval over the
long-run.  Unlike the relationship between prime ministerial satisfaction and
governing party support in Britain discussed in Chapter IV, no long-term
equilibriating relationship was found between presidential approval and any of
the economic measures.  Thus, one can conclude that presidential approval and
the economic measures are not as closely aligned as are prime ministerial
satisfaction and governing party support in Great Britain.  The absence of
cointegrating or fractionally cointegrating relationships between the American
series indicates that the use of error correction mechanisms are inappropriate for
the data.  Thus, multivariate analyses of presidential approval can begin by
simply fractionally differencing each of the variables by its own d value.  These
multivariate ARFIMA models are presented next.
5.6 Multivariate Models of Presidential Approval
I now consider multivariate models of presidential approval in the United
States for the years 1978-1997.  To begin, presidential approval and each of the
four subjective economic evaluations was fractionally differenced by its own d
value (see Table 5.6) in order to render each d=0.  As just discussed, the
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absence of cointegrating relationships between any of the economic variables
and presidential approval determined that error correction mechanisms were
inappropriate.  
Next, several interventions were included as independent variables to
account for the impact of events on presidential approval.  These events were:
the taking of American hostages in Iran (November, 1979), the failure of the
attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran and the subsequent frustration with
America’s continued inability to free them (March, 1980 - November, 1980),
President Reagan’s term in office (January, 1981 - December, 1988), the
attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan (March, 1981 - May, 1981) the Iran-
Contra scandal during President Reagan’s second term in office (November,
1986 - December 1988), President Bush’s term in office (January, 1989 -
December, 1992), the Tienanmin Square incident (June, 1989), and operation
Desert Storm (January, 1991).  Finally, an additional variable, EVENTS, is used
to capture expected shifts in public opinion due to miscellaneous political and
economic events. 
To ensure equation balance (see Phillips 1986; DeBoef and Granato
1997b), each of these interventions was differenced to the same extent (0.94) as
was the dependent variable, presidential approval.  This follows the standard
admonition that what one does to the left-hand-side variable in a Box-Jenkins-
Tiao (1977) intervention model, one must also do to the right-hand-side
intervention variables.  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the slight difference between
an intervention that has been differenced wholly and differenced fractionally.   
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Presidential approval - fractionally differenced - was used as the
dependent variable in the four separate analyses shown in Table 5.8.  Column 1
of Table 5.8 shows personal expectations are statistically significant (p # .05)
along with the intervention variables.  Column 2 shows that, contrary to Key’s
pocketbook hypothesis, personal retrospections are not significant.  Columns 3
and 4 show each of national expectations and national retrospections are
statistically significant (p # .01).  Thus, contrary to the findings of the British
analyses in Chapter IV, in the American case, sociotropic measures outperform
egocentric measures.  The J-test for encompassing (Mizon 1984; Mizon and
Richard 1986) shown in Table 5.10 further demonstrates the superiority of the
national expectations model as it encompasses the personal expectations model
(.01 level) while personal expectations fails to encompass national expectations
(.05 level).
As for the two sociotropic measures, Table 5.8 shows that national
prospections are a slightly better predictor of presidential approval than are
national retrospections (t = 4.23 vs t = 3.64).  These findings support those of
Clarke and Stewart (1994) who argue, contrary to MacKuen, Erikson, and
Stimson (1992), that national retrospections, as well as expectations, are
valuable as predictors of presidential approval.  Including both national
prospections and national retrospections in the same model yields t-statistics of
2.78 and 1.81, respectively.  However, the J-test for encompassing (Table 5.11)
finds that the national expectations model encompasses the national
retrospections model (.01 level) while the national retrospections model fails to
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encompass the national expectations model (.05 level).  These findings indicate
that while national prospections are a better predictor of presidential approval,
some additional predictive power is gained by including the national
retrospections variable.  Indeed, the finding that voters think like bankers, using
opinions regarding future national economic performance to evaluate their
president, must be tempered by the understanding that, mindful of the recent
past, perhaps many bankers are somewhat peasants.
The efficacy of the ARFIMA techniques used to estimate the rival models
was also tested.  Column 2 of Table 5.9 shows a national prospections model
that uses wholly differenced interventions while column 1 shows the national
prospections model of Table 5.8.  Although slight, there is a noticeable
improvement when the interventions are differenced to the same degree as the
dependent variable rather than wholly differenced.  Moving from the wholly
differenced intervention model to the fractionally differenced one, R  increases2
from .494 to .503, and the sum of squared residuals decreases from 2411.7 to
2368.8.  An encompassing test of the two models (Table 5.12) further
demonstrates the value of maintaining precise equation balance as the model
with fractionally differenced interventions encompasses the one with wholly
differenced interventions (p # .01) while the former model fails to encompass the
latter (p # .05). 
Finally, comparing the ARFIMA model of column 1 with the ARIMA model
of column 3, the benefits of the ARFIMA approach again are demonstrated. 
Moving from the ARIMA model to the ARFIMA, R  increases from .491 to .5032
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and the sum of squared residuals decreases from 2,423.8 to 2,368.8. 
Additionally, the more precise ARFIMA specification suggests a much stronger
link (b = 0.121) between national expectations and presidential approval than
does the ARIMA model (b = 0.088).  Thus, estimates derived from the ARFIMA
approach seem to show stronger support for the bankers hypothesis than do
estimates derived for ARIMA models.
5.7 Conclusions
Converse’s (1964) black/white model and Key’s (1966) switchers/stand-
patters model suggest that the American electorate is composed of individuals
with various autoregressive tendencies present in their voting behavior. 
Granger’s (1980) demonstration that aggregating heterogenous individual-level
data will create a fractionally integrated series should lead one to suspect the
presence of fractional dynamics in series such as aggregate presidential
approval and the components of the ICS.  Indeed, estimates of d obtained for
the American data indicate that these variables are fractionally integrated. 
Based on the simulation evidence of Chapters II and III, these variables were
rendered d=0 through fractional differencing prior to their inclusion in multivariate
models.  Tests of relationships between presidential approval and each of the
subjective evaluations found little evidence of cointegrating or fractionally
cointegrating relationships.  Thus, error correction mechanisms were deemed
inappropriate for the American presidential approval models.  
Regarding short-run relationships between the variables,  the multivariate
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ARFIMA models show clear support for the hypothesis that aggregated
sociotropic measures of the economy are better predictors of presidential
approval than are egocentric measures.  This finding is in contrast with the
British case of Chapter IV where egocentric measures were found to dominate
sociotropic ones.  Further, comparing the sociotropic measures, expectations
were found to dominate retrospections although both are significant when used
jointly in the presidential approval model.  Precisely accounting for the level of
integration of all of their variables, these ARFIMA models allow a greater deal of
confidence in their estimates than do ARIMA specifications.  Future work should
apply the techniques described in this and previous chapters to the development
and testing of multivariate models of other political attitudes and behavior.  Box-
Steffensmeier and Smith’s (1998) multivariate ARFIMA model of
macropartisanship was a significant step in enhancing understanding of factors
that affect aggregate dynamics of party identification in the American electorate. 
Building upon the methods of Box-Steffensmeier and Smith by including those
discussed in this and previous chapters will allow future researchers to better




1. Clarke and Stewart (1994) do allow for the possibility that these series could
be fractionally integrated but they do not test for it (1007; footnote 4).
2. Individual behavior is not confined to these two groups, however.  These are
merely endpoints in a continuum of autoregressive behavior.
3. Two additional variables that measure short term national expectations are
used as components of the ICS.  The first asks, "Generally speaking, do you
think now is a good or a bad time for people to buy major household items?" 
The second asks, "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole -
do you think that during the next 12 months we’ll have good times financially, or
bad times or what?"  MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) found that the long-
term measure of national expectations dominated the short-term measures in
multivariate analyses.  Clarke and Stewart (1994) also favor the long-term
measure and thus, only the long-term measure is used in the analyses here. 
Tests of stationarity and estimates of d did show each of these short-term
measures to be fractionally integrated with  d = .88  for buying conditions
good/bad and d = .83 for business conditions (see also Lebo, Walker, and
Clarke (1998a) for a discussion of the memory of these, and other, series).
4. Unlike national expectations and personal expectations and retrospections,
this variable is not a component of the ICS. 
5. Note that MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989, 1992) use a quarterly
measure of presidential approval in their analyses.  This quarterly measure has
been found to be fractionally integrated as well with d in the 0.89 - 0.93 range
(Lebo, Walker, and Clarke 1998a).
6. Tests for multiple cointegrating vectors were also performed.  Every
combination of the four independent variables was regressed on presidential
approval.  The d values for the residuals of these 15 regressions were estimated
and none were significantly lower than the d value of presidential approval
(0.94).
7. Clarke and Stewart (1994) use of ECMs cannot be rejected here as they used
quarterly data.  Tests for fractional cointegration between these quarterly
measures could prove the use of a fractionally integrated ECM (see Chapter IV)
to be appropriate for their data. 
8. The values estimated by Robinson’s (1995) procedure were used.
9. This period also corresponds to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
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10. By applying the fractional differencing filter to interventions, we can model
shocks so that they affect the dependent variable not only in the first period, but
well beyond.  Thus, long-memory is introduced into the intervention variable. 
The degree to which this occurs depends on the degree of memory in the
dependent variable.  Here, with d = .94, a series coded as ...0,1,0... becomes
...0,1,-1,0... in differenced form and becomes ...0,1,-0.940,-0.028,-0.010,-0.005...
when fractionally differenced.
11. When all four of the subjective variables were included in the same model,
the personal measures were not statistically significant and national prospections
(t=2.67) outperformed national retrospections (t=1.57).
12. With different dependent variables, we cannot speculate as to whether this




FRACTIONAL INTEGRATION AND POLITICAL MODELING
The introduction of fractional dynamics to political scientists is only just
beginning to have effects on the political modeler’s craft.  Granger’s (1980) initial
warning that fractional integration is a likely result when the behavior of
heterogenous individuals is aggregated was long ignored by researchers who
used data constructed precisely in that way.  However, with their 1996 American
Political Science Review article, “The Dynamics of Aggregate Partisanship,” Box-
Steffensmeier and Smith finally alerted political researchers that the knife-edged
distinction between stationary (I(0)) and random walk (I(1)) behavior is an
arbitrary one that fails to account for the true behavior of data generating
processes that create political variables.  Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998a)
followed Box-Steffensmeier and Smith by demonstrating that fractional
integration is actually quite common among popular political time series.  Then,
as DeBoef and Granato (1997a) did for the near-integrated case, Lebo, Walker,
and Clarke demonstrate that including untransformed fractionally integrated
series in bivariate regressions creates serious threats to inference by prompting
a tremendous increase in the false rejection rate of null hypotheses.  It remained
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to be demonstrated how a political researcher using fractionally integrated data
should proceed in analyses of the relationships between two or more fractionally
integrated variables.  
This dissertation has been concerned with developing and demonstrating
techniques for including fractionally integrated variables in complex models of
political relationships.  Based upon previous research and the analyses
presented above, it is apparent that time-series analysts need to include
fractional integration techniques as part of their standard operating procedure. 
The several steps of this new process are outlined below.
First, researchers must recognize that the method by which many political
variables are constructed is likely to produce a fractionally integrated series.  The
heterogeneity Granger (1980) refers to is in the autoregressive tendencies of
individuals in the sample population.  Certainly it is easy to apply this scenario to
political variables.  Converse’s (1964) black/white model and Key’s (1966)
division of voters into stand-patters and switchers delineate two types of
individuals with autoregressive tendencies of unit-root and stationary behavior,
respectively (see also Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc, and Pammett 1979, and; Clarke
and McCutcheon 1998).  If the population was made up only of individuals of
these two groups, the autocorrelation function of a series that aggregated their
behavior would show that the choices of the stand-patters were remembered
perfectly from one period to the next while those of the “white” switchers (0,0,0)
would be independent of their previous behavior.  As such, correlations across
long lags would be visible and fractional integration would be present.
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That autoregressive tendencies of varying strength exist within the general
population and among survey respondents should not be surprising although its
applicability to measures of partisanship is unsettling for some who view an
individual’s partisanship as an unchanging character trait (see Green and
Palmquist 1990).  Accepting Zaller’s (1992) conception of political knowledge as
being normally distributed in mass publics we can see that for those with little
knowledge, a change of mind can be based on the slightest bit of new
information while for those in the other tail of the knowledge distribution, opinions
will be highly persistent.  
The highly knowledgeable may hold unshakable opinions of leaders and
parties based upon years of loyalty while the approval of others is tenuous
enough to change based upon the latest evening news sound-bite.  When the
perfect memory, or unit-root behavior, of the highly knowledgeable is
amalgamated with the “top of their heads” (Taylor and Fiske 1978), or stationary
(i.e. X  = ,  and ,- N(o,F )) behavior of others, as well as with the wide array oft  t
2
autoregressive behaviors among those in the middle of the distribution, a
fractionally integrated series is born.  Of key importance is that for series created
through aggregation, only homogeneity at the individual-level makes integer
levels of integration possible.  Given the low likelihood that this assumption will
hold, political scientists should expect to habitually find fractional dynamics
characterize their aggregate time series data.
Once analysts recognize the prevalence of fractional integration, they will
need to familiarize themselves with the ARFIMA techniques presented in this
118
dissertation and elsewhere in the time series literature (especially Granger 1980;
Baillie 1996; Cheung and Lai 1993; Box-Steffensmeier and Smith 1996, 1998;
Abadir and Taylor 1998).  The first tools that should be learned are estimation
procedures for the d parameter such as those of Sowell (1992) and Robinson
(1995) discussed in Chapter IV.  These procedures allow us to dispense with the
tedious task of sorting through several dichotomous tests of stationarity
(Maddala and Kim 1998) by providing a precise estimate of the order of
integration.   This estimate may then be used to filter the original series in order1
to generate a new fractionally differenced series for which d=0.
Chapters II and III demonstrate that by using these transformed variables,
threats to inference produced by fractional dynamics are minimized.   Lebo,
Walker, and Clarke (1998b) demonstrate that the inclusion of untransformed
fractionally integrated variables in bivariate regression may increase the
likelihood of obtaining spurious results by a factor of 15. Chapters II and III
herein demonstrate through Monte Carlo evidence that rather than leaving them
untransformed, fractionally differencing each variable in an equation by its own
estimate of d will minimize the rate of type I errors as well as avoid the biasing of
Durbin-Watson statistics, standard errors, and coefficients that can wreak havoc
on inferences.  
Chapters II and III also test fractional differencing against the alternative
of over-differencing.  These simulations confirm that over-differencing the
dependent variable introduces autocorellation into the equation.  Short-term
moving-average components can be used to model out this autocorrelation but
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only at the expense of type I errors and the over-inflation of model diagnostics. 
Monte Carlo evidence also confirms that over-differencing independent variables
biases downwards coefficient and standard error estimates.  Thus, only by
differencing each variable in an equation by its precise value of d can one ensure
that no bias exists towards autocorellation or in the estimation of standard errors
and regression coefficients.  Absent these biases, analysts can be more secure
that when they find a significant relationship between variables, it is real rather
than nonsense (Yule, 1926). 
This dissertation also has explored the concept of fractional cointegration
as a method for more precisely dealing with relationships among variables.  The
possibility that long-run equilibrium relationships between variables may be
fractional processes implies the necessity of rethinking the methodology of
cointegration.  Dispensing with the assumption that the equilibrium term is I(0),
the analyst can be satisfied that two or more variables cointegrate if their errors
are simply mean reverting and of a lower order of integration than are any of the
original variables.  Expanding cointegration in this way allows for a greater
variety of equilibriating behavior and makes sense theoretically.  
For the British case, the finding in Chapter IV that prime ministerial
approval and governing party support are fractionally cointegrated means that
after a shock to one variable, the two variables will return to an equilibrium at
some non-geometric rate.  In political terms, this means that if some shock -
such as a cabinet scandal or the introduction of a highly unpopular measure like
the poll tax in Great Britain in the spring of 1990 - should affect peoples’
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perceptions of the prime minister,  voters will adjust their opinions of the
governing party at different rates.  Some voters may retain their partisan
attachments but may never forgive the prime minister while others quickly adjust
their partisanship decisions to be more in tune with their opinion of the country’s
leader.  First understanding that with the possibility of fractional integration,
equilibrium terms can follow more diverse behavior and, second, acquiring the
tools for assessing this wider range of behavior should become priorities for the
political analyst.
Using these new techniques Chapter IV investigates competing models of
governing party support.  Conservative vote intentions, prime ministerial
approval, and four subjective economic measures were tested and each was
found to be fractionally integrated.  After fractionally differencing each and after
creating a fractionally differenced error correction mechanism, models were
developed to determine which of personal expectations, personal retrospections,
national expectations, or national retrospections was the best predictor of
Conservative vote intentions for the years 1979-1996.  Support for the
arguments of Key (1966) and Sanders (1991) is found as it is shown that
egocentric measures outperform sociotropic ones.  However, no clear winner
could be found between personal expectations and personal retrospections. 
Encompassing tests also were shown to be incapable of choosing between the
two personal economic evaluation measures.  Besides the economic measures
and prime ministerial approval, each of the elections of 1983 and 1992, the
Falklands War, the introduction of the poll tax, and the beginning of John Major’s
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tenure as prime minister had significant impacts on levels of support for the
governing party.  These findings are in line with those of previous studies and
thus bolster the general conclusion that governing party support in Britain is
driven by a combination of economic and political factors. 
The techniques investigated in Chapters II and III are again applied in
Chapter V with a model of presidential approval in the United States for the
period 1978-1997.  Tests of stationarity and estimates of d were applied to
presidential approval and to four subjective economic variables and each was
found to be fractionally integrated, although presidential approval is found to be
very near to a unit-root process.  Again, prospective and retrospective
evaluations of the national economy are compared with perceptions of personal
finances.  However, for the American case, sociotropic evaluations are found to
dominate egocentric measures.  This finding supports the arguments of
MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) rather than those of Key (1996). 
MacKuen Erikson, and Stimson’s further argument that national expectations are
a better predictor of presidential approval than are national retrospections is also
supported by the evidence provided by the fractional models.  Despite their value
as predictors tests for cointegration and fractional cointegration between the four
subjective measures and presidential approval fails to find the existence of
fractionally and wholly cointegrating relationships.  
In sum, this dissertation has sought to investigate various techniques for
dealing with fractionally integrated variables in multivariate models of the
dynamics of political attitudes and behavior.  Researchers should note the
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threats to inference that can be avoided by careful use of fractional differencing. 
Also, the greater flexibility of equilibrium behavior provided by fractional
cointegration should be helpful to those studying closely related variables.
Avoiding the dichotomous distinction of stationarity versus random walk behavior
allows us to understand the univariate characteristics of our variables and to then
incorporate this understanding into more complex models.  Dispensing with
dichotomous tests such as Dickey-Fuller also will allow a greater degree of
precision in our diagnoses.  Perhaps from this, the hopes of the LSE school can
be reached: that two rival modelers with the same data can gradually hone in on
the same conclusions regarding what processes drives their variables.  In sum,
fractional integration techniques provide political scientists with an enhanced
ability to explain not only the dynamic properties of their variables, but the
relationships between them as well.
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Endnotes
1. Sowell’s technique in OX is especially useful because it allows the estimation
of d in (p,d,q) models.  Thus, we can estimate short-term and long-term
components simultaneously.  Robinson’s procedure in RATS is useful for
estimation of d in (0,d,0) models and for confirming estimates given by Sowell’s
estimator.  The use of other estimators such as Bayesian techniques or
Bootstrap methods can prove useful if data is especially sparse or if we adhere
to Hendry’s (1995) admonition to “test, test, test.”
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APPENDIX A




RATS Programs and Seed Values for Bivariate Simulations
RATS Program for Chapter 2 Simulation 1:
end 1
allocate 50000
dec vector coeff(1000) tstat(1000) dwstat(1000) stderrs(1000) rsq(1000)







compute n = 150
do J=1,10
 compute ja = (J * .1)
 compute d1 = ja
 display ’d1 is equal to ’ d1 ’.’
do K=1,10
 compute ka = (K * .1)
 compute d2 = ka
display ’d2 is equal to ’ d2 ’.’
do I=1,1
 @arfsim d1 n simvar1




  set simvar1b = simvar1 - simvar1{1}




  set simvar1b = simvar1








  set simvar2b = simvar2 - simvar2{1}




  set simvar2b = simvar2




* Application of the fractional differencing procedure (fif) was selectively applied
depending on the simulation.  In some cases first-differencing was used rather
than fractional differencing.
 @fif(d=d1a) simvar1b / simvar1a
 @fif(d=d2a) simvar2b / simvar2a
 linreg simvar1a / simres1
 # constant simvar2a
 compute coeff(I) = %BETA(2)
 compute dwstat(I) = %DURBIN
 compute stderrs(I) = sqrt(%SEESQ * %XX(2,2))
 compute rsq(I) = %RSQUARED
 compute tstat(I) = abs(coeff(I) / stderrs(I))






















* These numbers were chosen randomly and are provided to allow exact
replication of Chapter II’s simulations. 
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APPENDIX B




RATS Programs and Seed Values for Multivariate Simulations
RATS Program for Chapter 3 Simulation 1:
end 1
allocate 50000
dec vector coeff1(1000) tstat1(1000) dwstat(1000) stderrs1(1000) rsq(1000)
coeff2(1000) stderrs2(1000) tstat2(1000)







compute n = 150
compute d3 = .1
do J=1,10
 compute ja = (J * .1)
 compute d1 = ja
 display ’d1 is equal to ’ d1 ’.’
do K=1,10
 compute ka = (K * .1)
 compute d2 = ka
display ’d2 is equal to ’ d2 ’.’
do I=1,1000
 @arfsim d1 n simvar1
 @arfsim d2 n simvar2




  set simvar1b = simvar1 - simvar1{1}




  set simvar1b = simvar1








  set simvar2b = simvar2 - simvar2{1}




  set simvar2b = simvar2







  set simvar3b = simvar3 - simvar3{1}




  set simvar3b = simvar3
  compute d3a = d3
 }
end if
* Application of the fractional differencing procedure (fif) was selectively applied
depending on the simulation.
@fif(d=d1a) simvar1b / simvar1a
@fif(d=d2a) simvar2b / simvar2a
@fif(d=d3a) simvar3b / simvar3a
 linreg(NOPRINT) simvar3a / simres3
 # constant simvar1a simvar2a
 compute coeff1(I) = %BETA(2)
 compute dwstat(I) = %DURBIN
 compute stderrs1(I) = sqrt(%SEESQ * %XX(2,2))
 compute rsq(I) = %RSQUARED
 compute tstat1(I) = abs(coeff1(I) / stderrs1(I))
 compute coeff2(I) = %BETA(3)
 compute stderrs2(I) = sqrt(%SEESQ * %XX(3,3))
 compute tstat2(I) = abs(coeff2(I) / stderrs2(I))







* The above was repeated for d3 = .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, .8, .9,  and 1.0.
Seed Values used for Random Sampling:
Control Simulation: 15680.
Simulation 1: 
d(Y) = 0.1: 28723.
d(Y) = 0.2: 97315.
d(Y) = 0.3: 67984.
d(Y) = 0.4: 35412.
d(Y) = 0.5: 18354.
d(Y) = 0.6: 76544.
d(Y) = 0.7: 25974.
d(Y) = 0.8: 79438.
d(Y) = 0.9: 10941.
d(Y) = 1.0: 47211.
Simulation 2: 
d(Y) = 0.1: 35814.
d(Y) = 0.2: 98362.
d(Y) = 0.3: 69411.
d(Y) = 0.4: 24874.
d(Y) = 0.5: 75136.
d(Y) = 0.6: 91843.
d(Y) = 0.7: 55872.
d(Y) = 0.8: 23783.
d(Y) = 0.9: 33597.
d(Y) = 1.0: 48462.
Simulation 3: 
d(Y) = 0.1: 34617.
d(Y) = 0.2: 15645.
d(Y) = 0.3: 28771.
d(Y) = 0.4: 68159.
d(Y) = 0.5: 84772.
d(Y) = 0.6: 62371.
d(Y) = 0.7: 56715.
d(Y) = 0.8: 94579.
d(Y) = 0.9: 82713.
d(Y) = 1.0: 35456.
132
Simulation 4: 
d(Y) = 0.1: 37617.
d(Y) = 0.2: 75895.
d(Y) = 0.3: 50076.
d(Y) = 0.4: 73059.
d(Y) = 0.5: 93510.
d(Y) = 0.6: 32487.
d(Y) = 0.7: 25863.
d(Y) = 0.8: 35102.
d(Y) = 0.9: 95588.
d(Y) = 1.0: 77548.
Simulation 5: 
d(Y) = 0.1: 70958.
d(Y) = 0.2: 20451.
d(Y) = 0.3: 32870.
d(Y) = 0.4: 35258.
d(Y) = 0.5: 98102.
d(Y) = 0.6: 11057.
d(Y) = 0.7: 67621.
d(Y) = 0.8: 47417.
d(Y) = 0.9: 76632.




Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for Control Simulation
Variable N       Mean        Std. Dev. Min.       Max
X-Coef 100,000    0.0003      0.0825      -0.3949     0.3775 
X-Stderr 100,000    0.0822      0.0068 0.0543     0.1164
D-W Stat 100,000    1.9990      0.1628 1.3655     2.7565
R 100,000    0.0067      0.0094 0.0000     0.11512
TypeOne 100,000    0.0516      0.2213 0.0000     1.0000
|X-Coef| 100,000    0.0657      0.0499 0.0000     0.3949
T-Stat 100,000    0.0034      1.0061      -4.3239     4.3878
|T-Stat| 100,000    0.8013      0.6085       0.0000     4.3878
135
Table 2.2 Simulation 1: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |   48    59    57    50    42    62    61    45    55    50  529    
           
       .2 |   62    52    44    52    52    60    63    51    54    54  544    
    
       .3 |   51    52    46    43    57    52    57    47    48    59  512    
   
       .4 |   50    55    43    58    52    61    58    61    50    53  541    
    
       .5 |   49    49    37    57    48    45    47    46    42    53  473    
   
       .6 |   61    46    59    49    41    52    55    43    60    58  524    
   
       .7 |   59    51    56    57    77    54    40    47    52    50  543    
   
       .8 |   45    48    47    51    64    49    60    59    59    56  538    
   
       .9 |   44    43    41    47    58    47    57    61    42    44  484    
   
        1 |   45    51    43    58    52    54    40    50    47    53  493    
   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals       514   506   473   522   543   536   538   510   509   530 5181
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.3 Simulation 2: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
       .1 |   47    67    52    43    60    50    52    48    45    50   514   
   
       .2 |   68    57    51    52    49    58    53    44    50    57   539   
   
       .3 |   57    62    51    52    52    60    54    66    61    64   579   
   
       .4 |   57    53    50    63    61    71    78    72    76    82   663   
   
       .5 |   52    56    52    41    50    57    64    69    74    70   585   
   
       .6 |   46    49    49    52    58    59    59    73    63    49   557   
   
       .7 |   47    41    48    54    55    56    48    52    42    47   490   
   
       .8 |   47    52    47    60    51    54    60    49    32    55   507   
   
       .9 |   41    41    46    57    56    55    52    48    48    52   496   
   
        1 |   53    62    64    53    61    53    55    55    45    41   542   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
Totals       515   540   510   527   553   573   575   576   536   567  5472
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.4 Untransformed Fractionally Integrated Variables:
Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y, N=100 for Each Series.
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
       .1 |   56    65    67    67    97   109   124   112   116   137   950   
   
       .2 |   63    70    77   121   125   167   189   208   241   229  1490   
   
       .3 |   54    71   135   160   202   220   287   302   328   337  2096   
   
       .4 |   80   107   173   201   241   306   345   378   422   413  2666   
   
       .5 |   84   134   182   260   301   387   416   453   493   558  3268   
   
       .6 |   84   152   219   302   400   441   506   568   583   604  3859   
   
       .7 |   99   180   268   331   458   529   569   623   642   672  4371   
   
       .8 |  124   220   317   384   478   547   622   650   691   691  4724   
   
       .9 |  108   231   333   409   520   584   629   704   715   704  4937   
   
        1 |  131   237   320   445   513   587   651   693   761   742  5080   
   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
Totals       883  1467  2091  2680  3335  3877  4338  4691 4992  5087  33441
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
Source: Lebo, Walker, and Clarke (1998b; Table 6).
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Table 2.5 Simulation 2: Standard Errors by d Values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.082  0.080  0.077  0.071  0.064  0.054  0.045  0.036  0.028  0.020  0.056
      .2 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.064  0.054  0.045  0.036  0.027  0.021  0.056
      .3 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.045  0.036  0.028  0.020  0.056
      .4 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.064  0.055  0.045  0.036  0.028  0.020  0.056
      .5 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.045  0.036  0.027  0.021  0.056
      .6 | 0.082  0.080  0.077  0.071  0.064  0.054  0.045  0.036  0.027  0.020  0.056
      .7 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.045  0.035  0.028  0.020  0.056
      .8 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.054  0.044  0.036  0.028  0.020  0.056
      .9 | 0.082  0.079  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.044  0.036  0.027  0.020  0.056
       1 | 0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.045  0.036  0.027  0.020  0.056
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Mean     0.082  0.080  0.076  0.071  0.063  0.055  0.045  0.036  0.028  0.020  0.056
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Table 2.6 Simulation 2: Absolute Value of Coefficients by d Values of X and Y 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         |                                  d(X)                                  
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      .1 | 0.064  0.064  0.060  0.058  0.052  0.043  0.035  0.030  0.021  0.016  0.044
      .2 | 0.067  0.065  0.060  0.057  0.050  0.045  0.036  0.028  0.022  0.017  0.045
      .3 | 0.065  0.064  0.061  0.057  0.051  0.046  0.035  0.031  0.022  0.017  0.045
      .4 | 0.066  0.063  0.059  0.059  0.053  0.046  0.039  0.031  0.024  0.017  0.046
      .5 | 0.066  0.064  0.062  0.055  0.051  0.045  0.038  0.030  0.023  0.017  0.045
      .6 | 0.064  0.063  0.061  0.058  0.051  0.044  0.038  0.030  0.023  0.016  0.045
      .7 | 0.064  0.061  0.058  0.058  0.050  0.044  0.036  0.029  0.022  0.016  0.044
      .8 | 0.065  0.065  0.061  0.057  0.049  0.044  0.036  0.028  0.021  0.016  0.044
      .9 | 0.064  0.064  0.060  0.056  0.051  0.044  0.035  0.028  0.022  0.016  0.044
       1 | 0.065  0.065  0.061  0.055  0.052  0.044  0.036  0.029  0.022  0.016  0.044
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Mean    0.065  0.064  0.060  0.057  0.051  0.044  0.036  0.029  0.022  0.016  0.045 
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Table 2.7 Simulation 4: Durbin-Watson Values by d values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 2.916  2.917  2.911  2.910  2.918  2.918  2.916  2.913  2.915  2.917  2.915
      .2 | 2.855  2.855  2.859  2.852  2.861  2.857  2.857  2.853  2.858  2.863  2.857
      .3 | 2.793  2.786  2.792  2.795  2.792  2.797  2.795  2.797  2.792  2.798  2.794
      .4 | 2.726  2.730  2.720  2.723  2.719  2.723  2.715  2.725  2.719  2.726  2.722
      .5 | 2.638  2.636  2.632  2.633  2.643  2.638  2.637  2.635  2.636  2.638  2.637
      .6 | 2.556  2.543  2.552  2.550  2.553  2.540  2.549  2.547  2.543  2.544  2.548
      .7 | 2.447  2.446  2.438  2.439  2.433  2.440  2.437  2.447  2.441  2.435  2.440
      .8 | 2.318  2.314  2.318  2.316  2.310  2.321  2.314  2.307  2.311  2.318  2.315
      .9 | 2.175  2.173  2.160  2.175  2.159  2.178  2.167  2.169  2.172  2.178  2.171
       1 | 2.004  2.004  2.004  1.999  2.009  1.996  2.003  1.994  1.993  2.004  2.001
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mean       2.543  2.540  2.539  2.539  2.540  2.541  2.539  2.539  2.538  2.542  2.540 
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Table 2.8 Simulation 4A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter’s
Absolute t-stat > 1.96 by d values of X and Y
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Totals 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .2 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .3 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .4 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .5 | 1000   999  1000  1000   999   999  1000  1000   999   999   9995        
      .6 |  995   992   997   998   993   991   996   996   993   992   9943       
      .7 |  948   947   952   933   941   944   943   939   931   929   9407       
      .8 |  692   686   701   705   689   707   688   670   687   697   6922       
      .9 |  274   279   241   281   250   280   255   262   275   281   2678       
       1 |   59    71    59    66    64    78    59    76    73    61    666       
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------         
Totals   | 7968  7974  7950  7983  7936  7999  7941  7943  7958  7959  79611
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Table 2.9 Simulation 4A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter
          was Invertible by d values of X and Y
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Totals
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 |  702   703   684   663   699   691   686   693   698   721   6940       
      .2 |  825   825   839   807   834   820   821   815   849   821   8256       
      .3 |  928   944   941   943   942   935   931   937   962   918   9381       
      .4 |  988   986   983   986   982   988   989   979   989   984   9854       
      .5 |  999   998   999  1000   999   999   998   998   997   999   9986       
      .6 |  999  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000   999  1000  1000  1000   9998        
      .7 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .8 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
      .9 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
       1 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000        
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------     
   Totals| 9441  9456  9446  9399  9486  9433  9424  9422  9495  9443  94415
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Table 2.10 Simulation 4A: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |  153   161   164   183   163   164   156   136   136   137  1553   
    
       .2 |  136   142   128   138   134   116   139   117    99   120  1269   
     
       .3 |  102    97   100    96    90    96   103   102    91    90   967   
   
       .4 |   70    84    73    66    74    79    76    81    76    65   744   
   
       .5 |   62    68    59    62    54    59    52    60    58    58   592   
   
       .6 |   65    61    53    61    52    62    52    66    68    70   610   
   
       .7 |   68    62    60    53    56    55    64    37    54    55   564   
   
       .8 |   54    47    67    54    50    59    52    66    49    54   552   
   
       .9 |   48    59    59    51    56    50    60    53    61    48   545   
   
        1 |   58    62    71    52    46    49    62    59    55    46   560   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
  Totals  |  816   843   834   816   775   789   816   777   747   743  7956   
                                                  
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.11 Simulation 4A: Average R-Square by d values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.431  0.432  0.431  0.430  0.431  0.433  0.433  0.430  0.429  0.432  0.431
      .2 | 0.371  0.370  0.369  0.368  0.372  0.371  0.372  0.373  0.369  0.373  0.371
      .3 | 0.304  0.301  0.301  0.303  0.301  0.304  0.305  0.303  0.299  0.307  0.303
      .4 | 0.239  0.242  0.238  0.237  0.235  0.239  0.238  0.240  0.237  0.240  0.238
      .5 | 0.179  0.177  0.176  0.177  0.180  0.179  0.178  0.178  0.179  0.180  0.178
      .6 | 0.130  0.125  0.128  0.128  0.128  0.124  0.127  0.127  0.125  0.126  0.127
      .7 | 0.085  0.084  0.082  0.082  0.080  0.082  0.081  0.083  0.083  0.081  0.082
      .8 | 0.047  0.047  0.048  0.047  0.046  0.048  0.047  0.046  0.046  0.047  0.047
      .9 | 0.024  0.024  0.022  0.023  0.023  0.024  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023
       1 | 0.014  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.014
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Mean   | 0.182  0.182  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.182  0.182  0.182  0.180  0.182  0.182 
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Table 2.12 Simulation 6: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |   97   101   105    89    81    77    68    85    58    52  813    
   
       .2 |  109    97    89    84   101    83    73    74    55    60  825    
   
       .3 |   97    91   109    83    67    87    87    63    62    55  801    
   
       .4 |   95    87    86    98    98    76    69    74    56    46  785    
   
       .5 |   88    70    88    99    79    74    79    55    66    53  751    
   
       .6 |   91    72    75    72    85    66    62    66    69    57  715    
   
       .7 |   82    72    78    79    83    57    56    57    51    50  665    
   
       .8 |   69    68    64    74    54    68    67    68    49    49  630    
   
       .9 |   69    61    72    67    68    67    53    50    66    43  616    
   
        1 |   44    48    58    70    51    51    60    48    43    41  514    
 ---------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
 Totals   |  841   767   824   815   767   706   674   640   575   506 7115    
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.13 Simulation 6: Standard Errors by d Values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.083  0.086  0.090  0.095  0.099  0.102  0.105  0.108  0.110  0.112  0.099
      .2 | 0.078  0.083  0.086  0.090  0.094  0.098  0.100  0.103  0.105  0.107  0.094
      .3 | 0.075  0.079  0.083  0.086  0.090  0.093  0.096  0.099  0.101  0.101  0.090 
      .4 | 0.072  0.075  0.079  0.082  0.086  0.089  0.092  0.094  0.096  0.098  0.086
      .5 | 0.070  0.073  0.076  0.079  0.083  0.085  0.089  0.091  0.092  0.093  0.083
      .6 | 0.067  0.070  0.073  0.077  0.079  0.083  0.085  0.088  0.089  0.090  0.080
      .7 | 0.065  0.068  0.071  0.074  0.077  0.080  0.083  0.085  0.086  0.087  0.078
      .8 | 0.063  0.066  0.070  0.072  0.075  0.078  0.081  0.082  0.084  0.085  0.076
      .9 | 0.062  0.065  0.067  0.071  0.074  0.077  0.079  0.081  0.082  0.083  0.074
       1 | 0.061  0.064  0.067  0.070  0.073  0.076  0.079  0.080  0.082  0.082  0.073
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mean    | 0.070  0.073  0.076  0.080  0.083  0.086  0.089  0.091  0.093  0.094  0.084
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Table 2.14 Simulation 6: Absolute X-Coefficients by d Values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.079  0.080  0.085  0.089  0.089  0.090  0.091  0.093  0.094  0.091  0.088
      .2 | 0.077  0.078  0.081  0.081  0.086  0.085  0.086  0.089  0.089  0.088  0.084
      .3 | 0.071  0.072  0.077  0.079  0.080  0.084  0.087  0.082  0.082  0.083  0.080
      .4 | 0.067  0.070  0.073  0.076  0.078  0.078  0.080  0.082  0.079  0.078  0.076
      .5 | 0.065  0.063  0.069  0.072  0.072  0.074  0.076  0.076  0.077  0.072  0.072
      .6 | 0.062  0.061  0.066  0.067  0.069  0.068  0.072  0.073  0.074  0.071  0.068
      .7 | 0.058  0.058  0.061  0.065  0.066  0.067  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.065
      .8 | 0.054  0.056  0.061  0.061  0.062  0.067  0.068  0.069  0.067  0.068  0.063
      .9 | 0.051  0.054  0.059  0.059  0.061  0.065  0.066  0.065  0.068  0.064  0.061
       1 | 0.047  0.051  0.054  0.058  0.057  0.061  0.064  0.063  0.064  0.063  0.058
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Mean    | 0.063  0.064  0.069  0.071  0.072  0.074  0.076  0.076  0.076  0.075  0.072 
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Table 2.15 Simulation 6A: Rate/1000 That Moving-Average Parameter’s
Absolute t-stat > 1.96 by d values of X and Y
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Totals 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000
      .2 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000
      .3 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000
      .4 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  10000
      .5 | 1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000   999  1000  1000   9999
      .6 |  984   993   991   994   998   995   993   996   996   993   9933
      .7 |  938   929   938   945   944   929   930   941   947   935   9376
      .8 |  657   668   694   699   657   695   691   691   688   695   6835
      .9 |  277   253   267   262   261   249   262   283   258   283   2655
       1 |   48    72    67    84    62    71    61    44    47    60    616
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
  Totals  | 7904  7915  7957  7984  7922  7939  7937  7954  7936  7966  79414
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Table 2.16 Simulation 6A: Average Value of Standard Errors for
Moving-Average Parameters by d values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.035  0.034  0.034  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035  0.035
      .2 | 0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041  0.041
      .3 | 0.052  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.050  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.051
      .4 | 0.061  0.062  0.062  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.061
      .5 | 0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.069
      .6 | 0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075  0.075
      .7 | 0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079  0.079
      .8 | 0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081
      .9 | 0.082  0.082  0.082  0.082  0.082  0.083  0.083  0.082  0.083  0.083  0.082
       1 | 0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mean    | 0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066  0.066
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Table 2.17 Simulation 6A: Average Absolute Value of Moving-Average
Parameter’s Coefficient by d values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9     1   Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.934  0.943  0.943  0.936  0.942  0.943  0.939  0.942  0.948  0.953  0.942
      .2 | 0.882  0.882  0.883  0.882  0.883  0.882  0.883  0.883  0.889  0.886  0.883
      .3 | 0.771  0.780  0.785  0.785  0.789  0.783  0.783  0.783  0.788  0.785  0.783
      .4 | 0.664  0.659  0.661  0.663  0.664  0.662  0.663  0.668  0.667  0.670  0.664
      .5 | 0.543  0.538  0.541  0.546  0.541  0.542  0.548  0.549  0.550  0.552  0.545
      .6 | 0.421  0.422  0.421  0.426  0.426  0.429  0.427  0.425  0.431  0.431  0.426
      .7 | 0.311  0.311  0.312  0.314  0.314  0.317  0.312  0.317  0.316  0.318  0.314
      .8 | 0.205  0.207  0.209  0.210  0.200  0.210  0.211  0.207  0.211  0.207  0.208
      .9 | 0.115  0.115  0.117  0.115  0.118  0.111  0.116  0.119  0.115  0.118  0.116
       1 | 0.066  0.068  0.070  0.073  0.069  0.069  0.069  0.063  0.066  0.069  0.068
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Mean  | 0.491  0.492  0.494  0.495  0.495  0.495  0.495  0.496  0.498  0.499  0.495 
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Table 2.18 Simulation 6A: Moving-Average Parameter’s Average 
Absolute t-stat by d values of X and Y
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9     1    Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 29.36  30.29  30.47  29.26  29.91  29.36  29.48  29.65  30.01  30.15  29.80
      .2 | 24.23  24.49  24.59  24.54  24.21  24.23  24.10  24.37  24.61  24.02  24.34
      .3 | 16.35  16.99  17.22  17.15  17.45  16.98  17.32  16.92  17.06  16.90  17.03
      .4 | 11.45  11.35  11.36  11.60  11.60  11.61  11.43  11.62  11.85  11.79  11.57
      .5 |  8.14   8.03   8.03   8.16   8.08   8.07   8.23   8.20   8.27   8.43   8.16
      .6 |  5.74   5.73   5.73   5.81   5.80   5.84   5.83   5.78   5.88   5.88   5.80 
      .7 |  4.00   4.01   4.02   4.03   4.05   4.09   4.01   4.10   4.06   4.11   4.05
      .8 |  2.55   2.58   2.60   2.62   2.48   2.61   2.63   2.58   2.63   2.58   2.59
      .9 |  1.40   1.40   1.43   1.40   1.44   1.35   1.42   1.45   1.40   1.44   1.41
       1 |  0.80   0.83   0.85   0.88   0.83   0.84   0.84   0.77   0.80   0.83   0.83
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mean    | 10.40  10.57  10.63  10.55  10.59  10.50  10.53  10.54  10.66  10.61  10.56
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Table 2.19 Simulation 6A: Average R  by d values of X and Y2 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |                                  d(X)                               
   d(Y)  |    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean 
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 | 0.427  0.431  0.430  0.429  0.433  0.430  0.428  0.429  0.434  0.435  0.430
      .2 | 0.371  0.370  0.368  0.370  0.371  0.372  0.372  0.371  0.372  0.371  0.371
      .3 | 0.300  0.300  0.306  0.303  0.305  0.303  0.302  0.301  0.304  0.301  0.303
      .4 | 0.238  0.235  0.239  0.238  0.237  0.235  0.238  0.238  0.235  0.238  0.237
      .5 | 0.181  0.176  0.177  0.178  0.178  0.176  0.180  0.179  0.180  0.181  0.179
      .6 | 0.125  0.124  0.125  0.126  0.127  0.126  0.126  0.125  0.128  0.129  0.126
      .7 | 0.081  0.081  0.082  0.082  0.083  0.083  0.080  0.083  0.081  0.082  0.082
      .8 | 0.046  0.047  0.047  0.048  0.045  0.047  0.048  0.046  0.047  0.046  0.047
      .9 | 0.023  0.023  0.024  0.023  0.024  0.022  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023
       1 | 0.013  0.014  0.014  0.015  0.014  0.014  0.014  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.014
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mean    | 0.181  0.180  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.182  0.182  0.181
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Table 2.20 Simulation 6A: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |  117   136   120   108   131   134   132   144   140   139  1301 
       .2 |  103    99    92   113    96   123   140   116   137   122  1141 
       .3 |   71    65    72    73    75    96   104    80    92    92   820
       .4 |   56    69    67    74    72    76    85    87    73    81   740
       .5 |   62    47    60    63    67    54    67    57    72    67   616
       .6 |   53    49    48    54    62    59    52    63    69    65   574
       .7 |   56    52    64    63    56    56    60    63    54    57   581
       .8 |   51    48    57    61    49    56    61    59    53    51   546
       .9 |   62    55    59    63    66    63    49    47    67    45   576
        1 |   46    54    56    68    48    54    57    44    42    46   515
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals    |  677   674   695   740    722   771   807   760   799   765  7410  
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.21 Simulation 6B: Type I Errors by d Values of X and Y
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
d value
for dep. |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                      
    Y    |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Totals 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      .1 |    67    59    73    68    67    62    68    64    58    46   632
      .2 |    71    56    65    49    75    72    51    63    53    55   610
      .3 |    79    61    73    64    70    60    76    60    63    56   662
      .4 |    53    67    64    67    72    67    57    63    58    45   613
      .5 |    59    50    63    66    57    56    70    39    52    62   574
      .6 |    63    47    60    54    71    56    46    61    59    52   569
      .7 |    68    56    57    62    60    51    48    59    48    43   552
      .8 |    55    47    55    61    49    55    57    61    47    48   535
      .9 |    48    55    55    58    63    59    45    49    63    44   539
       1 |    44    53    51    68    49    52    53    46    39    45   500
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
  Totals |   607   551   616   617   633   590   571   565   540   496  5786
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.22 Simulation 6B: Type I Errors for Autoregressive Parameter 
by d Values of X and Y
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------- 
d value
for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    Y     |    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Total 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 10000
       .2 |  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 10000
       .3 |   999  1000  1000  1000   999  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  9998
       .4 |  1000   997  1000   999   999   999  1000   999   999   999  9991
       .5 |   988   991   994   995   989   996   997   993   990   994  9927
       .6 |   950   953   945   957   942   961   956   952   961   963  9540
       .7 |   791   807   835   833   814   816   820   814   848   836  8214
       .8 |   506   526   521   556   501   535   536   525   541   531  5278
       .9 |   194   170   200   194   198   172   165   192   192   197  1874
        1 |    35    51    57    67    54    48    42    43    41    45   483
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
   Totals |  7463  7495  7552  7601  7496  7527  7516  7518  7572  7565 75305
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 50 (.05).
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Table 2.23 Simulations 6C, 6D, 6, 6E, &6F: Standard Errors by d Values of Y  
and Sample Size
----------+----------------------------------------------------------------  
d value   |                      SAMPLE SIZE
for dep.  |               
    Y     |      T=50       T=100       T=150       T=200        T=500         
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |     0.176       0.122       0.099       0.085       0.054
       .2 |     0.167       0.116       0.094       0.082       0.051
       .3 |     0.160       0.111       0.090       0.078       0.049
       .4 |     0.153       0.106       0.086       0.075       0.047
       .5 |     0.147       0.102       0.083       0.072       0.045
       .6 |     0.141       0.099       0.080       0.069       0.044
       .7 |     0.137       0.095       0.078       0.067       0.042
       .8 |     0.134       0.093       0.076       0.065       0.041
       .9 |     0.131       0.091       0.074       0.064       0.040
        1 |     0.129       0.090       0.073       0.063       0.040
----------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     Mean |     0.147       0.103        0.084       0.072       0.045         
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Control Simulation
Variable      Obs         Mean    Std. Dev.  Min      Max
X-Coefficient     100,000    -0.0002   0.0830    -0.3276   0.3415            
X-Standard Error  100,000     0.0824   0.0068     0.0570   0.1162            
X-t-statistic     100,000    -0.0017   1.0101    -3.9551   4.3147           
W-Coefficient     100,000    -0.0002   0.0826    -0.3863   0.3291            
W-Standard Error  100,000     0.0824   0.0068     0.0569   0.1171
W-t-statistic     100,000    -0.0029   1.0056    -4.6031   4.2262      
Durbin-Watson     100,000     1.9998   0.1617     1.2924   2.6345  
R-Square          100,000     0.0135   0.0133     0.0000   0.1385
Absolute X-t-stat 100,000     0.8057   0.6092     0.0000   4.3147
Absolute W-t-stat 100,000     0.8005   0.6086     0.0000   4.6031
X-type I errors   100,000     0.0529   0.2238     0        1
W-type I errors   100,000     0.0519   0.2218     0        1
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for indep |                d value for independent variable - W                
variable,                       
    X     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |  547   541   555   502   501   537   524   491   522   522  5242   
           
       .2 |  495   504   521   531   493   499   543   524   510   504  5124   
    
       .3 |  567   523   531   479   575   548   517   531   500   532  5303   
   
       .4 |  546   509   492   537   563   522   523   527   511   566  5296   
    
       .5 |  510   535   527   503   525   513   520   486   512   548  5179   
   
       .6 |  532   510   532   510   527   547   513   499   525   516  5211   
   
       .7 |  523   519   510   517   522   529   553   488   526   497  5184   
   
       .8 |  538   518   493   542   476   525   511   530   483   498  5114   
   
       .9 |  529   548   536   530   479   494   551   527   531   531  5256   
   
        1 |  485   507   521   534   532   524   510   503   540   512  5168   
   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals      5272  5214  5218  5185  5193  5238  5265  5106  5160  5226 52077
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 500 (.05).
* Note that each cell is based on 10,000 regressions, 1,000 for each d value
of Y.  This is the case for every simulation table that follows.
159




for indep |                d value for independent variable - W                
variable,                       
    X     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |  487   552   524   540   499   517   509   532   502   546  5208   
           
       .2 |  513   497   511   512   537   490   522   518   496   554  5150   
    
       .3 |  527   542   515   505   520   541   515   531   503   513  5212   
   
       .4 |  511   549   509   519   518   537   535   540   522   496  5236   
    
       .5 |  558   542   507   489   502   550   549   500   529   521  5247   
   
       .6 |  512   520   524   490   498   511   551   500   553   548  5207   
   
       .7 |  528   525   497   519   517   466   484   534   548   527  5145   
   
       .8 |  526   504   534   527   524   541   533   510   533   495  5227   
   
       .9 |  512   523   540   529   520   537   558   513   503   504  5239   
   
        1 |  502   507   530   525   530   476   514   523   561   523  5191   
   
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals      5176  5261  5191  5155  5165  5166  5270  5201  5250  5227 52062
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 500 (.05).
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Table 3.4 Simulation 1: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                                
      d(X)|    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Mean  
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 1.995 1.997 1.994 1.993 1.996 1.996 1.997 1.995 1.998 1.995 1.995
       .2 | 1.995 1.998 1.994 1.996 1.996 1.994 1.998 1.996 1.995 1.995 1.996
       .3 | 1.993 1.996 1.997 1.994 1.993 1.994 1.996 1.998 1.993 1.996 1.995
       .4 | 1.997 1.996 1.995 1.996 1.997 1.997 1.996 1.996 1.994 1.995 1.996
       .5 | 1.995 1.991 1.995 1.998 1.994 1.993 1.990 1.995 1.993 1.996 1.994
       .6 | 1.994 1.996 1.992 1.993 1.995 1.994 1.995 1.994 1.997 1.995 1.995
       .7 | 1.995 1.994 1.997 1.994 1.995 1.996 1.998 1.993 1.998 1.996 1.996
       .8 | 1.994 1.997 1.994 1.996 1.994 1.996 1.993 1.996 1.994 1.995 1.995
       .9 | 1.995 1.998 1.995 1.997 1.996 1.998 1.997 1.995 2.000 1.996 1.997
        1 | 1.995 1.996 1.993 1.995 1.993 1.998 1.997 1.994 1.992 1.996 1.995
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 Mean       1.995 1.996 1.995 1.995 1.995 1.995 1.996 1.995 1.995 1.995 1.995
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Table 3.5 Simulation 1: Average Value of X’s Coefficient 
by d values of X and W
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                             
      d(X)|    .1     .2     .3     .4     .5     .6     .7     .8     .9      1  Mean
----------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |-0.001  0.000 -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000
       .2 |-0.002  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001 -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000
       .3 |-0.001 -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.000
       .4 | 0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 -0.001  0.002  0.001  0.000 0.000
       .5 | 0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000 -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.000 0.000
       .6 |-0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.002  0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.000-0.001
       .7 | 0.000  0.000 -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 -0.002 0.000
       .8 | 0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 0.000
       .9 | 0.000 -0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.000
        1 |-0.001  0.001  0.000 -0.001 -0.002  0.000  0.001  0.000 -0.001  0.001 0.000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mean  | 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000
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Table 3.6 Simulation 1: Average Standard Error for X by d values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                                
      d(X)     .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .2 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .3 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .4 | 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
       .5 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .6 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .7 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .8 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .9 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
        1 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Mean  | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
163
Table 3.7 Simulation 2: Average Absolute Value of X’s Coefficient
by d values of X and W
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                             
      d(X)|    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.066
       .2 | 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065
       .3 | 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.062 0.061 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.062
       .4 | 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.058
       .5 | 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.052
       .6 | 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.045
       .7 | 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.038
       .8 | 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.031
       .9 | 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.024
        1 | 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.018
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mean  | 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.046
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Table 3.8  Simulation 2: Average Standard Error for X by d values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                                
      d(X)     .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.082
       .2 | 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081
       .3 | 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
       .4 | 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072
       .5 | 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065
       .6 | 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.056
       .7 | 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.047
       .8 | 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.038
       .9 | 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.029
        1 | 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.022
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Mean  | 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057
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for indep |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    W     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
     .1   |  494   489   527   492   523   511   543   541   537   505  5162
     .2   |  549   536   505   504   532   530   550   492   523   513  5234
     .3   |  519   507   517   559   504   546   521   545   543   550  5311
     .4   |  521   526   591   540   540   558   540   549   556   554  5475
     .5   |  546   544   560   565   544   550   552   541   551   566  5519
     .6   |  528   607   583   575   551   567   526   508   547   572  5564
     .7   |  543   530   554   556   584   561   575   627   554   521  5605
     .8   |  545   540   584   635   596   573   581   566   537   600  5757
     .9   |  570   643   585   612   569   558   568   574   574   591  5844
      1   |  587   588   587   574   589   604   642   567   616   639  5993
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total |   5402  5510  5593  5612  5532  5558  5598  5510  5538  5611  55464
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 500 (.05).
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Table 3.10 Simulation 3: Average Absolute Value of W’s Coefficient
by d values of X and W
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(X)                             
      d(W)|    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.066
       .2 | 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
       .3 | 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.062
       .4 | 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
       .5 | 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.053
       .6 | 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.046
       .7 | 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039
       .8 | 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.031
       .9 | 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.024
        1 | 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.018
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mean  | 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.046
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Table 3.11  Simulation 3: Average Standard Error for W by d values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(X)                                
      d(W)     .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
       .2 | 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.081
       .3 | 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.078
       .4 | 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.073
       .5 | 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.065
       .6 | 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057
       .7 | 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.047
       .8 | 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.038
       .9 | 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.030
        1 | 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.022
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Mean  | 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.057
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Table 3.12 Simulation 4: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d values of X and W 
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                               d(W)                           
     d(X) |    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 1.986 1.984 1.987 1.987 1.986 1.987 1.987 1.987 1.989 1.992 1.987
       .2 | 1.984 1.983 1.983 1.986 1.990 1.988 1.989 1.988 1.987 1.992 1.987
       .3 | 1.984 1.986 1.985 1.987 1.987 1.985 1.987 1.990 1.991 1.993 1.988
       .4 | 1.986 1.986 1.988 1.985 1.987 1.986 1.989 1.992 1.989 1.991 1.988
       .5 | 1.983 1.987 1.986 1.986 1.988 1.989 1.988 1.993 1.991 1.992 1.988
       .6 | 1.988 1.989 1.988 1.987 1.990 1.987 1.989 1.991 1.995 1.994 1.990
       .7 | 1.987 1.983 1.986 1.990 1.988 1.990 1.991 1.988 1.993 1.990 1.989
       .8 | 1.986 1.988 1.988 1.989 1.988 1.990 1.995 1.992 1.995 1.995 1.991
       .9 | 1.988 1.990 1.989 1.992 1.990 1.991 1.993 1.993 1.994 1.995 1.992
        1 | 1.990 1.991 1.991 1.992 1.991 1.993 1.995 1.996 1.997 1.997 1.993
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
    Mean    1.986 1.987 1.987 1.988 1.989 1.989 1.990 1.991 1.992 1.993 1.989
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Table 3.13 Simulation 4: Average Absolute Value of X’s Coefficient
by d Values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                                
      d(X)|    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.049 0.049
       .2 | 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.051
       .3 | 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.054
       .4 | 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056
       .5 | 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.059
       .6 | 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.060 0.061
       .7 | 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063
       .8 | 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064
       .9 | 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.066
        1 | 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.066
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
     Mean   0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
170
Table 3.14 Simulation 4: Average Standard Error for X by d Values of X and W
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                                d(W)                              
      d(X)|    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.061
       .2 | 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.064 0.064
       .3 | 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
       .4 | 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
       .5 | 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073
       .6 | 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
       .7 | 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
       .8 | 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.080 0.081
       .9 | 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
        1 | 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
     Mean   0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
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for indep |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    W     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Total  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1       |
     .1 |    847   844   776   838   870   873   849   832   803   853  8385
     .2 |    818   828   878   837   830   809   784   793   843   804  8224
     .3 |    761   787   809   781   794   819   836   850   771   748  7956
     .4 |    791   761   757   765   819   768   801   741   778   784  7765
     .5 |    741   786   746   740   774   768   750   768   763   712  7548
     .6 |    735   721   706   686   713   687   701   698   724   740  7111
     .7 |    663   671   694   747   647   651   685   701   687   645  6791
     .8 |    629   627   651   598   640   637   648   669   637   652  6388
     .9 |    565   568   580   567   553   589   580   538   550   569  5659
      1 |    549   507   511   520   530   506   506   558   539   527  5253
--------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 Total  |   7099  7100  7108  7079  7170  7107  7140  7148  7095  7034 71080 
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 500 (.05).
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for dep.  |                d value for independent variable - X                
variable,                       
    W     |   .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1 Totals  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 |   73    81    74    69    88    93    83    76    74   77   788
       .2 |   80    78    90    76    65    78    75    75    85   72   774
       .3 |   64    60    80    89    89    66    79    89    80   64   760
       .4 |   64    78    64    85    71    82    89    57    80   76   746
       .5 |   68    67    79    71    81    89    63    79    62   58   717
       .6 |   79    66    87    60    78    60    60    75    55   70   690
       .7 |   67    65    74    75    63    51    54    73    52   73   647
       .8 |   54    60    64    58    74    68    67    64    57   64   630
       .9 |   63    56    47    48    55    50    59    47    50   55   530
        1 |   59    61    39    70    56    47    49    52    49   63   545
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    Total |  671   672   698    701   720   684   678   687   644  672  6827   
Bold figures are statistically distinguishable from 500 (.05).
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Table 3.17 Simulation 5: Average Durbin-Watson Value by d values of X and W 
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
          |                               d(W)                           
     d(X) |    .1    .2    .3    .4    .5    .6    .7    .8    .9     1  Mean
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------
       .1 | 2.533 2.530 2.533 2.531 2.530 2.532 2.533 2.528 2.532 2.534 2.532
       .2 | 2.530 2.530 2.533 2.530 2.530 2.533 2.531 2.534 2.531 2.534 2.532
       .3 | 2.532 2.530 2.531 2.533 2.531 2.533 2.533 2.531 2.534 2.536 2.532
       .4 | 2.531 2.530 2.534 2.531 2.531 2.531 2.533 2.532 2.533 2.536 2.532
       .5 | 2.531 2.532 2.533 2.533 2.532 2.532 2.534 2.533 2.534 2.534 2.533
       .6 | 2.532 2.532 2.531 2.534 2.531 2.533 2.532 2.534 2.535 2.537 2.533
       .7 | 2.528 2.534 2.532 2.535 2.532 2.533 2.535 2.536 2.536 2.534 2.534
       .8 | 2.532 2.530 2.532 2.532 2.533 2.535 2.533 2.535 2.533 2.534 2.533
       .9 | 2.533 2.534 2.532 2.532 2.535 2.534 2.535 2.534 2.535 2.535 2.534
        1 | 2.535 2.532 2.535 2.533 2.534 2.534 2.532 2.535 2.533 2.535 2.534
----------+------------------------------------------------------------------  
    Mean    2.532 2.531 2.532 2.532 2.532 2.533 2.533 2.533 2.534 2.535 2.533
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Table 4.1 Dickey-Fuller and Aumented Dickey-Fuller Results, N=210
Dickey-Fuller Augmented Dickey-Fullera
           Critical Values ß "= .10: -2.57 "= .10: -2.57  
Variable Name ÷ "= .01: -3.46 "= .01: -3.46
"= .05: -2.88 "= .05: -2.88
Conservative                -2.596*                -1.957
PM Approval                -2.693*                -2.472
Pers. Expect.                -4.154***                -2.727*
Pers. Retrospec.                -3.026**                -2.137
Nat. Expect.                -5.908***                -3.359**
Nat. Retrospec.                -2.993**                -1.933
 taken to three lags.a
* reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .01 level.
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Table 4.2 Variance Ratio Test Results, N=210
Differencing
Interval (k)   R(2) R(4)  R(8) R(16) R(32)
             ß
a a
Critical "=.05:
Values ß 1.157 2.170 3.578b




Governing   1.175**   1.788   2.532
Support.
  1.409**   1.646**
PM   1.066   1.309   2.021
Approval
  1.120   1.349
Personal   1.219**   2.869**   4.227**
Expects.
  1.735**   2.538**
Personal   1.420**   2.016*   2.526
Retrospecs.
  1.778**   2.152**
National   1.291**   4.200**   6.056**
Expects.
  2.142**   3.248**
National   1.139*   1.784   2.014
Retrospecs.
  1.527**   1.771**
* reject null hypothesis of Random walk with drift at the .10 level in a one-sided test.
** reject null hypothesis of Random walk with drift at the .05 level in a one-sided test.
 The recommended differencing intervals are K=4 or k=8 (Diebold, 1989:38).a
 Critical values are given in Diebold (1989:33-35).b
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Table 4.3 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept (0 ), N=210µ
Lag Trunc.
Parameter l=0 l=2 l=4 l=6 l=8
ß
Variable ÷   
a
Governing  7.736***  2.738***  1.265***  1.018***
Support.
 1.708***
PM  4.782***  1.700***  0.805***  0.654**
Approval
 1.074***
Personal  1.853***  0.707**  0.347*  0.284
Expects.
 0.458*
Personal  1.968***  0.705**  0.327  0.263
Retrospecs.
 0.441*
National  0.686**  0.294  0.159  0.134
Expects.
 0.203
National  1.383***  0.498**  0.233  0.188
Retrospecs.
 0.313
Critical Values: p<.1: .347; p<.05: .463; p<.01: .739.
* reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .01 level.
 Recommended lag trucation (l) is given by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shina
(1992:169-73); l = integer[4(T/100) ] = 4 for these series..25
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Parameter l=0 l=2 l=4 l=6 l=8
ß
Variable ÷   
a
Governing  1.894***  0.686***  0.326***  0.266***
Support.
 0.434***
PM  1.195***  0.430***  0.208**  0.170**
Approval
 0.275***
Personal  1.740***  0.663***  0.326***  0.267***
Expects.
 0.430***
Personal  1.700***  0.610***  0.283***  0.228***
Retrospecs.
 0.382***
National  0.478***  0.206**  0.111  0.094
Expects.
 0.142*
National  1.452***  0.522***  0.244***  0.197**
Retrospecs.
 0.329***
Critical Values: p<.1: .119; p<.05: .146; p<.01: .216.
* reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .01 level.
 Recommended lag trucation (l) is given by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shina
(1992:169-73); l = integer[4(T/100) ] = 4 for these series..25
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Table 4.5 Summary of Stationarity Tests,* N=210




H(0) ß d=1 d=1 d=0 d=0              
Variable ÷   with trend
Governing d=1 Reject Reject No trend 0<d#1
Support. d=1 d=0
PM d=1 d=1 Reject No trend 0<d#1
Approval d=0
Personal Reject Reject d=0 No trend 0#d<1
Expects. d=1 d=1
Personal Reject Reject d=0 No trend 0#d<1
Retrospecs. d=1 d=1
National Reject Reject d=0 Trend 0#d<1
Expects. d=1 d=1 Stationary
National Reject Reject d=0 No trend 0#d<1
Retrospecs. d=1 d=1
* All at .05 level of significance.
Differencing interval R(4), R(8).a 
 Lag truncation parameter=4.b
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Table 4.6  Estimates of d Based on Robinson’s and Sowell’s Procedures, N=210
VARIABLE Robinson’s Sowell’s T-stat  T-stat
d estimate d estimate (dû0) (dû1)
(s.e.) (s.e.)
a a
Conservative Party 0.85 0.82 14.32** -2.53*
Support (0.059) (0.058)
Prime Ministerial 0.96 0.91 16.18** -0.67
Approval (0.059) (0.060)
Personal Economic 0.70 0.72 11.80** -5.06**
Expectations (0.059) (0.059)
Personal Economic 0.84 0.77 14.16** -2.70**
Retrospections (0.059) (0.051)
National Economic 0.63 0.61 10.62** -6.24**
Expectations (0.059) (0.060)




 based on Robinson’s procedure.a
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Table 4.7 Governing Party Support - Multivariate ARFIMA Models, N=209
Pers. Expect Pers. Retro. Nat. Expect. Nat. Retro.
Constant -0.123 (0.133) -0.132 (0.132) -0.149 (0.133) -0.136 (0.133)
Pers. 0.055 (0.028)*
Expect.
Pers. Retro. 0.068 (0.032)*
Nat. Expect. 0.015 (0.013)
Nat. Retro 0.012 (0.014)
PM Sat. 0.362 (0.037)** 0.367 (0.037)** 0.367 (0.038)** 0.371 (0.038)**
(Frac. Diff.)
ECM (1) -0.282 (0.058)** -0.283 -0.293 -0.291
(Frac. Diff.) (0.058)** (0.058)** (0.058)**
Election 83 3.357 (1.326)** 3.594 (1.312)** 3.600 (1.325)** 3.681 (1.323)**
Election 92 4.305 (1.295)** 4.378 (1.293)** 4.335 (1.303)** 4.398 (1.307)**
Falklands 6.407 (1.868)** 6.634 (1.862)** 6.555 (1.877)** 6.475 (1.875)**
Poll Tax -3.155 (1.312)** -3.875 -3.365 -3.468
(1.315)** (1.313)** (1.312)**
Major 5.778 (1.861)** 5.685 (1.861)** 6.026 (1.867)** 6.000 (1.871)**
Events 1.634 (0.290)** 1.591 (0.288)** 1.612 (0.292)** 1.612 (0.294)**
R-Square .596 .597 .591 .590
Sum of 663.5 661.5 671.7 673.7
Residuals2
Durbin- 1.90 1.91 1.89 1.89
Watson
Q (36-0) 30.6 26.9 27.4 27.4
Coefficients are shown - standard errors are in parenthesis.
* significant at .05 level - one tail.      ** significant at .01 level - one tail.
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Table 4.8 Personal Expectations Models - Various Specifications, N=209
ARFIMA ARIMA ARFIMA ARFIMA
Both Sides ECM level- One-Step
a
formb
Constant -0.123 (0.133) 0.041 (0.137) -0.035 (0.132) 1.320 (0.596)*
Pers. Expect. 0.055 (0.028)* 0.060 (0.027)* 0.056 (0.029)* 0.056 (0.029)*
Governing -0.177
Support (t-1) (0.040)**
PM Sat. (t-1) 0.127 (0.031)**
PM Sat. 0.362 (0.037)** 0.377 (0.038)** 0.365 (0.038)** 0.366 (0.039)**
ECM (1) -0.282 -.228 (0.042)** -0.177 (0.04)**
(0.058)**
Election 83 3.357 (1.326)** 2.766 (1.373)* 3.109 (1.332)* 3.070 (1.341)*
Election 92 4.305 (1.295)** 4.612 (1.356)** 4.290 (1.305)** 4.302 (1.309)**
Falklands 6.407 (1.868)** 6.030 (1.954)** 6.349 (1.883)** 6.339 (1.888)**
Poll Tax -3.155 -3.038 (1.371)* -3.015 (1.322)* -3.021 (1.326)*
(1.312)**
Major 5.778 (1.861)** 4.464 (1.955)* 5.137 (1.885)** 5.165 (1.891)**
Events 1.634 (0.290)** 1.588 (0.302)** 1.714 (0.292)** 1.703 (0.295)**
R-Square .596 .570 .587 .588
Sum of 663.5 731.4 677.5 677.2
Residuals2
Durbin-Watson 1.90 2.23 2.11 2.12
Q(36-0) 30.6 41.3 36.1 35.7
Coefficients are shown - standard errors are in parenthesis.
Conservative support, PM approval, Pers. Expectations are differenced - ECM is level-a 
form.
 Same as column 1 except for ECM which is left in level-form.b
* significant at .05 level - one tail.      ** significant at .01 level - one tail.
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Table 4.9 The J-test for Encompassing - Personal Expectations vs. Retrospections
Personal Retrospections > Personal Expectations
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.030  0.151 -0.201 0.841
PR Y-Hats    0.711  0.553  1.287* 0.199
PE  0.034  0.033  1.034 0.303
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.098  0.209  0.470 0.639
ECM(1) - F. differenced -0.077  0.169 -0.046 0.649 
Election 83  0.850  2.355  0.361 0.718
Election 92   1.235  2.713  0.455 0.650
Falklands War  1.776  4.052  0.438 0.662
Poll Tax -0.810  2.244 -0.361 0.719
Major begins  1.568  3.761  0.417 0.677
Events  0.492  0.933  0.527 0.599
Personal Expectations > Personal Retrospections
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.048  0.155 -0.313 0.755
PE Y-Hats    0.614  0.594  1.034** 0.302
PR  0.048  0.037  1.287 0.199
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.137  0.226  0.606 0.545
ECM(1) - F. differenced -0.106  0.181 -0.583 0.561
Election 83  1.346  2.539  0.530 0.597
Election 92  1.707  2.890  0.591 0.555
Falklands War  2.563  4.356  0.588 0.557
Poll Tax -1.630  2.539 -0.642 0.522
Major begins  2.067  3.965  0.521 0.603
Events  0.621  0.982  0.632 0.528
* The personal retropections model does not encompass the
personal expectations model.
** The personal expectations model does not encompass the
personal retrospections model.
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Table 4.10 The J-test for Encompassing - Personal Expectations vs. Retrospections
One-Step Error Correction Model
Personal Retrospections > Personal Expectations
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant  0.420  0.975  0.431 0.667
PR Y-Hats    0.678  0.582  1.165* 0.246
PE  0.037  0.033  1.116 0.266
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.111  0.223  0.498 0.619
Conservative support(1) -0.540  0.113 -0.476 0.635
PMSAT(1)  0.038  0.082  0.465 0.643
Election 83  0.872  2.315  0.377 0.707
Election 92   1.376  2.832  0.486 0.628
Falklands War  1.967  4.201  0.468 0.640
Poll Tax -0.869  2.273 -0.382 0.703
Major begins  1.567  3.621  0.433 0.666
Events  0.569  1.017  0.560 0.576
Personal Expectations > Personal Retrospections
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant  0.409  0.973  0.421 0.674
PE Y-Hats    0.659  0.591  1.116** 0.266
PR  0.043  0.037  1.165 0.246
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.121  0.228  0.534 0.594
Conservative support(1) -0.057  0.115 -0.499 0.618
PMSAT(1)  0.036  0.091  0.396 0.721
Election 83  1.088  2.389  0.456 0.643
Election 92  1.508  2.884  0.523 0.602
Falklands War  2.248  4.311  0.521 0.603
Poll Tax -1.405  2.470 -0.569 0.570
Major begins  1.628  3.649  0.446 0.656
Events  0.570  1.017  0.560 0.576
* The personal retropections model does not encompass the
personal expectations model.
** The personal expectations model does not encompass the
personal retrospections model.
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Table 4.11 The J-test for Encompassing - Model with Fractionally Differenced Error 
Correction Mechanism vs. Model with Level-Form Error Correction Mechanism
Fractionally Differenced ECM > Level-Form ECM
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.008  0.130 -0.062 0.951
ECM FRACDIFF Y-Hats  0.712  0.251  2.832* 0.005
PE  0.013  0.032  0.391 0.696
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.113  0.096  0.177 0.241
ECM(1) -0.095  0.049 -1.938 0.054 
Election 83  1.050  1.497  0.701 0.484
Election 92   1.215  1.680  0.723 0.471
Falklands War  1.747  2.463  0.710 0.479
Poll Tax -0.845  1.509 -0.560 0.576
Major begins  1.281  2.299   0.557 0.578
Events  0.502  0.516  0.973 0.332
Level-Form ECM > Fractionally Differenced ECM
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.078  0.134 -0.587 0.558
ECM LEVEL-FORM Y-Hats  0.539  0.278  1.939** 0.054
PE  0.022  0.033  0.653 0.515
PMSAT - F. differenced  0.174  0.104  1.676 0.095
ECMDF(1) -0.201  0.071 -2.822 0.005
Election 83  1.766  1.551  1.138 0.256
Election 92  1.966  1.763  1.115 0.266
Falklands War  2.889  2.595  1.113 0.267
Poll Tax -1.465  1.567 -0.935 0.351
Major begins  2.622  2.463  1.065 0.288
Events  0.741  0.543  1.364 0.174
* Fractionally differenced ECM encompasses level-form ECM (.01
level).
** Level-form ECM does not encompass fractionally differenced ECM
(.05 level).
185
Table 5.1 Dickey-Fuller and Aumented Dickey-Fuller Results, N=240
Dickey-Fuller Augmented Dickey-Fullera
           Critical Values ß "= .10: -2.57 "= .10: -2.57  
Variable Name ÷ "= .01: -3.46 "= .01: -3.46
"= .05: -2.88 "= .05: -2.88
Presidential Approval                -3.447**                -3.528***
Personal Expectations                -4.832***                -3.474***
Personal Retrospections                -3.479***                -2.270
National Expectations                -4.019***                -3.007**
National Retrospections                -1.823                -2.350
 taken to three lags.a
* reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .01 level.
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Table 5.2 Variance Ratio Test Results, N=240
Differencing
Interval (k)   R(2) R(4)  R(8) R(16) R(32)
             ß
a a
Critical "=.05:
Values ß 1.157 2.170 3.578b




Presidential   0.937   1.666   2.379
Approval
  0.959   1.217
Personal   1.583**   5.770**   8.150**
Expects.
  2.084**   3.984**
Personal   1.634**   3.924**   4.554**
Retrospecs.
  2.128**   3.438**
National   1.283**   3.152**   4.155**
Expects.
  1.636**   2.139**
National   0.848   0.781   0.980
Retrospecs.
  0.670   0.775
* reject null hypothesis of Random walk with drift at the .10 level in a one-sided test.
** reject null hypothesis of Random walk with drift at the .05 level in a one-sided test.
 The recommended differencing intervals are K=4 or k=8 (Diebold, 1989:38).a
 Critical values are given in Diebold (1989:33-35).b
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Table 5.3 KPSS Test for Strong Mixing with Intercept (0 ), N=240µ
Lag Trunc.
Parameter l=0 l=2 l=4 l=6 l=8
ß
Variable ÷   
a
Presidential  2.176***  0.796***  0.400*  0.333
Approval
 0.519**
Personal  3.853***  2.329***  1.146***  0.933***
Expects.
 1.510***
Personal  5.025***  1.820***  0.837***  0.667**
Retrospecs.
 1.137***
National  2.743***  1.025***  0.500**  0.412*
Expects.
 0.659**
National  2.761***  0.955***  0.442*  0.357*
Retrospecs.
 0.595**
Critical Values: p<.1: .347; p<.05: .463; p<.01: .739.
* reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .01 level.
 Recommended lag trucation (l) is given by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shina
(1992:169-73); l = integer[4(T/100) ] = 4 for these series..25
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Parameter l=0 l=2 l=4 l=6 l=8
ß
Variable ÷   
a
Presidential  1.539***  0.563***  0.283***  0.236***
Approval
 0.367***
Personal  2.250***  0.898***  0.454***  0.372***
Expects.
 0.592***
Personal  2.766***  1.014***  0.469***  0.374***
Retrospecs.
 0.637***
National  1.854***  0.695***  0.338***  0.279***
Expects.
 0.446***
National  1.742***  0.602***  0.279***  0.225***
Retrospecs.
 0.376***
Critical Values: p<.1: .119; p<.05: .146; p<.01: .216.
* reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .10 level.
** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of stationary, strong mixing process at the .01 level.
 Recommended lag trucation (l) is given by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shina
(1992:169-73); l = integer[4(T/100) ] = 4 for these series..25
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Table 5.5 Summary of Stationarity Tests,* N=240




H(0) ß d=1 d=1 d=0 d=0              
Variable ÷   with trend
Presidential Reject  d=1 d=1 Reject No trend 0<d#1
Approval d=0
Personal Reject Reject Reject No trend 0<d<1
Expects. d=1 d=1 d=0
Personal Reject Reject Reject No trend 0<d<1
Retrospecs. d=1 d=1 d=0
National Reject Reject Reject No trend 0<d<1
Expects. d=1 d=1 d=0
National d=1 d=1 Reject No trend d = 1
Retrospecs. d=0
* All at .05 level of significance.
Differencing interval R(4), R(8).a 
 Lag truncation parameter=4.b
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Table 5.6  Estimates of d Based on Robinson’s and Sowell’s Procedures, N=240
VARIABLE Robinson’s Sowell’s T-stat  T-stat
d estimate d estimate (dû0) (dû1)
(s.e.) (s.e.)
a a
Presidential Approval 0.94 0.97 16.71** -1.07
(0.056) (0.060)
Personal Economic 0.66 0.60 11.73** -6.04**
Expectations (0.056) (0.050)
Personal Economic 0.75 0.64 13.33** -5.64**
Retrospections (0.056) (0.045)
National Economic 0.73 0.72 12.98** -4.80**
Expectations (0.056) (0.052)




 based on Robinson’s procedure.a
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Table 5.7 Stationarity Tests for the Residuals of Cointegrating Regressions with 
Presidential Approval (d=.94 (s.e.=.056)), N=240
Independent Var. Residuals’ d Dickey-Fuller Regression Series’ d
Value ValueTest Coeffiecient
Statistic* (s.e.) (s.e.)
Personal Economic 0.91 -3.54*** 0.44 0.66
Expectations (0.056) (0.062) (0.056)
+
Personal Economic 0.88 -3.77*** 0.34 0.75
Retrospections (0.056) (0.049) (0.056)
+
National Economic 0.91 -3.29** 0.23 0.73
Expectations (0.056) (0.037) (0.056)
+
National Economic 0.94 -3.42** 0.07 0.89
Retrospections (0.056) (0.019) (0.056)
+
* critical values are "= .10: -2.57, "= .05: -2.88, and "= .01: -3.46.
** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .05 level.
*** reject the null hypothesis of unit-root process at the .01 level.
 statistically significant at the .01 level.+
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Table 5.8 Presidential Approval - Multivariate ARFIMA Models, N=239
Pers. Expect. Pers. Retro. Nat. Expect. Nat. Retro.
Constant -0.297 (0.22) -0.264 (0.22) -0.291 (0.21) -0.259 (0.21)
Pers. Expect. 0.122 (0.05)*
Pers. Retro. 0.042 (0.04)
Nat. Expect. 0.121 (0.03)**
Nat. Retro. 0.081 (0.02)**
Iran Rescue 10.246 (3.32)** 10.170 (3.36)** 9.817 (3.24)** 10.757 (3.27)**
Iran Resc. (1) 13.288 (3.32)** 13.825 (3.36)** 14.223 (3.24)** 13.536 (3.27)**
Hostages -8.432 (2.35)** -7.978 (2.37)** -7.876 (2.29)** -8.107 (2.31)**
Reagan 12.022 (2.71)** 12.693 (2.73)** 11.832 (2.64)** 12.396 (2.66)**
Assassination 7.498 (2.36)** 7.301 (2.39)** 7.453 (2.31)** 7.439 (2.33)**
Iran-Contra -11.64 (2.71)** -12.32 (2.73)** -11.15 (2.70)** -12.17 (2.66)**
Bush 4.580 (1.71)** 4.047 (1.74)* 4.824 (1.67)** 4.965 (1.69)**
Tienanmen 10.543 (2.41)** 10.435 (2.44)** 10.752 (2.35)** 10.286 (2.38)**
Desert Storm 23.139 (3.31)** 23.812 (3.36)** 21.912 (3.25)** 23.159 (3.26)**
Events 2.463 (0.36)** 2.413 (0.37)** 2.538 (0.35)** 2.417 (0.36)**
R-Square 0.478 0.466 .503 0.493
Sum of 2486.1 2543.5 2368.8 2414.7
Resids
Durbin-Watson 1.87 1.85 1.95 1.94
Q(36-0) 39.6 36.7 47.2 40.2
Coefficients are shown - standard errors are in parenthesis.
* significant at .05 level - one tail test.      ** significant at .01 level - one tail test.
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Table 5.9 National Prospections Models - Various Specifications, N=239
All Variables Interventions All Variables
Fractionally Wholly Differenced Wholly Differenced
Differenced
Constant -0.291 (0.21) -0.221 (0.21) -0.185 (0.21)
Nat. Expect. 0.121 (0.03)** 0.124 (0.03)** 0.088 (0.023)**
Iran Rescue 9.817 (3.24)** 9.873 (3.27)** 10.046 (3.28)**
Iran Resc. (1) 14.223 (3.24)** 14.877 (3.27)** 14.236 (3.28)**
Hostages -7.876 (2.29)** -7.261 (2.31)** -7.794 (2.31)**
Reagan 11.832 (2.64)** 11.725 (2.67)** 12.039 (2.68)**
Assassination 7.453 (2.31)** 7.269 (2.30)** 7.112 (2.31)**
Iran-Contra -11.15 (2.70)** -11.10 (2.68)** -11.21 (2.69)**
Bush 4.824 (1.67)** 4.765 (1.64)** 4.839 (1.64)**
Tienanmen 10.752 (2.35)** 10.416 (2.31)** 10.719 (2.31)**
Desert Storm 21.912 (3.25)** 22.152 (3.28)** 22.381 (3.30)**
Events 2.538 (0.35)** 2.411 (0.35)** 2.487 (0.35)**
R-Square .503 .494 .491
Sum of Resids 2368.8 2411.7 2423.8
Durbin-Watson 1.95 1.95 2.01
Q(36-0) 47.2 46.8 43.4
Coefficients are shown - standard errors are in parenthesis.
* significant at .05 level - one tail test.      ** significant at .01 level - one tail test.
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Table 5.10  The J-test for Encompassing - National Expectations vs. Personal
Expectations
National Expectations > Personal Expectations
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.045  0.220 -0.204 0.838
Nat. Expects. Y-Hats  0.913  0.228  4.010* 0.000
Pers. Expects.  0.063  0.049  1.273 0.204
Iran Rescue  0.928  3.966  0.234 0.815
Iran Rescue (1)  1.008  4.441  0.227 0.821 
Hostages -0.900  2.951 -0.305 0.761
Reagan   0.766  3.843  0.200 0.842
Assassination  0.669  2.851  0.235 0.815
Iran-Contra -0.737  3.781 -0.195 0.846
Bush  0.536  1.940  0.277 0.782
Tienanmen  0.978  3.338  0.293 0.770
Desert Storm  1.875  6.199  0.302 0.763
Events  0.222  0.660  0.337 0.736
Personal Expectations > National Expectations
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.155  0.237 -0.655 0.513
Pers. Expects. Y-Hats  0.524  0.409  1.281** 0.201
Nat. Expects.  0.108  0.030  3.595 0.000
Iran Rescue  4.529  5.244  0.864 0.389
Iran Rescue (1)  7.018  6.489  1.082 0.281 
Hostages -3.679  3.994 -0.921 0.358
Reagan   5.267  5.757  0.917 0.360
Assassination  3.546  3.821  0.928 0.354
Iran-Contra -4.827  5.597 -0.862 0.389
Bush  2.535  2.445  1.037 0.301
Tienanmen  5.267  4.885  1.078 0.282
Desert Storm  9.780 10.012  0.977 0.330
Events  1.250  1.067  1.169 0.244
* The national expectations encompasses the personal expectations
model (.01 level).
** The personal expectations model does not encompass the
national expectations model (.05 level).
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Table 5.11  The J-Test for Encompassing - National Expectations vs. National
Retrospections
National Expectations > National Retrospections
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.055  0.219 -0.250 0.803
Nat. Expects. Y-Hats  0.797  0.250  3.193* 0.002
Nat. Retrospects.  0.041  0.025  1.631 0.104
Iran Rescue  2.360  4.149  0.569 0.570
Iran Rescue (1)  2.712  4.666  0.581 0.562 
Hostages -1.662  3.034 -0.548 0.584
Reagan   2.425  4.069  0.596 0.552
Assassination  1.529   2.949  0.518 0.605
Iran-Contra -2.430  4.014 -0.605 0.546
Bush  1.222  2.032  0.601 0.548
Tienanmen  2.049  3.476  0.590 0.556
Desert Storm  4.599  6.636  0.693 0.489
Events  0.481  0.700  0.688 0.492
National Retrospections > National Expectations
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.139  0.227 -0.613 0.540
Nat. Retros. Y-Hats  0.565  0.313  1.805** 0.072
Nat. Expectations  0.091  0.033  2.776 0.006
Iran Rescue  4.161  4.495  0.926 0.356
Iran Rescue (1)  6.375  5.413  1.178 0.240 
Hostages -3.373  3.378 -0.999 0.319
Reagan   4.876  4.664  1.046 0.297
Assassination  3.241  3.272  0.991 0.323
Iran-Contra -4.485  4.535 -0.989 0.324
Bush  2.280  2.180  1.046 0.297
Tienanmen  4.790  4.049  1.183 0.238
Desert Storm  9.038  7.832  1.154 0.250
Events  1.134  0.854  1.329 0.185
* The national expectations encompasses the national
retrospections model (.01 level).
** The national retrospections model does not encompass the
national expectations model (.05 level).
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Table 5.12  The J-test for Encompassing - Wholly Differenced Interventions vs.
Fractionally Differenced Interventions - National Expectations Models
Wholly Differenced > Fractionally Differenced
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant -0.844  0.382 -2.208 0.028
Wholly Diff. Y-Hats -1.887  1.088 -1.734* 0.084
Nat. Expectations  0.348  0.134  2.592 0.010
Iran Rescue 28.480 11.237  2.534 0.012
Iran Rescue (1) 41.078 15.822  2.596 0.010 
Hostages     -21.949  8.431 -2.603 0.010
Reagan  33.237 12.623  2.633 0.009
Assassination 20.978  8.131  2.580 0.011
Iran-Contra     -31.637 12.110 -2.612 0.010
Bush 14.044  5.572  2.520 0.012
Tienanmen 30.971 11.895  2.604 0.010
Desert Storm 63.684 24.309  2.620 0.009
Events  7.216  2.721  2.652 0.009
Fractionally Differenced > Wholly Differenced
Variable Coeff. Std. E. T-Stat Signif.
constant  0.428  0.315  1.359 0.176
Fraction. Diff. Y-Hats  2.973  1.077  2.760** 0.006
Nat. Expectations -0.245  0.137 -1.792 0.074
Iran Rescue     -19.084 10.976 -1.739 0.083
Iran Rescue (1)     -29.003 16.223 -1.788 0.075 
Hostages 15.484  8.550  1.811 0.071
Reagan      -24.334 13.329 -1.826 0.069
Assassination     -15.096  8.417 -1.734 0.074
Iran-Contra 22.513 12.462  1.807 0.072
Bush -9.209  5.315 -1.733 0.085
Tienanmen     -20.619 11.474 -1.797 0.074
Desert Storm     -42.686 23.717 -1.800 0.073
Events -4.917  2.677 -1.836 0.068
* The wholly differenced intervention model does not encompass
the fractionally differenced intervention model (.05 level).
** The fractionally differenced intervention model encompasses
































Coefficient 0.065 0.064 0.060 0.057 0.051 0.044 0.036 0.029 0.022 0.016
Standard Error 0.082 0.080 0.076 0.071 0.063 0.055 0.045 0.036 0.028 0.020
Ave. T-Stat 0.793 0.800 0.789 0.803 0.810 0.800 0.800 0.806 0.786 0.800
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0















































* Line indicates distribution of standard errors in
 Simulation 1 and control experiment.





















* Line indicates distribution of Durbin-Watson statistics
 in Simulation 1 and control experiment.






















* Line indicates distribution of Durbin-Watson statistics
 in Simulation 1 and control experiment.





















* Line indicates distribution of Durbin-Watson statistics
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